FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION NOV 08 2010
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
CAROL JO GAVIN and ALBERT J. No. 09-55369
GAVIN,
D.C. No. 2:05-cv-09001-FMC-SS
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
v. MEMORANDUM *
CITY OF LOS ANGELES; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Florence-Marie Cooper, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted November 3, 2010 **
Pasadena, California
Before: SCHROEDER, TALLMAN and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiffs Carol Jo Gavin and Albert J. Gavin claim that the district court
erred by limiting the time for trial in their civil rights action against the City of Los
Angeles, thus depriving them of due process. We have jurisdiction under 28
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
U.S.C. § 1291, and we find that the district court did not abuse its discretion. See
Navellier v. Sletten, 262 F.3d 923, 941(9th Cir. 2001).
Because the parties are familiar with the facts of this case, we do not repeat
them here. District courts “have broad authority to impose reasonable time limits.”
Id.; see also Monotype Corp. PLC v. Int’l Typeface Corp., 43 F.3d 443, 450-51
(9th Cir. 1994) (finding no abuse of discretion by a district court that imposed a
trial time limit of nine days when a party had initially requested three weeks); Gen.
Signal Corp. v. MCI Telecomms. Corp., 66 F.3d 1500, 1508 (9th Cir. 1995)
(finding no abuse of discretion by a district court that imposed a “rigid limit on
time,” so long as both parties were informed of the time remaining and were able
to conduct “limited cross-examination” of opposing witnesses); Amarel v.
Connell, 102 F.3d 1494, 1514 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding no abuse of discretion even
though a time limit forced a party to choose between examining its own witnesses
and cross-examining opposing witnesses).
Furthermore, while “[a] crowded docket does not justify an infringement on
the right to reasonably develop a case . . . the objecting party must show there was
harm incurred as a result.” Monotype, 43 F.3d at 451; see also Gen. Signal, 66
F.3d at 1508 (refusing to find a time limit to be unreasonable when the
complaining party failed to show what required evidence it was prevented from
presenting). The Gavins have made the conclusory assertion that they “were not
permitted to present all relevant, material and non-cumulative evidence.” While it
is clear that they were unable to present all the evidence they would have liked to,
they have made no specific showing as to how the time limit ultimately prejudiced
them by preventing them from presenting any evidence that was required in order
to reasonably develop their case. Absent such a showing, we cannot say that the
district court’s limitation of the trial to eight days, during which the parties
introduced seventy exhibits and called twenty witnesses, all of whom were cross-
examined, violated the Gavins’ due process right to a fair trial.
AFFIRMED.