UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 09-4113
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
WILLIE TERRANCE BATTS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Wilmington. James C. Fox, Senior
District Judge. (5:08-cr-00120-F-1)
Submitted: October 14, 2010 Decided: October 27, 2010
Before WILKINSON, GREGORY, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, G. Alan DuBois,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, James E. Todd, Jr., Research
and Writing Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant.
George E. B. Holding, United States Attorney, Anne M. Hayes,
Jennifer P. May-Parker, Assistant United States Attorneys,
Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM
Willie Batts appeals his conviction and 120-month
sentence for possession of a firearm after having been convicted
of a felony, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924 (2006).
We affirm.
Batts challenges two rulings of the district court.
Specifically, he contends the court improperly limited the scope
of cross-examination of a witness and improperly limited closing
argument.
A district court’s determination as to the scope of
cross-examination is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See
United States v. Scheetz, 293 F.3d 175, 184 (4th Cir. 2002). A
district court has “wide latitude . . . to impose reasonable
limits on . . . cross-examination based on concerns about, among
other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues,
the witness’ safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only
marginally relevant.” United States v. Smith, 441 F.3d 254, 266
(4th Cir. 2006) (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673,
679 (1987)).
After reviewing the record, we conclude that the
district court did not abuse its discretion in limiting the
scope of cross-examination. Batts’s attorney sought to elicit
testimony from a police detective regarding the motivation
behind a recently enacted North Carolina statute requiring
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police interviews with homicide suspects to be recorded
electronically. The question was not relevant to Batts’s case
and any answer would have been utterly speculative. Moreover,
the district court allowed Batts’s counsel to argue (and she did
in fact argue) that the jury did not have to accord the same
weight to the written statement prepared by a police detective
to memorialize Batts’s confession as it would give to an
electronic recording of Batts’s confession. We conclude the
district court did not abuse its discretion.
“The district court is afforded broad discretion in
controlling closing arguments and is only to be reversed when
there is a clear abuse of its discretion. ‘A reversal may be
required where counsel is restricted within unreasonable
bounds.’” See United States v. Wills, 346 F.3d 476, 491-92
(4th Cir. 2003) (citing United States v. Rhynes, 196 F.3d 207,
236 (4th Cir. 1999)). Here too, we find no abuse of discretion.
Batts’s attorney sought to argue that the state’s decision not
to charge Batts was relevant to explain why he may have made a
false confession. However, because there was no evidence that
police told Batts he would not be charged, there is no logical
link between the state’s charging decision and Batts’s
expectations at the time he confessed. We find that the
district court could properly conclude that such an argument
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would have been irrelevant or confusing to the jury, and did not
abuse its discretion by excluding it. *
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district
court. We dispense with oral argument as the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
*
In any event, in light of the overwhelming evidence
supporting the jury’s verdict, we would readily conclude that
any error by the district court in either of its challenged
rulings was harmless.
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