[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10-11815 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
Non-Argument Calendar OCTOBER 25, 2010
________________________ JOHN LEY
CLERK
D.C. Docket No. 1:09-cr-00181-KD-M-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
RAYFORD JAMES WILLIAMS, JR.,
lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Alabama
________________________
(October 25, 2010)
Before TJOFLAT, BARKETT and WILSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Rayford James Williams, Jr. appeals his convictions and 70-month sentence
for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
922(g)(1), and for possession of crack cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 844(a).
The charges arose when law enforcement officials executing a search warrant
found a semi-automatic pistol and crack cocaine in the bedroom where Williams
was sleeping. On appeal, Williams argues that the government failed to produce
sufficient evidence to sustain either conviction because it failed to show that he
knowingly possessed the firearm or the crack cocaine. He also argues that his
sentence was unreasonable because the district court failed to properly consider
the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors and thus imposed a sentence that was greater than
necessary to accomplish the purposes of federal sentencing. After careful review,
we affirm.
First, the government presented sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude
beyond a reasonable doubt that Williams knowingly possessed the firearm.1 To
establish knowing possession, the government “need only show constructive
possession . . . [which] exists when the defendant exercises ownership, dominion,
or control over the item or has the power and intent to exercise dominion or
1
To obtain a conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm, the government must
prove that (1) the defendant was a convicted felon, (2) the defendant was in knowing possession
of a firearm, and (3) the firearm was in or affecting interstate commerce. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1);
United States v. Beckles, 565 F.3d 832, 841 (11th Cir. 2009). Because the parties stipulated at
the beginning of trial to Williams’ status as a convicted felon and the firearm’s effect on
interstate commerce, the only issue before the jury was whether Williams knowingly possessed
the firearm.
2
control.” United States v. Beckles, 565 F.3d 832, 841 (11 th Cir. 2009) (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted). The government presented evidence that
the firearm was found two feet from Williams in the bedroom of the residence
where he lived with his girlfriend, Letitia Jackson, and their child. Jackson also
testified that Williams had referred to his new “iron” while patting the bag in
which the firearm was later discovered, had told her after they were arrested that
they were done for if the police found the “Tech,”2 and had written her a letter
from jail asking her to testify that he only visited their residence from time to time.
The jury was entitled to credit Jackson’s testimony and conclude that Williams
constructively possessed the firearm, and was thus guilty of violating 18 U.S.C. §
922(g)(1).
The government also presented sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude
beyond a reasonable doubt that Williams knowingly possessed crack cocaine. As
in the case of the firearm possession offense, the government need only prove that
Williams constructively possessed the crack cocaine to obtain a conviction.
United States v. Hernandez, 433 F.3d 1328, 1333 (11th Cir. 2005). At trial, the
government presented evidence that the crack cocaine was found in the bedroom
where Williams was sleeping next to personal items belonging to him. This
2
The semi-automatic pistol at issue was an Intratec, Model AB-10, 9mm handgun.
3
evidence, along with the evidence that Williams lived at the residence and
Jackson’s testimony that she did not know that the drugs were there, was sufficient
for the jury to reasonably conclude that Williams constructively possessed the
crack cocaine, and was thus guilty of violating 21 U.S.C. § 844(a). Therefore, we
affirm Williams’s convictions.
We also conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by
sentencing Williams to 70 months imprisonment, the low end of his sentencing
guidelines range.3 Williams argues that his sentence was procedurally and
substantively unreasonable because the district court failed to properly consider
the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors – specifically § 3553(a)(1), which requires
consideration of the history and characteristics of the defendant – by not
considering Williams’s mental health history and the physical and emotional abuse
he was subjected to by his father, which he contends resulted in a sentence greater
than necessary to accomplish the purposes of federal sentencing. However, the
record shows that the district court heard argument by counsel on Williams’s
mental health history and history of abuse and considered the § 3553(a) factors,
including Williams’s history and characteristics, and thus committed no
3
Williams does not challenge the district court’s calculation of his sentencing guidelines
range.
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procedural error.
Nor is Williams’s sentence substantively unreasonable. The district court
explained that a downward variance from the sentencing guidelines range would
be inappropriate due to the seriousness of the offense – including the presence of a
child in the home with the firearm and drugs, and Williams’s attempt to suborn
perjury from Jackson – Williams’s criminal history, and the likelihood of
recidivism. Williams’s 70-month sentence, at the low end of his guidelines range,
falls within the range of reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of the case.
Therefore, we affirm Williams’s sentence.
AFFIRMED.
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