FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
November 16, 2010
TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee, No. 09-8043
v. (D. Wyoming)
JOSE GUADALUPE MULGADO- (D.C. No. 2:08-CR-00108-WFD-5)
PATIDA,
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before HARTZ, O’BRIEN, and TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judges.
Jose Mulgado-Patida (Defendant) was convicted of conspiracy to possess
and distribute methamphetamine and sentenced to 240 months’ imprisonment. He
raises two issues on appeal: (1) that the district court violated the Speedy Trial
Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161–74, by making inadequate findings when granting several
continuances, and (2) that the evidence at trial did not establish the single
conspiracy alleged in the indictment. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291 and affirm. Even if the district court’s findings were inadequate to
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
Cir. R. 32.1.
support some of the continuances, there was no violation of the Speedy Trial Act
because Defendant’s trial was still timely. And even if there was a variance
between the conspiracy charged and the conspiracy proved at trial, Defendant was
not substantially prejudiced by the variance.
DISCUSSION
I. The Speedy-Trial Act Claim
A. Background
Defendant was detained for 672 days (about one year and 10 months) from
the time he was arrested on the original conspiracy charge against him until his
trial began. He was first indicted by a grand jury in the United States District
Court for the District of Wyoming on May 17, 2007. The indictment charged him
and eight codefendants with conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute, and to
distribute, methamphetamine. The alleged conspiracy began in January 2006 and
continued until the date of the indictment. Defendant was arrested in Idaho on
May 29, 2007, and was arraigned in Wyoming federal court on July 18. He was
held without bail.
After an August 1, 2007, search of the Westminster, Colorado, residence of
Ramon Espinoza-Aguilar resulted in the seizure of about 2 pounds of
methamphetamine, a superseding indictment was filed on September 20. It added
Espinoza-Aguilar and five others as codefendants on the conspiracy charge and
extended the conspiracy ending date to September 20, 2007. The superseding
-2-
indictment alleged that coconspirator David Morales-Martinez would receive
methamphetamine from Espinoza-Aguilar in Colorado and California and would
then distribute it to other coconspirators, including Defendant, who would in turn
redistribute the methamphetamine to additional coconspirators for sale to others.
By May 2008 the charges against all but three of the defendants had been
resolved. Several who had pleaded guilty had cooperated with the government,
enabling it to widen its investigation and discover a link between the conspiracy
alleged in the superseding indictment and a conspiracy charged in a separate
indictment. A third indictment, which charged the enlarged conspiracy, was filed
on May 15, 2008, and the superseding indictment was dismissed on the
government’s motion. Charged in the third indictment were Defendant and his
two remaining codefendants from the superseding indictment, two defendants
from the separate indictment, and nine new defendants. The alleged conspiracy
began in June 2003 and continued until May 2008.
Jury trial on the third indictment was originally scheduled for July 28,
2008. But the district court granted four continuances, and trial did not
commence until March 30, 2009. By that time, only four defendants remained to
be tried. The court declared a mistrial on April 1. The trial of one codefendant
was then severed, and the charges against another codefendant were dismissed by
the government. Trial for Defendant and Espinoza-Aguilar, the sole remaining
codefendant, began on April 6.
-3-
B. The Speedy Trial Act
When a defendant pleads not guilty, the Speedy Trial Act requires trial to
begin within 70 days of the indictment filing date or the defendant’s first
appearance “before a judicial officer of the court in which such charge is
pending,” whichever occurs later. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1). The sanction for
violation of the Act is dismissal of the indictment. See id. § 3162(a).
Subsection 3161(h) of the Speedy Trial Act provides exclusions that toll the
running of a defendant’s speedy-trial clock. See id. § 3161(h). Several are
essentially automatic. Three of these are relevant to this appeal.
First, subparagraph (h)(1)(A) excludes “delay resulting from any
proceeding, including any examinations, to determine the mental competency or
physical capacity of the defendant.” Id. § 3161(h)(1)(A). Excludable time under
§ 3161(h)(1)(A) “generally runs from the date the motion is filed seeking the
examination to the date the matter is taken under advisement after receipt by the
court of results and briefs and completion of any hearings.” James Cissell,
Federal Criminal Trials § 12-1[c][5][i] (7th ed. 2008); see United States v.
