Ahanchian v. Xenon Pictures, Inc.

FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

AMIR CYRUS AHANCHIAN, an 
individual,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 08-56667
XENON PICTURES, INC., a Delaware  D.C. No.
2:07-cv-06295-
corporation; CKRUSH, INC., a
Delaware corporation; SAM JFW-E
MACCARONE, an individual;
PRESTON LACY, an individual,
Defendants-Appellees.


AMIR CYRUS AHANCHIAN, an 
individual,
Plaintiff-Appellant, No. 08-56906
v. D.C. No.
XENON PICTURES, INC., a California  2:07-cv-06295-
corporation; CKRUSH INC., a JFW-E
Delaware corporation; SAM
MACCARONE, an individual; OPINION
PRESTON LACY, an individual,
Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
John F. Walter, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted
February 2, 2010—Pasadena, California

Filed November 3, 2010

18133
18134 AHANCHIAN v. XENON PICTURES, INC.
Before: Andrew J. Kleinfeld, Kim McLane Wardlaw and
Consuelo M. Callahan, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Wardlaw
 AHANCHIAN v. XENON PICTURES, INC. 18137

COUNSEL

Jeffrey Jay Daar, Daar & Newman, PC, Los Angeles, Califor-
nia, for the plaintiff-appellant, Amir Cyrus Ahanchian.

Leonard S. Machtinger, Kenoff & Machtinger, LLP, Los
Angeles, California; Richard L. Charnley, Terry Anastassiou
and Ernest E. Price, Ropers, Majeski, Kohn, & Bentley, Los
Angeles, California, for the defendants-appellees.

OPINION

WARDLAW, Circuit Judge:

Procedure “is a means to an end, not an end in itself—the
‘handmaid rather than the mistress’ of justice.” Charles E.
Clark, History, Systems and Functions of Pleading, 11 Va. L.
Rev. 517, 542 (1925). While district courts enjoy a wide lati-
tude of discretion in case management, this discretion is cir-
cumscribed by the courts’ overriding obligation to construe
and administer the procedural rules so as “to secure the just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and
proceeding.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 1. These consolidated appeals
arise from a district court’s refusal to exercise discretion con-
sistent with the dictates of Rule 1.

Amir Cyrus Ahanchian’s counsel moved for a one-week
extension of time to file his opposition to defendants’ sum-
mary judgment motion, citing as good cause: (1) the
extremely short eight day response deadline (with three of
those days falling over a federal holiday weekend) created by
the combination of an unusual local rule and defendants’ liti-
18138 AHANCHIAN v. XENON PICTURES, INC.
gation tactics; (2) his preplanned absence, beginning the day
defendants filed the motions, in fulfillment of an out-of-state
commitment; and (3) the large number of supporting exhibits
attached to defendants’ motion. Defense counsel, without
regard to the previous professional courtesies extended to him
by Ahanchian’s counsel, vigorously opposed the extension.
Despite the presence of what most reasonable jurists would
regard as good cause and the absence of prejudice to anyone,
the district court denied the motion. Even so, Ahanchian’s
counsel managed to file the opposition, albeit three days late,
due to a calendaring mistake and computer problems, along
with a motion asking that the district court accept the late-
filed opposition. Five days later, the district court construed
that motion as one for reconsideration under Rule 60(b), and,
applying an incorrect legal standard, denied it. That same day,
having plaintiff’s opposition in hand, but refusing to consider
it, the district court granted defendants’ motion for summary
judgment, failing to provide any legal reasoning or citation to
law or facts.1 To add injury to insult, the district court
awarded defense counsel $247,171.32 in attorneys’ fees. We
conclude that the district court abused its discretion in deny-
ing both the request for an extension of time and the motion
to accept the late-filed opposition, and erred in granting
defendants’ motion for summary judgment and in awarding
attorneys’ fees to defense counsel.
1
Ahanchian does not argue that we should reverse the district court for
its failure to provide any reasoning in its order granting summary judg-
ment. However, we have held this alone is reversible error, because it pre-
cludes us from conducting a meaningful review of the district court’s
order. See Gov’t Employees Ins. Co. v. Dizol, 133 F.3d 1220, 1225 (9th
Cir. 1998) (en banc) (noting that remand is appropriate where the district
court fails to “make a sufficient record of its reasoning to enable appellate
review”). Nonetheless, we have reviewed the district court record in its
entirety and reverse in part and affirm in part the award of summary judg-
ment in the memorandum disposition filed concurrently with this opinion.
We also vacate the award of attorneys’ fees.
 AHANCHIAN v. XENON PICTURES, INC. 18139
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

