UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 09-1837
CHAUNCEY LOUIS PAYNE,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
CITY OF LAUREL, MARYLAND, a municipal corporation; DAVID
CRAWFORD; JOHN PROCTOR,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. Richard D. Bennett, District Judge.
(1:07-cv-00583-RDB)
Argued: October 27, 2010 Decided: November 15, 2010
Before MOTZ and KEENAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Matthew August LeFande, Arlington, Virginia, for Appellant.
Daniel Karp, KARPINSKI, COLARESI & KARP, PA, Baltimore,
Maryland, for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Chauncey Payne, a reserve officer with the Washington, D.C.
Metropolitan Police Department (the “D.C. Police Department”),
brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) against
Laurel Police Officer John Proctor, the City of Laurel,
Maryland, and Laurel’s Chief of Police, David Crawford. Payne
also asserts state common law and constitutional claims against
these defendants. Payne alleges that he suffered injuries
because Officer Proctor deliberately or recklessly filed a
deficient warrant affidavit that, if corrected, would have
provided no probable cause for charges. The district court
granted summary judgment to the defendants. We affirm.
I.
On April 20, 2006, Officer Proctor drafted and filed an
application for statement of charges (the “warrant affidavit”)
based on his investigation of Payne. The investigation arose
from complaints that Lasheka Brown lodged against Payne with the
Laurel Police Department.
In short, Brown reported that on March 11 and 15, 2006,
Payne approached her in the vicinity of the apartment complex in
which she lived. The complex is located at 9407 Springhouse
Lane in Laurel, Maryland. Brown alleged that during their first
encounter Payne identified himself as “Chauncey,” and advised
2
her that he was a police officer, who had the authority to issue
warnings for vehicles not registered in Maryland. Brown’s
vehicle was registered in South Carolina. According to Brown,
Payne further told her that he had seen her exercising at the
Sport Fit gym. Brown subsequently spoke with someone at
Springhouse Lane's leasing office and learned that there was no
resident in the complex with the name of “Chauncey,” and that
the apartment complex had never granted anyone the authority to
issue vehicle warnings. During the second encounter, Brown
reported that Payne ran after her car as she drove away from her
apartment. *
On March 28, 2006, Officer Proctor met Brown at Sport Fit
after she reported seeing Payne there. Officer Proctor observed
that Brown was “noticeably afraid.” He investigated and learned
that the gym had offered Payne a law enforcement discount; he
discovered in Payne’s membership file a photocopy of a D.C.
Police Department badge, which bore the word “Reserve” on the
top and lacked any identifying information. The membership file
also indicated that Payne lived not at Brown’s apartment complex
but at 8714 Cresthill Court, Laurel, Maryland.
*
Although Payne and Brown have conflicting recollections of
the encounters, Payne does not dispute that Brown recounted her
version of events to the police.
3
As part of his investigation of Payne, Officer Proctor
additionally contacted the D.C. Police Department and inquired
whether Payne was a D.C. police officer (but not whether he was
a reserve officer). A personnel employee informed Officer
Proctor that Payne was not listed in the D.C. Police
Department’s database. Officer Proctor also visited the
management office of Brown’s apartment complex. The manager
informed Officer Proctor that Payne was not a resident of the
complex and that the complex had not granted Payne the authority
to issue warnings or citations on the premises. Officer Proctor
learned that the apartment complex listed an “Anabel Payne” as a
resident, but he did not knock on the door of Anabel Payne’s
apartment, or attempt to contact Payne at the Cresthill Court
residence listed in the Sport Fit membership file. In fact, at
the time of the events in question, Anabel Payne, the signatory
on the lease of an apartment in the Springhouse Lane complex,
was Chauncey Payne’s mother and Chauncey Payne had resided in
her apartment since December 2005.
In the warrant affidavit, Officer Proctor identified
Payne’s residence as the Cresthill Court address shown on the
Sport Fit membership file. Although Officer Proctor had
possession of a Maryland Motor Vehicle Administration report
showing Payne’s residence as 9407 Springhouse Lane, Officer
Proctor made no mention of that fact in the affidavit. Nor did
4
Officer Proctor include in the warrant affidavit that the
Springhouse Lane complex listed “Anabel Payne” as a resident.
On April 20, 2006, on the basis of Officer Proctor’s
warrant affidavit, a state court commissioner issued an arrest
warrant charging Payne with two counts of impersonation of a
police officer (one count as to Brown and one count as to Sport
Fit gym), one count of wearing police articles, and one count of
stalking. On the first day of the ensuing trial, the prosecutor
issued a nolle prosequi on all charges.
Thereafter, Payne filed this suit. At the heart of Payne’s
claims is the charge that Officer Proctor violated Payne’s
Fourth Amendment rights by deliberately or recklessly omitting
facts from the warrant affidavit, and that these omissions were
material in improperly establishing probable cause for the
warrant.
II.
The district court concluded, as a matter of law, that
Officer Proctor had not alleged sufficient facts to support any
violation of Payne’s Fourth Amendment rights. The court held
that the proffered facts could not support a finding that
Officer Proctor deliberately or recklessly omitted material
information from the warrant affidavit. The court reasoned that
“even after including the information that an ‘Anabel Payne’ was
5
listed as a resident and the fact that Payne lived at 9407
Springhouse Lane (as opposed to 8714 Cresthill Court), the
‘corrected’ warrant affidavit would still establish probable
cause for -- at minimum -- the impersonation charge.”
Further, the district court determined that, in any event,
qualified immunity barred Payne’s claims against Officer Proctor
because “it was reasonable for Proctor to believe, under the
circumstances, that his warrant affidavit exhibited probable
cause.” Based on its findings that probable cause existed for
Payne’s arrest and that Officer Proctor was entitled to
qualified immunity, the district court granted the defendants’
motion for summary judgment on all of Payne’s federal and state
claims.
Payne filed a timely appeal. We review a grant of summary
judgment de novo, examining the facts in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Russell, 247 F.3d
125, 129 (4th Cir. 2001).
III.
Having carefully considered the record, the briefs and
arguments of the parties, and the controlling authorities, we
conclude that the district court’s analysis was correct.
Accordingly, we affirm on the basis of the district court’s well
6
reasoned opinion. See Chauncey Louis Payne v. City of Laurel,
Md., No. RDB-07-583 (D.Md. June 29, 2009).
AFFIRMED
7