Murphy, 241 F.3d 447, 455–56 (6th Cir. 2001) (collecting cases). There may be
an exception within that time, however, when the defendant is transported for
examination. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(F) (excluding “delay resulting from
transportation of any defendant from another district, or to and from places of
examination or hospitalization, except that any time consumed in excess of ten
-4-
days from the date an order of removal or an order directing such transportation,
and the defendant’s arrival at the destination shall be presumed to be
unreasonable”). “Time devoted to transportation for examination purposes is
more properly excluded under [§ 3161(h)(1)(F)],” and “[a]ny transportation time
in excess of 10 days from the order causing the transportation is presumed to be
unreasonable under the [Speedy Trial Act].” Cissell, supra, at § 12-1[c][5][i]; see
also United States v. Noone, 913 F.2d 20, 25 n.5 (1st Cir. 1990) (holding that any
other reading would render § 3161(h)(1)(F) “mere surplusage”); Committee on
the Administration of the Criminal Law of the Judicial Conference of the United
States, Guidelines to the Administration of the Speedy Trial Act of 1974, As
Amended, 106 F.R.D. 271, 286 (1984) (“Unreasonable delay in transporting a
defendant to or from an institution at which the examination takes place may
serve to reduce the amount of excludable time.”).
Second, subparagraph (h)(1)(D) excludes “delay resulting from any pretrial
motion, from the filing of the motion through the conclusion of the hearing on, or
other prompt disposition of, such motion.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(D). And
third, subparagraph (h)(1)(H) excludes “delay reasonably attributable to any
period, not to exceed thirty days, during which any proceeding concerning the
defendant is actually under advisement by the court.” Id. § 3161(h)(1)(H).
In addition, a district court can continue the case and exclude the resulting
delay from counting under the Speedy Trial Act. See id § 3161(h)(7).
-5-
Paragraph (h)(7) excludes the period of the continuance if the court finds, on the
record, that the ends of justice served by granting the continuance outweigh the
best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial. See id.
Of special importance in this case, delays that stop the speedy-trial clock
for one defendant typically stop the clock for codefendants as well. Paragraph
(h)(6) excludes “[a] reasonable period of delay when the defendant is joined for
trial with a codefendant as to whom the time for trial has not run and no motion
for severance has been granted,” id. § 3161(h)(6); see United States v. Vogl, 374
F.3d 976, 983 (10th Cir. 2004) (“an exclusion for delay attributable to one
defendant is applicable to all co-defendants” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 1
“The obvious purpose behind the exclusion in § 3161(h)(7) is to accommodate the
efficient use of prosecutorial and judicial resources by trying multiple defendants
in a single trial.” Vogl, 374 F.3d at 983 (brackets and internal quotation marks
omitted). Although the filing of a superseding indictment generally “does not
serve to toll the speedy trial clock,” United States v. Apperson, 441 F.3d 1162,
1181 (10th Cir. 2006), the period from the filing of a superseding indictment
joining new codefendants until the initial appearance of the last new codefendant
under that indictment does trigger a paragraph (h)(6) exclusion. See United States
1
Under paragraph (h)(6) the period of delay must be “reasonable.” In
measuring reasonableness we consider whether the defendant was incarcerated,
whether he actively sought an earlier trial date, and whether it is most efficient to
try the defendant and codefendant together. See United States v. Tranakos, 911
F.2d 1422, 1426 (10th Cir. 1990).
-6-
v. Olivo, 69 F.3d 1057, 1062 (10th Cir. 1995); see also Henderson v. United
States, 476 U.S. 321, 323 n.2 (1986) (“All defendants who are joined for trial
generally fall within the speedy trial computation of the latest codefendant.”).
C. Application to Defendant
On appeal Defendant’s sole argument under the Speedy Trial Act is that the
district court granted several ends-of-justice continuances under § 3161(h)(7)
without making sufficient oral or written findings on why the continuances should
be granted. We review for an abuse of discretion the district court’s denial of a
motion to dismiss for violation of the Act. See Vogl, 374 F.3d at 982. We review
de novo its compliance with the legal requirements of the Act, see id., and we
accept its factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous, see id.
In this case, Defendant’s argument on appeal is beside the point. Even if
he is correct that none of the ends-of-justice continuances were proper, he has not
challenged the government’s contentions in its answer brief on appeal that his
trial complied with the Speedy Trial Act because of tolling provisions other than
paragraph (h)(7). We could affirm solely on the basis of Defendant’s failure to
challenge the government’s alternative ground for affirmance. See Berna v.
Chater, 101 F.3d 631, 633 (10th Cir. 1996). But we briefly examine the
government’s arguments to assure ourselves that they are essentially correct. 2
2
In this brief examination we do not dwell on whether the excluded periods
for codefendants were “reasonable” under § 3161(h)(6). Arguing against
(continued...)
-7-
Defendant’s speedy-trial clock began to run on July 18, 2007, when he was
arraigned in the Wyoming district court. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1) (requiring
trial to begin within 70 days of the indictment filing date or the defendant’s first
appearance before a judicial officer of the court in which such charge is pending,
whichever occurs later). From that date on, a series of overlapping exclusions
covered almost the entire period until his initial trial (which ended in a mistrial).
