09-4582-cv (L), 09-4773-cv (Con)
Belpasso v. Port Authority of New York and New Jersey
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the
2 Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan United States
3 Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of New York, on the 17th
4 day of November, two thousand ten.
5
6 PRESENT:
7
8 ROGER J. MINER,
9 CHESTER J. STRAUB,
10 DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON,
11
12 Circuit Judges.
13
14 __________________________________________
15
16 Philip R. Belpasso,
17
18 Plaintiff-Appellant,
19
20 -v.- 09-4582-cv (L)
21 09-4773-cv (Con)
22
23 Port Authority of New York and New Jersey,
24
25 Defendant-Appellee,
26
27 City of New York, New York,
28
29 Defendant.*
30 __________________________________________
*
The Clerk of Court is directed to amend the official
caption to conform with the caption above.
1
2 FOR APPELLANT: Philip R. Belpasso, pro se, Fair Lawn, New
3 Jersey.
4
5 FOR APPELLEE: Megan Lee, Port Authority of New York and New
6 Jersey, New York, New York.
7
8
9 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND
10 DECREED that the district court’s judgment be AFFIRMED.
11 In this consolidated appeal, plaintiff-appellant Philip R.
12 Belpasso (“Belpasso”), pro se, appeals from a judgment of the
13 United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
14 (Stein, J.) 1) adopting the magistrate judge’s report and
15 recommendation and granting defendant-appellee Port Authority of
16 New York and New Jersey’s (“Port Authority”) motion for summary
17 judgment; and 2) denying Belpasso’s motion for a “contempt hearing”
18 and request for sanctions against the Port Authority. Belpasso
19 also appeals from an order dismissing, on the grounds set forth in
20 the report and recommendation, a separate action raising identical
21 legal claims and involving the same parties. He further moves to
22 compel defendant City of New York, New York (“City”) to file a
23 response brief in this appeal.1 We assume the parties' familiarity
24 with the facts and procedural history.
25 We review a grant of summary judgment de novo and must
1
The district court dismissed Belpasso’s claims against the
City in a Memorandum and Order issued July 2, 2008. Belpasso’s
motion for reconsideration was denied on October 20, 2008. The
City is not a party to this appeal.
2
1 determine whether the district court properly concluded that there
2 was no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
3 party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Miller v.
4 Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P., 321 F.3d 292, 300 (2d Cir. 2003);
5 Republic Nat’l Bank v. Delta Air Lines, 263 F.3d 42, 46 (2d Cir.
6 2001). In determining whether there are genuine issues of material
7 fact, we are “‘required to resolve all ambiguities and draw all
8 permissible factual inferences in favor of the party against whom
9 summary judgment is sought.’” Terry v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 128, 137
10 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting Stern v. Trustees of Columbia Univ. in City
11 of N.Y., 131 F.3d 305, 312 (2d Cir. 1997)). However, “[t]he mere
12 existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff’s
13 position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the
14 jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.” Anderson v. Liberty
15 Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986) (emphasis added); see also
16 Jeffreys v. City of New York, 426 F.3d 549, 554 (2d Cir. 2005).
17 When the moving party has carried its burden, its opponent “must do
18 more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to
19 the material facts,” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
20 Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986), and cannot “rely on conclusory
21 allegations or unsubstantiated speculation,” Fujitsu Ltd. v. Fed.
22 Express Corp., 247 F.3d 423, 428 (2d Cir. 2001).
23 Where the party opposing summary judgment is proceeding pro
24 se, we must read that party’s pleadings “liberally and interpret
3
1 them to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest.”
2 McPherson v. Coombe, 174 F.3d 276, 280 (2d Cir. 1999) (internal
3 quotation marks omitted). A pro se plaintiff, however, cannot
4 defeat a motion for summary judgment by simply relying on the
5 allegations of his complaint; he must present admissible evidence
6 from which a reasonable jury could find in his favor. See Champion
7 v. Artuz, 76 F.3d 483, 485 (2d Cir. 1996). Viewing the evidence in
8 the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, summary judgment
9 is appropriate where there is no genuine issue of material fact.
10 See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
11 Having reviewed the record in light of these principles, we
12 affirm the district court’s judgment for substantially the same
13 reasons presented in the thorough and well-reasoned report and
14 recommendation by the magistrate judge. We have considered all of
15 Belpasso’s contentions on appeal and find them to be without merit.
16 The judgment and order of the district court are therefore
17 AFFIRMED. It is further ORDERED that Belpasso’s motion to compel
18 the City to file a brief in this action is DENIED.
19
20 FOR THE COURT:
21 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
22
4