These appeals arise from the creation of the movie National
Lampoon’s TV: The Movie, theatrically released in November
2006. Unlike traditional films, this movie eschews plot or
character development, instead lampooning several high pro-
file television programs in a series of independent comedic
skits. This lawsuit involves the disputed authorship of a num-
ber of these skits. Ahanchian claims that ten skits he authored
(and subsequently copyrighted) either appear verbatim in the
movie or serve as the basis for skits included in the final ver-
sion of the movie.

Ahanchian filed a complaint on September 17, 2007 against
Sam Maccarone (director and writer of the film), Preston
Lacy (writer and actor), Xenon Pictures, Inc. (distributor), and
CKrush, Inc. (producer) asserting causes of action for copy-
right infringement, breach of an implied contract, and unfair
competition in violation of the Lanham Act. Apparently, Mac-
carone and Lacy were difficult to locate. Defense counsel for
Xenon Pictures, who had been appointed by the district court
to represent Maccarone and Lacy, sought additional time to
answer Ahanchian’s complaint on their behalf. Exhibiting the
professional courtesy expected of officers of the court,
Ahanchian’s counsel stipulated to an extension of time—
which stipulation the district court then rejected.

On January 7, 2008, the district court issued its scheduling
order establishing, among other deadlines: November 18,
2008, as the date for the commencement of trial; September
2, 2008, as the discovery cut-off date; and September 15,
2008, as the last day for hearing motions. Maccarone and
Lacy did not file their answer to the complaint until June 30,
2008. Because of Maccarone and Lacy’s late entrance into the
litigation, the parties entered into a joint stipulation on July 9,
2008, seeking to extend by twelve weeks all the deadlines
established by the scheduling order to allow more time for
discovery. The district court again denied the stipulated exten-
18140 AHANCHIAN v. XENON PICTURES, INC.
sion of time, finding that the parties had failed to demonstrate
good cause as to why discovery could not be completed by
September 2, 2008.

Because the district court’s scheduling order set September
15, 2008, as the last day for hearing motions, the local rules
in force at the time made August 25, 2008, the last date to file
any motion for summary judgment. See C.D. Cal. Local R. 6-
1 (2008) (requiring that any motion be filed within twenty-
one days before the hearing date). Though there is no indica-
tion in the record that they did so, the defendants assert that
they informed Ahanchian’s counsel on August 6, 2008, that
they would be filing a motion for summary judgment. On
August 25, 2008, the last possible day for filing, the defen-
dants moved for summary judgment seeking dismissal of all
of Ahanchian’s claims and for terminating sanctions resulting
from a discovery dispute. These motions were accompanied
by roughly 1,000 pages of supporting exhibits and declara-
tions. Because the defendants chose to wait until the last day
to file their motions, the local rules operated to set a deadline
of September 2, 2008—the day after Labor Day—for
Ahanchian to review these materials and to prepare and file
his oppositions. Ahanchian, therefore, was left with a mere
eight days, three over the Labor Day weekend, to draft his
oppositions to the motions. See C.D. Cal. Local R. 7-9 (2008)
(requiring any opposition to be filed no later than fourteen
days before the hearing date); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a)(1)(c)
(extending deadlines by an additional day where a deadline
would otherwise fall on a holiday). Also, Ahanchian’s lead
counsel was scheduled to travel out of state on August 25 to
fulfil a previously-scheduled commitment.2