Motions filed by codefendants resulted in exclusions from the date of his
arraignment until August 23, 2007. Codefendant Tracy Glidewell filed a motion
to suppress on July 2, 2007 (before Defendant’s arraignment), and the district
court scheduled a hearing on that motion and “all other pending motions” for
July 24, 2007. See id § 3161(h)(1)(D) (excluding “delay resulting from any
pretrial motion, from the filing of the motion through the conclusion of the
hearing on . . . such motion”); id. § 3161(h)(6) (excluding “[a] reasonable period
of delay when the defendant is joined for trial with a codefendant as to whom the
time for trial has not run and no motion for severance has been granted”); Vogl,
374 F.3d at 983 (“[a]n exclusion for delay attributable to one defendant is
applicable to all co-defendants” (internal quotation marks omitted)). At the
2
(...continued)
reasonableness is that Defendant was incarcerated. But the efficiency of trying
alleged coconspirators together generally justifies the application of that
provision; and Defendant did not object to any continuance until codefendant
Vigil’s motion to postpone the trial setting for November 3, 2007, five months
before the eventual trial.
-8-
hearing the district court took two other motions under advisement, extending the
exclusion an additional 30 days to August 23. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(H)
(excluding “delay reasonably attributable to any period, not to exceed thirty days,
during which any proceeding concerning the defendant is actually under
advisement by the court”). Motions filed after the July 24 hearing probably
further tolled Defendant’s speedy-trial clock, but we will assume for convenience
that the clock ran from August 23 until the superseding indictment was filed on
September 20, 2007, a period of 28 days.
The next excluded period ran from September 20, 2007, until February 27,
2008, when Joshua Weichselberger, a new codefendant under the September 20
indictment, was arraigned. See id § 3161(h)(6); Olivo, 69 F.3d at 1062 (filing of
superseding indictment joining new codefendants triggers a paragraph (h)(6)
exclusion from the filing date of the superseding indictment until the initial
appearance of the last new codefendant under that indictment). Overlapping that
excluded period was the period from January 31, 2008, when Espinoza-Aguilar
filed a motion to suppress, until the district court completed the hearing on that
motion on April 15, 2008. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161(h)(1)(D), (h)(6). The court
took the motion under advisement, which tolled the Defendant’s speedy-trial
clock for 30 additional days, see id. § 3161(h)(1)(H), until May 15, 2008.
Defendant’s clock was then tolled from the filing of the third indictment on
May 15, 2008, until the last codefendant under that indictment, Derrick Daniel
-9-
Abbott, was arraigned on September 9, 2008. See Olivo, 69 F.3d at 1062. That
excluded period overlaps the period from July 7, 2008, when codefendant Brian
Nazareno filed a motion for a mental evaluation, to October 24, 2008, when
Nazareno was evaluated in Wyoming. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(A) (excluding
“delay resulting from any proceeding, including any examinations, to determine
the mental competency or physical capacity of the defendant”); id. § 3161(h)(6).
(Nazareno pleaded guilty on December 19, 2008. The excluded period probably
extended past the evaluation date, but all time after October 15 was excluded
anyway, as explained in the next paragraph.)
The period from October 15, 2008, until trial began on March 30, 2009, is
excluded because of a motion filed by codefendant Christopher Vigil. Among
other things, the motion sought a James hearing to determine whether statements
by alleged coconspirators that would otherwise be hearsay would be admissible
under the coconspirator exception. See United States v. James, 590 F.2d 575 (5th
Cir. 1979); Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E) (coconspirator exception). A motion that
“requires a hearing” tolls the speedy-trial clock from the filing of the motion until
the conclusion of the hearing. Henderson, 476 U.S. at 329. A motion to
determine the applicability of the coconspirator exception is such a motion. We
have said that “a district court can only admit coconspirator statements if it holds
a James hearing or conditions admission on forthcoming proof of a predicate
conspiracy through trial testimony or other evidence” and have expressed a
-10-
“strong preference for James proceedings.” United States v. Townley, 472 F.3d
1267, 1273 (10th Cir. 2007) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Other circuits have decided that motions for James hearings are motions
“necessitating hearings,” and “[a]s such, the entire time from the filing of the
motion to the conclusion of the hearing is excludable, even when the hearing is
deferred until trial.” United States v. Phillips, 936 F.2d 1252, 1254 (11th Cir.
