FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION OCT 27 2010
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 09-30055
Plaintiff - Appellee, D.C. No. 3:06-CR-00357-BR-1
v.
MEMORANDUM*
ROBERT LEE WINGFIELD,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Oregon
Anna J. Brown, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted July 7, 2010**
San Francisco, California
Before: HUG, SKOPIL and BEEZER, Circuit Judges.
Defendant-appellant Robert Wingfield (“Wingfield”) appeals from a final
judgment convicting him of one count of bank robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 2113(a), and one count of possession of a destructive device, in violation of 26
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
U.S.C. § 5861(d). Wingfield pleaded guilty to the crimes with a plea agreement,
and the district court sentenced him to 108 months imprisonment, 22 months less
than the low end of the applicable guidelines range. Wingfield argues on appeal
that the government breached the terms of the plea agreement and that the district
court abused its discretion by applying a particular sentence enhancement.
We have jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we
affirm.
The facts of this case are known to the parties. We do not repeat them.
I
Our “standard of review for a district court’s determination concerning an
alleged breach of a plea agreement [is] ‘inconsistent.’” United States v.
Franco-Lopez, 312 F.3d 984, 988 (9th Cir. 2002). We have reviewed such
determinations under both a de novo standard and the more deferential clearly
erroneous standard. Id. (citations omitted).
We review “the district court’s application of the Sentencing Guidelines to
the facts of [a] case for abuse of discretion.” United States v. Stoterau, 524 F.3d
988, 997 (9th Cir. 2008).
2
II
Regardless of the standard of review that we apply, the district court
properly concluded that the government has complied with the terms of the plea
agreement.
“Plea agreements . . . are measured by contract law standards.”
Franco-Lopez, 312 F.3d at 989. Courts construe ambiguities in the plea agreement
against the government and will use the defendant’s reasonable beliefs at the time
of pleading to construe the agreement. Id.
Here, the plea agreement states: “The government will take no position on
the applicability of the § 2K2.1(b)(6) enhancement, but defendant understands that
the government is obliged to fully apprise the court of all relevant facts.” The
government subsequently stated in its sentencing memoranda that “the Court must
impose either the [§ 2K2.1(b)(6) enhancement] or alternatively the two-level multi-
count adjustment under USSG § 3D1.4, but not both.”
In so doing, the government complied with the terms of the plea agreement.
The government’s sentencing memoranda expressly explained that it was taking no
position on whether § 2K2.1(b)(6) applied, and the government clearly stated that
it recommended the exact same sentence regardless of whether the court applied
§ 2K2.1(b)(6). The sentence that Wingfield objects to is simply the government’s
3
clarification of the sentencing framework, depending on whether the district court
applied or refused to apply the enhancement. Wingfield could not reasonably have
believed that the plea agreement prohibited the government from mentioning
§ 2K2.1(b)(6) in this fashion. See Franco-Lopez, 312 F.3d at 989.
III
Wingfield also argues that the district court abused its discretion by applying
a sentence enhancement for obstruction of justice pursuant to USSG § 3C1.2.1
This argument is unconvincing. The district court acted well within its discretion
in concluding that a “substantial cause” for Wingfield’s evading the police was to
avoid detection for the convicted crimes. United States v. Duran, 37 F.3d 557, 560
(9th Cir. 1994).
AFFIRMED.
1
The government argues that Wingfield waived appeal of this issue
according to the terms of the plea agreement. We disagree. The plea agreement
expressly reserves Wingfield’s right to appeal “on grounds of reasonableness of the
sentence.” If, as Wingfield argues, the district court had applied the enhancement
without any factual support, the sentence would be presumptively unreasonable.
4