Given the already unreasonably strained deadlines, within
which fell an out-of-state commitment and Labor Day week-
2
On appeal, Ahanchian’s counsel revealed that his trip was required
because he was serving as a duly-elected California state delegate to a
major political party’s national convention. See Cal. Elec. Code § 6201.
 AHANCHIAN v. XENON PICTURES, INC. 18141
end, on August 28, 2008, Ahanchian asked defense counsel to
stipulate to a one-week continuance of the hearing date for
defendants’ motions, along with corresponding one-week
extensions of the deadlines for Ahanchian to file oppositions
and for defendants to reply. Defense counsel refused to so
stipulate. The very next day, on August 29, 2008, Ahanchian
filed an ex parte application pursuant to Local Rule 7-19 seek-
ing a one-week extension. Ahanchian recited as good cause
for the requested extension of time that: (1) defendants had
waited until the last day to file their motions, choosing to file
four days before the Labor Day weekend, and with knowledge
of pending depositions; (2) the accompanying motions and
exhibits amounted to 1,000 pages of materials; (3) Ahanchi-
an’s lead counsel had left the state on August 25 on a pre-
scheduled trip and would not be returning until September 2;
and (4) Ahanchian, who was needed to respond to the motion,
was also out of town over Labor Day weekend. Ahanchian
noted that “[n]o party will suffer any prejudice” should the
court grant the continuance.

Defendants opposed the motion, arguing that Ahanchian
had failed to demonstrate “good cause.” Specifically, they
argued that Ahanchian’s counsel “knew (or should have
known) that the motions would be filed no later than August
25—and yet, for reasons unexplained, this is precisely the
date plaintiff’s counsel decided to travel ‘out of state.’ Why?
No reason is offered.” In a footnote, the defendants posed
some hypothetical possibilities: “A family emergency? A con-
flicting work-related priority? Or a vacation to Mexico? The
point is, it is not explained. Absence [sic] explanation, good
cause cannot be discerned.” As for prejudice, defendants
made the weak and false arguments that the requested contin-
uance would give Ahanchian “several weeks to prepare an
Opposition,” and yet defendants would have only one week
to file their reply. They also asserted that they would have
“less time to prepare for trial.” In point of fact, Ahanchian had
requested extensions of time to file both his opposition and
for the defendants’ replies. Had Ahanchian’s request been
18142 AHANCHIAN v. XENON PICTURES, INC.
granted, defendants would have had the full time allowed by
the local rules to reply. Moreover, the trial was not scheduled
to commence for another three months.

Ahanchian ultimately filed his opposition to the summary
judgment motion three days late, on September 5, 2008,3 at
which time he also filed an ex parte application seeking per-
mission to make the late filing.4 On September 8, 2008, defen-
dants responded by reiterating their opposition to any
extension of time, and urging the district court to “ignore” the
late opposition. They further suggested that Ahanchian’s
counsel’s representation that he believed the deadline was
September 4 was disingenuous, and that Ahanchian had failed
to adequately explain the technical computer problems that
had resulted in the one-day delay.

On September 10, 2008, in a three-paragraph order, the dis-
trict court granted defendants’ summary judgment motion in
full. It simultaneously denied Ahanchian’s ex parte motion,
concluding, without citing any record support, that
Ahanchian, “apparently not pleased with the court’s ruling,”
had simply failed to file timely oppositions. The court con-
strued Ahanchian’s September 5, 2008, ex parte application as
a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) motion for reconsid-
eration of its denial of Ahanchian’s August 29, 2008, request
for a one-week extension. The court then denied the motion,
3
Ahanchian’s opposition to the Motion for Terminating Sanctions was
filed two days earlier, on September 3.
4
In this application, Ahanchian’s counsel explained that his office had
made a calendaring error, and thus he erroneously believed that the oppo-
sitions were not due until September 4, 2008. The truth of this statement
is supported by counsel’s earlier application seeking an extension of the
deadlines, which represented that “Plaintiff’s opposition papers are cur-
rently due on September 4, 2008.” Neither defense counsel nor the court
chose to alert counsel that he had misstated the deadline, adding two days.
Counsel also explained he attempted to meet that erroneously-calculated
deadline but “due to technical computer circumstances beyond control,”
he could not file until September 5.
 AHANCHIAN v. XENON PICTURES, INC. 18143
citing three authorities: (1) a Fifth Circuit decision concluding
that the “inadvertent mistake” of counsel was not a sufficient
ground to excuse missing a filing deadline; (2) a Sixth Circuit
decision rejecting “calendaring errors” as justification for
reconsideration; and (3), finally, an inapposite Ninth Circuit
decision that suggests a party should sue its lawyer for mal-
practice rather than bring a Rule 60(b)(1) motion when it
comes to regret an action based on erroneous legal advice.

