NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT NOV 17 2010
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
RACHEL ZIEGLER, individually and as No. 09-56321
Guardian Ad Litem for her minor children,
SAR and STR, D.C. No. 2:07-cv-08190-ODW-OP
Plaintiff - Appellant,
MEMORANDUM *
v.
COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees,
and
CARY BINGHAM; et al.,
Defendants.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Otis D. Wright, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted October 8, 2010 **
Pasadena, California
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Before: PREGERSON, D.W. NELSON and IKUTA, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff-Appellant Rachel Ziegler (“Ziegler”), individually and as Guardian
Ad Litem for her nine-year-old daughter (“SAR”), appeals from a district court
grant of summary judgment for Defendants-Appellees on the basis of qualified
immunity. Ziegler filed suit against social workers Thomas Hall (“Hall”) and
Blanca Alonso Hall (“Alonso”), and Riverside County pursuant to 42 U.S.C §
1983 claiming that they violated Ziegler’s and SAR’s Fourteenth Amendment right
to familial association and SAR’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from
unreasonable seizures of her person when they removed SAR from Ziegler’s
custody at a hospital without a warrant. Ziegler also sued under various state tort
laws.
The district court granted Hall and Alonso’s motion for summary judgment
on qualified immunity grounds and denied Ziegler’s motion for summary judgment
on the ground that her constitutional rights were not violated, dismissing her other
state and federal claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 1292.
We reverse in part, affirm in part and remand for proceedings consistent with this
disposition.
2
I.
To determine whether a defendant is entitled to qualified immunity, courts
apply a two-pronged inquiry: (1) whether the defendants’ actions violated a
constitutional right; and (2) whether the right was clearly established. Saucier v.
Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200 (2001). The court may address these two prongs in any
order “in light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand.” Pearson v.
Callahan, 129 S.Ct. 808, 818 (2009).
When evaluating constitutional violations under the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments for the removal of children, the same standard applies: “Officials
may remove a child from the custody of its parent without prior judicial
authorization only if the information they possess at the time of the seizure is such
as provides reasonable cause to believe that the child is in imminent danger of
serious bodily injury and that the scope of the intrusion is reasonably necessary to
avert that specific injury.” Wallis v. Spencer, 202 F.3d 1126, 1138 (9th Cir. 2000).
“Summary judgment in favor of the defendants is improper unless, viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, it is clear that no reasonable
jury could conclude that the plaintiff’s constitutional rights were violated.” Id.
Construing the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, we conclude
that there are disputed issues of material fact appropriate for a jury. A reasonable
3
jury could find that (1) where hospital staff reported no evidence of abuse or
neglect and Ziegler said she had a place to stay for the night, the social workers did
not have reasonable cause to conclude that SAR was in imminent danger of serious
bodily injury; or (2) the social workers should have taken less intrusive actions,
short of removing SAR from her mother’s custody, if they felt SAR needed to be
kept safe until a warrant could be obtained. In contrast, a reasonable jury could
find that Hall and Alonso’s actions were reasonable based on their perceptions
regarding Ziegler’s mental status and the alleged role reversal between mother and
child. Thus, there are disputed issues of material fact as to whether Ziegler and
SAR’s constitutional rights were violated. Therefore, the grant of summary
judgment for social workers Hall and Alonso was improper, and the denial of
summary judgment for Ziegler was appropriate.1
II.
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the denial of summary judgment to
plaintiff, Ziegler. We REVERSE the district court’s grant of summary judgment
in favor of social workers Hall and Alonso, and REMAND for proceedings
consistent with this disposition.
1
The district court granted summary judgment only on the basis of the first
prong of the Saucier analysis. We, too, decline to proceed to the second prong, and
do not decide whether the rights at issue were clearly established.
4
Each party shall bear its own costs on appeal.
5