[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
NOVEMBER 23, 2010
No. 09-14783
JOHN LEY
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 09-00943-CV-T-27-EAJ
HARRY MICHAEL SCHMITT,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
UNITED STATES OFFICE OF
PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
_________________________
(November 23, 2010)
Before EDMONDSON, WILSON and MARTIN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Harry Michael Schmitt appeals the district court’s sua sponte order
dismissing his amended pro se complaint with prejudice for his willful failure to
comply with an earlier court order and his re-filing of a duplicative action.1 On
appeal, Schmitt proceeds pro se and argues that his claim was “clearly pled and
un-rebutted by Appellees.” He therefore requests that we remand the case and
instruct the district court to hold an evidentiary hearing on his claims. After a
careful review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
“We review for abuse of discretion a district court’s dismissal for failure to
comply with the rules of court.” Betty K Agencies, Ltd. v. M/V Monada, 432 F.3d
1333, 1337 (11th Cir. 2005). On motion of defendant, Rule 41(b) authorizes a
district court to dismiss an action for failure to comply with a court order or
federal rule. Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b). The court also has the inherent ability to
dismiss a claim in light of “its authority to enforce its orders and provide for the
efficient disposition of litigation.” Zocaras v. Castro, 465 F.3d 479, 483 (11th
Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). However, since dismissal with prejudice is
considered a sanction of “last resort, applicable only in extreme circumstances,”
1
Although the district court did not indicate whether the dismissal was with or without
prejudice, where the district court fails to specify, the dismissal is deemed to have been with
prejudice. Cohen v. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., 782 F.2d 923, 924 n.1 (11th Cir. 1986) (per
curiam).
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id. (quoting Goforth v. Owens, 766 F.2d 1533, 1535 (11th Cir. 1985)), it is not
proper unless the district court finds a “clear record of delay or willful conduct and
that lesser sanctions are inadequate to correct such conduct.” Betty K Agencies,
432 F.3d at 1339.
Schmitt’s amended complaint was submitted on a standardized form entitled
“U.S. Office of Special Counsel Complaint of Possible Personnel Practice or Other
Prohibited Activity.” Although the nature of his complaint is unclear, it appears
that he is alleging an attorney for the United States Navy coerced a Naval
Ordinance Test Unit ethics officer into providing a false statement to a Navy
investigator during the course of an employment investigation. It is not clear
whether Schmitt sought review of earlier Merit Systems Protection Board
proceedings, review of the United States Navy administrative proceedings, or
whether he is attempting to bring a federal suit under Title VII, other regulations
and statutes addressing workplace retaliation, or what he terms the “Medical
Privacy Act.”
While the court is obligated to construe a pro se litigant’s pleadings
liberally, Tannenbaum v. U.S., 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998) (per curiam),
a party who proceeds pro se nevertheless must comply with the same procedural
rules that other litigants must follow. Loren v. Sasser, 309 F.3d 1296, 1304 (11th
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Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (citation omitted). Where it appears that a more carefully
drafted complaint might state a claim, the district court should give a pro se
plaintiff an opportunity to amend his complaint instead of dismissing it. See Bank
v. Pitt, 928 F.2d 1108, 1112 (11th Cir. 1991) (per curiam), overruled in part by
Wagner v. Daewoo Heavy Indus. Am. Corp., 314 F.3d 541, 542 (11th Cir. 2002)
(en banc) (overruling Bank as it relates to counseled litigants, but specifically
declining to do so for pro se litigants).
Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion. In this case, the district
court dismissed Schmitt’s initial complaint and granted him leave to amend,
permitting him an opportunity to assert his claim in compliance with the Federal
Rules. Rather than comply, Schmitt filed a timely amended complaint on a
standardized form that is specifically designed for administrative actions in the
United States Office of Special Counsel. Under a liberal construction, the
complaint loosely identifies the United States Navy as a potential defendant but
still fails to comply with Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), which requires a “short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” In addition,
the amended complaint indicates Schmitt’s previous attempts to institute
proceedings in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida
and the United States Court of Federal Claims based on the same facts.
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We agree with the district court that allowing Schmitt’s action to continue
would have resulted in unnecessarily prolonged proceedings and immense
expenditure of resources, and would have been an undue burden on the court’s
docket. Even a liberal reading of the complaint would not allow the district court
to determine the basis for the suit or any applicable law, nor would it provide any
potential defendant with notice of a claim or the grounds supporting it, as required
by Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S. Ct 99, 103 (1957). Thus, the district
court acted within its discretion when it dismissed Schmitt’s amended complaint
based on his willful failure to comply with the court’s previous order and his re-
filing of a duplicative action. The district court explicitly found that a lesser
sanction than dismissal was not sufficient, and this Court agrees. Accordingly, we
affirm the judgment of dismissal.
AFFIRMED.
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