Meanwhile, in its summary judgment order, the court cor-
rectly observed that Ninth Circuit precedent bars district
courts from granting summary judgment simply because a
party fails to file an opposition or violates a local rule, and
also correctly cited its obligation to analyze the record to
determine whether any disputed material fact was present. It
then effectively flouted both legal principles,5 stating that it
had reviewed only the defense evidence, even though it knew
the opposition papers were already filed, having ruled upon
the accompanying motion for a late filing. Unsurprisingly,
based on only defendants’ version of the facts, the court con-
cluded that defendants were not liable on any claim and
granted judgment in their favor.

Ahanchian timely appeals the district court’s procedural
rulings, the grant of summary judgment, and the award of
attorneys’ fees.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The district court’s denial of an extension of time pursuant
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b) is reviewed for abuse
of discretion, see Kyle v. Campbell Soup Co., 28 F.3d 928,
5
For example, even without considering the late-filed opposition papers,
the record then before the district court included the certificates of copy-
right registration, which are prima facie evidence of ownership and which
should have precluded an award of summary judgment on Ahanchian’s
copyright claims.
18144 AHANCHIAN v. XENON PICTURES, INC.
930 (9th Cir. 1994), as is a court’s denial of a Rule 60(b)
motion, see United States v. Asarco Inc., 430 F.3d 972, 978
(9th Cir. 2005). Accordingly, we reverse where the district
court applied the incorrect legal rule or where the district
court’s application of the law to the facts was: (1) illogical;
(2) implausible; or (3) without support in inferences that may
be drawn from the record. United States v. Hinkson, 585 F.3d
1247, 1262 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc).

III. DISCUSSION

Ahanchian argues that the district court abused its discre-
tion first in denying his request for a one-week extension of
time to file his opposition to defendants’ summary judgment
motion and then in denying his application to file that opposi-
tion late. We agree.

A.

[1] Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b)(1) provides:

(1) In General. When an act may or must be done
within a specified time, the court may, for good
cause, extend the time:

(A) with or without motion or notice if the
court acts, or if a request is made, before
the original time or its extension expires; or

(B) on motion made after the time has
expired if the party failed to act because of
excusable neglect.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(1). This rule, like all the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, “[is] to be liberally construed to effectuate
the general purpose of seeing that cases are tried on the mer-
its.” Rodgers v. Watt, 722 F.2d 456, 459 (9th Cir. 1983)
(quoting Staren v. American Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. of Chi-
 AHANCHIAN v. XENON PICTURES, INC. 18145
cago, 529 F.2d 1257, 1263 (7th Cir. 1976)); see also Fed. R.
Civ. P. 1 (“[The Federal Rules] should be construed and
administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive deter-
mination of every action and proceeding.”). Consequently,
requests for extensions of time made before the applicable
deadline has passed should “normally . . . be granted in the
absence of bad faith or prejudice to the adverse party.” 4B
Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice
and Procedure § 1165 (3d ed. 2004).

