Dieng v. Holder

09-3396-ag Dieng v. Holder BIA Weisel, IJ A093 451 733 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. 1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals 2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan 3 United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of 4 New York, on the 22nd day of October, two thousand ten. 5 6 PRESENT: 7 JOSEPH M. McLAUGHLIN, 8 JOSÉ A. CABRANES, 9 RICHARD C. WESLEY, 10 Circuit Judges. 11 _______________________________________ 12 13 IBRAHIMA DIENG, ALSO KNOWN AS DIENG 14 IBRAHIMA, 15 Petitioner, 16 17 v. 09-3396-ag 18 NAC 19 ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., UNITED STATES 20 ATTORNEY GENERAL 21 Respondent. 22 ______________________________________ 23 24 FOR PETITIONER: Brian I. Kaplan, Goldberg & Kaplan, 25 LLP, New York, New York. 26 27 FOR RESPONDENT: Tony West, Assistant Attorney 28 General; Cindy S. Ferrier, Senior 29 Litigation Counsel; R. Alexander 30 Goring, Trial Attorney, Office of 31 Immigration Litigation, Civil 32 Division, United States Department 33 of Justice, Washington, D.C. 1 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a 2 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby 3 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review 4 is DENIED. 5 Petitioner Ibrahima Dieng, a native and citizen of 6 Senegal, seeks review of a July 17, 2009, order of the BIA 7 affirming the July 7, 2008, decision of Immigration Judge 8 (“IJ”) Robert D. Weisel denying Dieng’s application for 9 asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the 10 Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Ibrahima Dieng, 11 No. A093 451 733 (B.I.A. July 17, 2009), aff’g No. A093 451 12 733 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City July 7, 2008). We assume the 13 parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and 14 procedural history in this case. 15 Under the circumstances of this case, we review the 16 IJ’s decision as supplemented by the BIA’s decision. See 17 Yan Chen v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268, 271 (2d Cir. 2005). The 18 applicable standards of review are well-established. 19 See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Salimatou Bah v. Mukasey, 529 20 F.3d 99, 110 (2d Cir. 2008). 21 Although Dieng asserts that he has suffered 22 “persecution” and “torture,” based on his and his family’s 2 1 experience in Senegal, he does not meaningfully challenge 2 the agency’s determination that he failed to establish past 3 persecution. As the agency noted, and Dieng does not 4 dispute, Dieng was never harmed or mistreated while in 5 Senegal. His sole argument for past persecution is entirely 6 based on the suffering and killing of his family members 7 because of their suspected support for the MFDC. However, 8 “[a]s a general principle, an asylum applicant cannot claim 9 past persecution based solely on harm that was inflicted on 10 a family member on account of that family member’s political 11 opinion or other protected characteristic.” Tao Jiang v. 12 Gonzales, 500 F.3d 137, 141 (2d Cir. 2007). Although we 13 have recognized that there may exist circumstances where 14 harm to an applicant’s family member in conjunction with 15 other factors may be sufficiently severe to amount to past 16 persecution, such as a young child witnessing severe harm to 17 their family members, see Jorge-Tzoc v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 18 146, 150 (2d Cir. 2006), such circumstances do not exist 19 here. Accordingly, no presumption applies and Dieng was 20 required to establish that he had a well-founded fear of 21 future persecution. 3 1 Substantial evidence supports the agency’s conclusion 2 that Dieng failed to establish a likelihood of persecution 3 upon his return to Senegal. Although Dieng argues that the 4 IJ failed to consider his testimony and evidence concerning 5 the persecution of MFDC members, the record does not compel 6 this conclusion. See Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 7 471 F.3d 315, 337 n.17 (2d Cir. 2006). Indeed, the IJ 8 credited Dieng’s testimony that his relatives were killed by 9 the Senegalese authorities because of their perceived 10 support for the MFDC, but found that: (1) Dieng was not a 11 member of the MFDC; (2) Dieng did not participate in MFDC 12 activities; (3) Dieng was never threatened by the Senegalese 13 authorities at the time his relatives were killed; and 14 (4) despite Dieng’s testimony that Senegalese authorities 15 questioned his wife about his whereabouts, there was no 16 indication that the authorities were interested in him 17 because of his perceived involvement with the MFDC. As the 18 record supports these findings, the IJ reasonably found that 19 Dieng had not met his burden of establishing a likelihood of 20 persecution upon his return to Senegal. 21 Dieng’s argument that the deaths of his relatives 22 establish that he too will be persecuted because of his 4 1 perceived support for the MFDC is not supported by the 2 record. As the IJ explained, Dieng himself was not involved 3 with the MFDC and did not submit evidence to show that the 4 government has particular suspicions of his involvement. 5 His statements that soldiers have occupied his house and 6 government authorities have asked his wife whether he is in 7 the country do not compel the inference that the government 8 now suspects Dieng of involvement with the MFDC. See Siewe 9 v. Gonzales, 480 F.3d 160, 167 (2d Cir. 2007) (“Where the 10 evidence would support either of competing inferences, the 11 fact that this Court might have drawn one inference does not 12 entitle it to overturn the trial court’s choice of the 13 other.”). Accordingly, substantial evidence supports the 14 IJ’s conclusion that Dieng failed to establish a likelihood 15 of persecution if he returned to Senegal. 16 Finally, because Dieng’s claim for CAT relief was based 17 on the same factual predicate as his claim for withholding 18 of removal, the agency did not err in denying CAT relief. 19 See Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156 (2d Cir. 2006). 20 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is 21 DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of 22 removal that the Court previously granted in this petition 5 1 is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in 2 this petition is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for 3 oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with 4 Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second 5 Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b). 6 FOR THE COURT: 7 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk 8 9 6