IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 98-40803
Summary Calendar
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
CURTIS RAY ROBERTSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Texas
(9:97-CR-35-ALL)
June 17, 1999
Before JOLLY, SMITH, and WIENER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
A jury convicted Curtis Ray Robertson of possession with
intent to distribute cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §
841(a)(1). The district court sentenced Robertson to a 168-month
term of imprisonment and a five-year term of supervised release.
Robertson timely filed this appeal. We affirm.
Robertson first argues that the evidence was not sufficient to
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
prove that he possessed the cocaine. This argument is unavailing.
With an insufficient evidence claim, we consider the evidence in
the light most favorable to the verdict and will affirm the
conviction if a reasonable trier of fact could have found that the
evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.1 The jury
alone is responsible for determining the weight and credibility of
the evidence.2 To establish Robertson’s guilt, the government had
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Robertson knowingly
possessed cocaine base with an intent to distribute it.3
Possession “may be actual or constructive, may be proven by
circumstantial or direct evidence.”4 Our review of the
circumstantial and direct evidence, viewed in the light most
favorable to the jury’s verdict, convinces us that the evidence was
sufficient to sustain a conviction for possession with intent to
distribute cocaine base.5
Robertson next contends that the district court erred by
failing to suppress evidence seized after his flight from the
police because it was tainted by a constitutionally unreasonable
search and seizure. Because, however, Robertson did not make a
1
See United States v. Martinez, 975 F.2d 159, 160-61 (5th Cir.
1992).
2
Id. at 161.
3
United States v. Brown, 29 F.3d 953, 958 (5th Cir. 1994).
4
Id.
5
See Martinez, 975 F.2d at 160-61; United States v. DeLeon,
641 F.2d 330, 335-36 (5th Cir. 1981).
2
timely suppression motion in the district court, he has waived this
issue on appeal.6
Finally, Robertson argues that the district court abused its
discretion by denying his motion, made following jury voir dire,
for substitution of counsel. This contention is also without
merit. Substitution of counsel during trial is warranted if the
defendant shows “good cause, such as a conflict of interest, a
complete breakdown in communication or an irreconcilable conflict
which leads to an apparently unjust verdict.”7 Robertson’s
assertion that the district court did not inquire sufficiently
regarding the reasons for his motion to substitute counsel is
refuted by the record. Robertson made only a vague reference to
misrepresentation and allowed his attorney to explain that
Robertson’s dissatisfaction concerned the lack of an independent
fingerprint analysis. Robertson has not expressed any other reason
supporting his motion for substitution of counsel. Accordingly,
the district court did not abuse its discretion.
AFFIRMED.
6
See United States v. Chavez-Valencia, 116 F.3d 127, 130-33
(5th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 325 (1997).
7
United States v. Young, 482 F.2d 993, 995 (5th Cir. 1973)
(citations omitted).
3