[2] The circumstances of Ahanchian’s predicament clearly
demonstrate the “good cause” required by Rule 6(b)(1).
“Good cause” is a non-rigorous standard that has been con-
strued broadly across procedural and statutory contexts. See,
e.g., Venegas-Hernandez v. Sonolux Records, 370 F.3d 183,
187 (1st Cir. 2004); Thomas v. Brennan, 961 F.2d 612, 619
(7th Cir. 1992); Lolatchy v. Arthur Murray, Inc., 816 F.2d
951, 954 (4th Cir. 1987). To begin with, Ahanchian faced an
exceptionally constrained deadline resulting from the peculiar
dictates of the local rules for the Central District of California.6
6
Like the rules in several districts in this circuit, the Central District
Local Rules establish deadlines for filing motions and oppositions by
counting backwards from an established hearing date. In 2008, Central
District of California Local Rule 6-1 provided that any motion had to be
filed “not later than twenty-one (21) days before the date set for hearing.”
C.D. Cal. Local R. 6-1 (2008). Similarly, Central District Local Rule 7-9
governed the filing of oppositions and provided that any opposition had
to be filed “not later than fourteen (14) days before the date designated for
the hearing of the motion.” C.D. Cal. Local R. 7-9 (2008). As a result,
where the movant chose to file a motion twenty-one days before the
hearing—the last day allowed by local rules—the nonmovant has a mere
seven days to file an opposition. This abbreviated timeline is unusual;
every other district in this circuit guarantees nonmovants at least fourteen
days to file an opposition to a motion. See D. Ariz. Local R. 56.1(d); D.
Alaska Local R. 7.1(e); E.D. Cal. Local R. 78-230(b); N.D. Cal. Local R.
7-2(a), 7-3(a); S.D. Cal. Local R. 7.1(e)(1), (2); D. Guam Local R. 7.1(d);
D. Hawaii Local R. 7.2(a), 7.4; D. Idaho Local R. 7.1(c); D. Mont. Local
R. 7.1(d)(1)(B); D. Nevada Local R. 7.2(b); D. N. Mariana Islands Local
R. 7.1(c)(2); D. Oregon Local R. 7.1(f); E.D. Wash. Local R. 7.1(c); W.D.
Wash. Local R. 7(d)(3).
18146 AHANCHIAN v. XENON PICTURES, INC.
Compounding the problem, this deadline followed immedi-
ately upon Labor Day weekend—during which even the fed-
eral courts are closed. By taking advantage of the unusual
local rules, defendants cut Ahanchian’s time to respond to two
dispositive motions to five business days and three days over
the holiday weekend. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a)(1)(C). As was
certainly neither unreasonable nor unexpected, both
Ahanchian and his attorney were out of town over Labor Day
weekend, and, moreover, as he informed the district court,
Ahanchian’s lead counsel was out-of-state in fulfillment of a
previously-scheduled commitment from the day defendants
chose to file their motions through the day the responses were
due.7

[3] Critically, the record is devoid of any indication either
that Ahanchian’s counsel acted in bad faith or that an exten-
sion of time would prejudice defendants. To the contrary, the
record reflects that Ahanchian’s counsel acted conscientiously
throughout the litigation, promptly seeking extensions of time
when necessary and stipulating to defendants’ earlier request
for an extension of time to file their answer and to the twelve-
week extension due to two defendants’ late appearances.
Moreover, defendants’ argument that they would be preju-
diced by only having a week to reply while Ahanchian would
7
Even without the revelation that Ahanchian’s lead counsel’s absence
was due to his position as an elected delegate to a major political party’s
national convention, his lack of availability due to a previously planned
trip is a reasonable basis for seeking an extension of time. As Supreme
Court Justice David Brewer once recognized, attorneys have an obligation
as professionals to assume positions of important social responsibility. See
David J. Brewer, The Ideal Lawyer, Atlantic Monthly, November 1906, at
587, 598 (“[T]he true lawyer never forgets the obligations which he as a
lawyer owes to the republic, . . . he always remembers that he is a citi-
zen.”). Moreover, attorneys, like everyone else, have critical personal and
familial obligations that are particularly acute during holidays. It is impor-
tant to the health of the legal profession that attorneys strike a balance
between these competing demands on their time. See Patrick J. Schiltz, On
Being a Happy, Healthy, and Ethical Member of an Unhappy, Unhealthy,
and Unethical Profession, 52 Vand. L. Rev. 871, 889-90 (1999).
 AHANCHIAN v. XENON PICTURES, INC. 18147
have had several weeks to draft an opposition is unpersuasive
and neglects the fact that in the overwhelming majority of dis-
tricts, more time is given for drafting oppositions than for
drafting replies. See, e.g., N.D. Cal. Local R. 7-3(a), (c); S.D.
Cal. Local R. 7.1(e)(1), (2). Had the district court had any
doubts about the veracity or good faith of Ahanchian’s coun-
sel, or been worried about prospective prejudice, it could have
held an evidentiary hearing or sought more information;
instead, without support in the record, it summarily denied
Ahanchian’s request.

[4] The record shows that Ahanchian’s requested relief
was reasonable, justified, and would not result in prejudice to
any party. The district court nevertheless denied Ahanchian’s
motion, thus effectively dooming Ahanchian’s case on the
impermissible ground that he had violated a local rule.
Because Ahanchian clearly demonstrated the “good cause”
required by Rule 6, and because there was no reason to
believe that Ahanchian was acting in bad faith or was misrep-
resenting his reasons for asking for the extension, the district
court abused its discretion in denying Ahanchian’s timely
motion.

