In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
No. 09-2232
R ESEARCH A UTOMATION, INC.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
S CHRADER-B RIDGEPORT
INTERNATIONAL, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee.
____________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 1:09-cv-01265—Joan B. Gottschall, Judge.
____________
A RGUED S EPTEMBER 15, 2010—D ECIDED N OVEMBER 23, 2010
____________
Before M ANION, S YKES, and H AMILTON, Circuit Judges.
H AMILTON, Circuit Judge. This case presents a relatively
rare appeal of an issue that arises frequently in district
courts: two parties file identical lawsuits, each a mirror-
image of the other, in different federal districts. To prevent
duplication of this sort, district courts may transfer, enjoin,
or dismiss one of the lawsuits. We take this opportunity to
provide additional guidance on this issue for district courts
and for litigants.
2 No. 09-2232
The parties in this case filed mirror-image lawsuits in
two different district courts, each claiming the other had
breached their contract for the manufacture and sale of an
industrial cleaning machine. Shortly after seller Research
Automation, Inc., an Illinois corporation, delivered the
machine to the Virginia manufacturing plant of buyer
Schrader-Bridgeport, Inc., a dispute arose as to whether the
machine met the contract specifications. Each party filed
suit in its home state’s courts. After both cases were
removed to their respective federal courts, each defendant
moved to transfer the competing lawsuit to its preferred
venue. Research Automation also asked the Illinois court
to enjoin the Virginia proceedings on the ground that the
Illinois suit should receive priority for having been filed
first. The Illinois district judge ruled on that motion
together with Schrader-Bridgeport’s transfer motion,
finding that a transfer to Virginia under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)
was the most appropriate resolution of the parties’ compet-
ing motions.
We affirm the district court’s decision to deny the
injunction and to transfer the Illinois action to the Western
District of Virginia. Where a district court gives thoughtful
consideration to the factors applicable to a transfer analysis
under section 1404(a), we give its decision substantial
deference. That deference applies regardless of whether
there is only one lawsuit between the parties or whether
there is a second case pending in the other forum.
No. 09-2232 3
Facts and Procedural Background
In 2006, plaintiff Research Automation, Inc. entered into
an agreement with defendant Schrader-Bridgeport Interna-
tional, Inc. to manufacture a custom-made “High Pressure
Water Jet Deburr and Cleaning Machine,” which Schrader-
Bridgeport planned to use to clean and deburr its automo-
tive valves and stems. The machine was to be completed in
2007, but Schrader-Bridgeport alleged that the machine
failed to satisfy the requirements specified in the agree-
ment and filed a lawsuit alleging breach of the agreement
in a Virginia state court on November 16, 2007. As the
parties attempted to work out their differences, the state
court litigation was not pursued and eventually was non-
suited on February 2, 2009, due to lack of service.1
Four days later, Research Automation sued Schrader-
Bridgeport in an Illinois state court. Research Automation
alleged that Schrader-Bridgeport breached the parties’
amended agreement by failing to pay. On February 23,
2009, Schrader-Bridgeport filed its own suit in a Virginia
state court alleging that Research Automation breached the
same agreement. Each case was removed to federal court
on the basis of diversity jurisdiction: Schrader-Bridgeport
1
Under Virginia law, a party is allowed one non-suit, which
acts as a voluntary dismissal, as a matter of right. Va. Code Ann.
§ 8.01-380(B). This earlier filed state court case might have been
construed as the first-filed case between the parties on this issue,
undermining Research Automation’s claim to have the “first-
filed” case. The district court did not see things that way,
however, so we do not pursue that line of analysis.
4 No. 09-2232
removed the Illinois suit to the Northern District of Illinois
on February 27, 2009, and Research Automation removed
the Virginia action to the Western District of Virginia on
March 23, 2009. The parties agree that these suits are
mirror images of each other, with the exception that the
Virginia action also names as a defendant a North Carolina
corporation that served as Research Automation’s agent in
the parties’ original negotiations.
On March 24, 2009, one day after removing the Virginia
action, Research Automation filed a motion in Illinois to
enjoin Schrader-Bridgeport from prosecuting its action in
Virginia. Two days later, on March 26, Schrader-Bridgeport
moved to transfer the Illinois case to the Virginia court
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). On April 27, 2009, the
Illinois court denied Research Automation’s motion for an
injunction and granted Schrader-Bridgeport’s motion to
transfer. This appeal followed.
Analysis
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1), we have jurisdiction over
the appeal of the district court’s order denying Research
Automation’s motion for an injunction. A decision granting
or denying a section 1404(a) transfer is ordinarily a non-
reviewable interlocutory order. Hill v. Potter, 352 F.3d 1142,
1144 (7th Cir. 2003). The doctrine of pendent appellate
jurisdiction, however, allows us to review an otherwise
unappealable interlocutory order if it is “inextricably
intertwined with an appealable one.” Montano v. City of
Chicago, 375 F.3d 593, 599 (7th Cir. 2004), quoting Jones v.
InfoCure Corp., 310 F.3d 529, 536 (7th Cir. 2002). Here, the
No. 09-2232 5
district court’s two rulings are inextricably intertwined.
Both the denial of the injunction and the district court’s
transfer order concern the same single issue: whether this
case should be litigated in Illinois or in Virginia. We
exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction over the district
court’s order transferring the case to Virginia.
The parties agree that we review the district court’s
decision on both motions for an abuse of its discretion. See
Coffey v. Van Dorn Iron Works, 796 F.2d 217, 219-20 (7th Cir.