1991); see United States v. Grosz, 76 F.3d 1318, 1324 n.3 (5th Cir. 1996)
(“pending James motions do toll the speedy trial clock when they are heard and
ruled upon at trial”). Although the district court never set Vigil’s motion for
hearing, it explained its intention to make James determinations during the trial
itself. Accordingly, the period from the filing of Vigil’s motion until the start of
trial on March 30, 2009, is excluded under § 3161(h)(1)(D). 3
Thus, even assuming that none of the ends-of-justice continuances were
properly granted, Defendant’s speedy-trial clock ran at most 28 days (between
August 23 and September 20, 2007), comfortably within the 70 days allowed.
There were then five days from the declaration of the mistrial on April 1 until the
first day of trial on April 6, but the declaration restarted a 70-day clock. See 18
3
The district court issued an order on March 27, 2009, denying Vigil’s
discovery motions as moot. The order listed the docket numbers for the affected
motions, and one of those listed was the motion that included, in addition to
discovery motions, Vigil’s request for a James hearing. The court obviously was
not including the James-hearing request in the order because it announced early
during trial that it intended to resolve the James issues during trial.
-11-
U.S.C. § 3161(e) (“[T]he trial shall commence within seventy days from the date
the action occasioning the retrial becomes final.”).
There was no violation of the Speedy Trial Act.
II. Variance
Defendant argues that there was a variance between the single conspiracy
charged in the indictment and the alleged multiple, smaller conspiracies proved at
trial. When a defendant seeks reversal because of an alleged variance, we
examine (1) whether the evidence presented supports the overall conspiracy
charged or if a variance occurred, and (2) if there was a variance, whether the
variance was substantially prejudicial to the defendant. See United States v.
Carnagie, 533 F.3d 1231, 1237 (10th Cir. 2008). If a variance is found, we
review the question of prejudice de novo. See id. at 1240.
In this case we need not address the first issue because we conclude that
even if there was a variance, Defendant did not suffer substantial prejudice as a
result. Defendant argues that he suffered prejudice because the physical evidence
introduced during trial, much of it seized after he claims to have severed
connections with the alleged coconspirators, implicated only Espinoza-Aguilar
and “cast the danger of the inference of guilt” against Defendant. Aplt Br. at 40.
He asserts that the “bulk of the evidence was so overwhelming that it
overshadowed any attempt to demonstrate his innocence” and that it was
impossible to discern his true conduct or relevant conduct attributable to him. Id.
-12-
at 41. He claims that he was additionally prejudiced by being incarcerated for
more than 22 months while the government continued to investigate, gather
evidence, and indict more people in the conspiracy.
Defendant has failed to show, however, that he was prejudiced by the
introduction of evidence at trial (whether this evidence was acquired by the
government before or after his incarceration) that did not relate specifically to
him. A variance is substantially prejudicial “if the evidence adduced against
co-conspirators involved in separate conspiracies was more likely than not
imputed to the defendant by the jury in its determination of the defendant’s guilt.”
Carnegie, 533 F.3d at 1241 (internal quotation marks omitted). But in
Defendant’s trial the evidence implicating only Espinoza-Aguilar was “not so
intricate as to render the jury unable to segregate the evidence associated with
each defendant’s individual actions.” Id. at 1242 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
To be sure, the government presented evidence of a far-ranging conspiracy
that went well beyond Defendant’s activities. The conspiracy involved a drug-
dealing organization run by Espinoza-Aguilar that operated in Wyoming,
California, Colorado, and Iowa. This conspiracy included several mid- and low-
level dealers and distributors. One such mid-level dealer was Morales-Martinez,
who sold drugs for Espinoza-Aguilar in Wyoming and brought several others into
-13-
the conspiracy. Thus Defendant, whose involvement was through Morales-
Martinez, was a comparatively minor actor.
But the evidence against Defendant was not vague allegations of mere
association with the culprits. Although witnesses described Defendant as a
“sidekick” of Morales-Martinez, they also described his specific criminal conduct.
Several testified that Defendant cut the methamphetamine with another chemical
to increase the weight of the substance, weighed methamphetamine and packaged
it for distribution, and distributed methamphetamine to users and other dealers.
There was further testimony that Defendant would accompany Morales-Martinez
on trips to California to pick up methamphetamine.
Given that there was only one codefendant at Defendant’s trial and that the
evidence against Defendant was compartmentalized, there was no risk of jury
confusion. See id. at 1242 (concluding that the risk of prejudice was not great in
a trial involving three codefendants). Even if a variance occurred, Defendant has
not shown that he suffered substantial prejudice as a result.
CONCLUSION
We AFFIRM the district court’s denial of Mr. Mulgado-Patida’s motion to
dismiss for violation of the Speedy Trial Act and AFFIRM his conviction.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Harris L Hartz
Circuit Judge
-14-