B.

We next turn to the district court’s denial of Ahanchian’s
September 5, 2008, ex parte application to allow his late-filed
opposition, which the court construed as a Rule 60(b) motion
for reconsideration of its denial of Ahanchian’s Rule 6 motion
for an extension. Rule 60(b) provides that a court “may
relieve a party or its legal representative from a final judg-
ment, order, or proceeding” on the basis of “mistake, inadver-
tence, surprise, or excusable neglect.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
The court denied Ahanchian’s application after concluding
that Ahanchian had not demonstrated “excusable neglect.” In
so doing, however, the district court failed to cite the correct
18148 AHANCHIAN v. XENON PICTURES, INC.
legal standard, applying an incorrect legal standard for decid-
ing Rule 60(b) motions.8

[5] To determine whether a party’s failure to meet a dead-
line constitutes “excusable neglect,” courts must apply a four-
factor equitable test, examining: (1) the danger of prejudice to
the opposing party; (2) the length of the delay and its potential
impact on the proceedings; (3) the reason for the delay; and
(4) whether the movant acted in good faith. Pioneer Inv.
Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 507 U.S. 380,
395 (1993); Briones v. Riviera Hotel & Casino, 116 F.3d 379,
381 (9th Cir. 1997) (adopting this test for consideration of
Rule 60(b) motions). Through other decisions, including
Bateman v. U.S. Postal Serv., 231 F.3d 1220 (9th Cir. 2000),
and Pincay v. Andrews, 389 F.3d 853 (9th Cir. 2004) (en
banc), we have further clarified how courts should apply this
test.

[6] In Bateman, we concluded that when considering a
Rule 60(b) motion a district court abuses its discretion by fail-
ing to engage in the four-factor Pioneer/Briones equitable bal-
ancing test. Bateman, 231 F.3d at 1223-24. Bateman’s
counsel had left the country before filing an opposition to the
Postal Service’s summary judgment motion, allowed the
8
Defendants assert that Ahanchian waived this argument because he did
not state in his application that he was relying on the “excusable neglect”
standard or cite Rule 60(b). Defendants are correct that a party will be
deemed to have waived any issue or argument not raised before the district
court. Ritchie v. United States, 451 F.3d 1019, 1026 n.12 (9th Cir. 2006).
However, this general rule “does not apply where the district court never-
theless addressed the merits of the issue” not explicitly raised by the party.
Blackmon-Malloy v. U.S. Capitol Police Bd., 575 F.3d 699, 707 (D.C. Cir.
2009); see also Citizens United v. F.E.C., 130 S. Ct. 876, 888 (2010).
Here, despite Ahanchian’s understandable failure to explicitly reference
the excusable neglect standard in what he thought was a motion for late
filing, and not a Rule 60(b) motion, the district court chose to construe his
application as one brought pursuant to Rule 60 and purported to apply the
excusable neglect standard. Ahanchian did not waive his argument that the
district court abused its discretion in its application of Rule 60.
 AHANCHIAN v. XENON PICTURES, INC. 18149
deadline to pass while abroad, failed to file any motions for
extensions of time, and failed to contact the district court for
sixteen days after he returned because of “jet lag and the time
it took to sort through the mail.” Id. at 1223. Because the dis-
trict court had already awarded summary judgment to the
Postal Service, Bateman moved to set aside the judgment pur-
suant to Rule 60(b). Id. The district court, without mentioning
the Pioneer/Briones test, denied the motion after considering
only facts relating to the reason for Bateman’s delay—the
third Pioneer/Briones factor. Id. at 1224. We concluded that
the district court had failed to engage in the equitable analysis
mandated by Pioneer and Briones, and, by ignoring three of
the four Pioneer/Briones factors, had abused its discretion in
denying Bateman’s Rule 60(b) motion. Id.; see also Lemoge
v. United States, 587 F.3d 1188, 1192 (9th Cir. 2009) (“We
conclude that the district court did not identify the Pioneer-
Briones standard or correctly conduct the Pioneer-Briones
analysis and that this was an abuse of discretion.”).

[7] In Pincay, we held that courts engaged in balancing the
Pioneer/Briones factors may not apply per se rules. Pincay,
389 F.3d at 855 (“We now hold that per se rules are not con-
sistent with Pioneer.”). Defendants, who had filed their notice
of appeal twenty-four days late, asserted that their tardy filing
resulted from a calendaring mistake caused by attorneys and
paralegals misapplying a clear legal rule. See id. Applying the
same four-factor balancing test as required under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 60(b), the district court found that defen-
dants’ neglect was excusable under Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 4(a)(5). See id. Sitting en banc, we rejected the
plaintiffs’ contention that the district court had abused its dis-
cretion in ruling for defendants. We concluded that, while the
calendaring mistake was not a “compelling excuse,” because
of the “nature of the contextual analysis and the balancing of
the factors adopted in Pioneer,” courts applying the Pio-
neer/Briones test cannot create or apply any “rigid legal rule
against late filings attributable to any particular type of negli-
gence.” Id. at 860.
18150 AHANCHIAN v. XENON PICTURES, INC.
[8] The district court’s failure to apply Ninth Circuit prece-
dent, particularly the rules set forth in Bateman and Pincay,
to Ahanchian’s Rule 60(b) motion was error. Just like the dis-
trict court in Bateman, the district court here neither cited nor
applied the Pioneer/Briones test, but instead based its deci-
sion solely on whether the reason for the delay—the third Pio-
neer/Briones factor—could establish excusable neglect. By
ignoring the other three factors, the district court abused its
discretion. See Bateman, 231 F.3d at 1224. The district court
then compounded its legal error by concluding that “a calen-
daring mistake is the type of ‘inadvertent mistake’ that is not
entitled to relief pursuant to Rule 60(b)(1),” impermissibly
adopting a per se rule in applying the Pioneer/Briones balanc-
ing test. See Pincay, 389 F.3d at 859-60.

The district court’s errors are particularly troublesome
because our application of the correct equitable analysis con-
vinces us that Ahanchian’s delay was the result of excusable
neglect. See Bateman, 231 F.3d at 1224 & n.3. We start by
recognizing that “Rule 60(b) is ‘remedial in nature and . . .
must be liberally applied.’ ” TCI Group Life Ins. v. Knoebber,
244 F.3d 691, 696 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Falk v. Allen, 739
F.2d 461, 463 (9th Cir. 1984)). With this standard in mind, we
conclude that all four Pioneer/Briones factors favor
Ahanchian. First, the defendants would not have been preju-
diced by a week’s delay in the filing of the opposition and a
concomitant week extension to file a reply. At most, they
would have won a quick but unmerited victory, the loss of
which we do not consider prejudicial. Cf. Bateman, 231 F.3d
at 1225 (finding insufficient prejudice where defendants
“would have lost a quick victory and, should it ultimately
have lost the summary judgment motion . . . would have to
reschedule the trial date”). Second, the length of the delay was
a mere three days; filing the opposition then would not have
adversely affected either the summary judgment hearing date,
which was ten days away, or the trial, which was two and a
half months away. Compare id. (finding a delay of over a
month “not long enough to justify denying relief”). Third,
 AHANCHIAN v. XENON PICTURES, INC. 18151
while a calendaring mistake caused by the failure to apply a
clear local rule may be a weak justification for an attorney’s
delay, we have previously found the identical mistake to be
excusable neglect. See, e.g., Pincay, 389 F.3d at 860. In fact,
in Bateman, the attorney’s reasons for his nearly month-long
delay, the need to recover from jet lag and to review mail,
were far less persuasive. Yet, we concluded that excusable
neglect was established. Bateman, 231 F.3d at 1225. Fourth,
there is no indication that Ahanchian’s failure to file the oppo-
sition on time was the result of bad faith. Ahanchian’s counsel
displayed his (mistaken) belief that the oppositions were due
on September 4, 2008, in his initial request for an extension
of time. Thus, his reliance on the calendaring mistake was not
a bad-faith, post-hoc rationalization concocted to secure addi-
tional time. Ahanchian’s counsel had no history of missing
deadlines or disobeying the district court’s orders; in fact, he
demonstrated a sensitivity to the court’s orders and deadlines
by promptly seeking extensions of time where necessary. We
have found good faith in situations where attorneys acted far
less diligently and conscientiously. See id. (“[Counsel]
showed a lack of regard for his client’s interests and the
court’s docket. But there is no evidence that he acted with
anything less than good faith.”).

[9] By failing to apply the Pioneer/Briones equitable bal-
ancing test and instead adopting an impermissible per se rule,
the district court abused its discretion. See Lemoge, 587 F.3d
at 1193 (citing Hinkson, 585 F.3d at 1261). Applying the cor-
rect legal standard, we conclude that Ahanchian’s counsel
sufficiently established that his failure to timely file the oppo-
sition to summary judgment was the result of excusable
neglect, and that the motion to allow the late opposition
should have been granted.

C.

[10] Perhaps contributing to the district court’s errors and
certainly compounding the harshness of its rulings, defense
18152 AHANCHIAN v. XENON PICTURES, INC.
counsel disavowed any nod to professional courtesy, instead
engaging in hardball tactics designed to avoid resolution of
the merits of this case. We feel compelled to address defense
counsel’s unrelenting opposition to Ahanchian’s counsel’s
reasonable requests. Our adversarial system depends on the
principle that all sides to a dispute must be given the opportu-
nity to fully advocate their views of the issues presented in a
case. See Indep. Towers of Wash. v. Washington, 350 F.3d
925, 929 (9th Cir. 2003); Iva Ikuku Toguri D’Aquino v.
United States, 192 F.2d 338, 367 (9th Cir. 1951). Here,
defense counsel took knowing advantage of the constrained
time to respond created by the local rules, the three-day fed-
eral holiday, and Ahanchian’s lead counsel’s prescheduled
out-of-state obligation. Defense counsel steadfastly refused to
stipulate to an extension of time, and when Ahanchian’s coun-
sel sought relief from the court, defense counsel filed fierce
oppositions, even accusing Ahanchian’s counsel of unethical
conduct. Such uncompromising behavior is not only inconsis-
tent with general principles of professional conduct, but also
undermines the truth-seeking function of our adversarial sys-
tem. See Cal. Attorney Guidelines of Civility & Professional-
ism § 1 (“The dignity, decorum and courtesy that have
traditionally characterized the courts and legal profession of
civilized nations are not empty formalities. They are essential
to an atmosphere that promotes justice and to an attorney’s
responsibility for the fair and impartial administration of jus-
tice.”); see also Marcangelo v. Boardwalk Regency, 47 F.3d
88, 90 (3d Cir. 1995) (“We do not approve of the ‘hardball’
tactics unfortunately used by some law firms today. The
extension of normal courtesies and exercise of civility expe-
dite litigation and are of substantial benefit to the administra-
tion of justice.”).

[11] Our adversarial system relies on attorneys to treat
each other with a high degree of civility and respect. See
Bateman, 231 F.3d at 1223 n.2 (“[A]t the risk of sounding
naive or nostalgic, we lament the decline of collegiality and
fair-dealing in the legal profession today, and believe courts
 AHANCHIAN v. XENON PICTURES, INC. 18153
should do what they can to emphasize these values.”); Peter-
son v. BMI Refractories, 124 F.3d 1386, 1396 (11th Cir.
1997) (“There is no better guide to professional courtesy than
the golden rule: you should treat opposing counsel the way
you yourself would like to be treated.”). Where, as here, there
is no indication of bad faith, prejudice, or undue delay, attor-
neys should not oppose reasonable requests for extensions of
time brought by their adversaries. See Cal. Attorney Guide-
lines of Civility & Prof. § 6.

CONCLUSION

The district court abused its discretion in denying Ahanchi-
an’s request for a one-week extension to file his opposition
and erred in denying Ahanchian’s motion to allow a three-day
late-filed opposition it construed as a Rule 60(b) motion.9
Accordingly, we REVERSE the district court’s grant of sum-
mary judgment, vacate the district court’s award of attorneys’
fees, and REMAND this case for further proceedings.

9
The district court also stated in a footnote that the denial was, in the
alternative, based on a lack of good cause. This conclusion was also an
abuse of discretion, as the above discussion demonstrates.