1986) (reviewing a transfer order under an abuse-of-
discretion standard); Martin v. Graybar Electric Co., 266 F.2d
202, 203-05 (7th Cir. 1959) (applying an abuse-of-discretion
standard to an injunction to halt proceedings in identical
lawsuits). This standard implies “a very limited scope of
appellate review.” Coté v. Wadel, 796 F.2d 981, 985 (7th Cir.
1986). We “do not simply engage in a perfunctory rub-
ber-stamping of the district court’s decision,” but we “give
that decision substantial deference.” American Hospital
Supply Corp. v. Hospital Products Ltd., 780 F.2d 589, 594 (7th
Cir. 1986) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
The parties disagree with respect to the scope of the
district court’s discretion and the manner in which it was
applied. Research Automation contends that the judicial
doctrine known as the “first-to-file rule” defines the
bounds of the district court’s discretion, limiting the
court’s analysis under section 1404(a) to a determination of
which case was filed first. Schrader-Bridgeport argues that
the district court has the discretion to depart from the first-
to-file rule where a transfer analysis otherwise warrants.
Based on the weight of authority and principles of sound
6 No. 09-2232
judicial administration, we conclude that the filing order is
only one factor among many and in this case was not
entitled to control the district court’s evaluation.
As a practical matter, we address the section 1404(a)
issue first because, like the district court, we find it to be
decisive in this case.
I. Transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)
In 1948, Congress enacted the federal change of venue
statute, codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1404, to allow a district court
to transfer an action filed in a proper, though not necessar-
ily convenient, venue to a more convenient district.
Subsection (a) provides: “For the convenience of the parties
and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may
transfer any civil action to any other district or division
where it might have been brought.”
Recognizing that what is convenient for one litigant may
not be convenient for the other, the Supreme Court has
taught that section 1404(a) “is intended to place discretion
in the district court to adjudicate motions for transfer
according to [a] ‘. . . case-by-case consideration of conve-
nience and fairness.’ ” Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh
Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 29 (1988), quoting Van Dusen v. Barrack,
376 U.S. 612, 622 (1964); see also In re Joint Eastern &
Southern Districts Asbestos Litigation, 22 F.3d 755, 762 (7th
Cir. 1994) (the section 1404 statutory transfer power “was
clearly intended to vest in the transferor court more
discretion than it had been permitted to exercise under the
common law doctrine”). By the same token, we grant a
No. 09-2232 7
substantial degree of deference to the district court in
deciding whether transfer is appropriate. See Tice v.
American Airlines, Inc., 162 F.3d 966, 974 (7th Cir. 1998). The
statutory language guides the court’s evaluation of the
particular circumstances of each case and is broad enough
to allow the court to take into account all factors relevant
to convenience and/or the interests of justice. The statute
permits a “flexible and individualized analysis” and
affords district courts the opportunity to look beyond a
narrow or rigid set of considerations in their determina-
tions. Stewart, 487 U.S. at 29.
With respect to the convenience evaluation, courts
generally consider the availability of and access to wit-
nesses, and each party’s access to and distance from
resources in each forum. See, e.g., Schumacher v. Principal
Life Insurance Co., 665 F. Supp. 2d 970, 977 (N.D. Ind. 2009);
Jaramillo v. DineEquity, Inc., 664 F. Supp. 2d 908, 913-15
(N.D. Ill. 2009). Other related factors include the location of
material events and the relative ease of access to sources of
proof. See, e.g., Sassy, Inc. v. Berry, 406 F. Supp. 2d 874, 876-
77 (N.D. Ill. 2005); Brandon Apparel Group, Inc. v. Quitman
Manufacturing Co., 42 F. Supp. 2d 821, 833-34 (N.D. Ill.
1999).
The “interest of justice” is a separate element of the
transfer analysis that relates to the efficient administration
of the court system. See Van Dusen, 376 U.S. at 626-27. For
this element, courts look to factors including docket
congestion and likely speed to trial in the transferor and
potential transferee forums, see Chicago, Rock Island &
Pacific Railroad Co. v. Igoe, 220 F.2d 299, 303 (7th Cir. 1955);
8 No. 09-2232
each court’s relative familiarity with the relevant law, Van
Dusen, 376 U.S. at 645; the respective desirability of resolv-
ing controversies in each locale, Allied Van Lines, Inc. v.
Aaron Transfer & Storage, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 2d 941, 946 (N.D.
Ill. 2002); and the relationship of each community to the
controversy, see Hanley v. Omarc, Inc., 6 F. Supp. 2d 770,
777 (N.D. Ill. 1998). The interest of justice may be determi-
native, warranting transfer or its denial even where the
convenience of the parties and witnesses points toward the
opposite result. See Coffey, 796 F.2d at 220-21.
Taking each of these factors of convenience and public
interest into account, the district court determined that the
sum of the interests among the parties weighs more heavily
toward adjudication in Virginia. First, the court concluded
that neither party established that the other forum would
pose an overwhelming hardship for the parties themselves.
Next, the court evaluated the convenience of party and
non-party witnesses and found that neither forum would
be more convenient for the witnesses overall. The court
then considered the locations of sources of proof and
determined that this factor slightly favored Virginia.
Finally, the court listed the “material events” taking place
in Virginia: the negotiation of the original agreement,
performance of the amended agreement, and the ultimate
testing of the machine. The district court also noted the fact
that the purpose of the original and amended agreements
was for Research Automation not only to deliver but also
to install the machine in Schrader-Bridgeport’s Virginia
facility, where it was supposed to work successfully. These
material events in Virginia formed the basis of the court’s
transfer decision. The court’s conclusion was reasonable.
No. 09-2232 9
Where the balance of convenience is a close call, merely
shifting inconvenience from one party to another is not a
sufficient basis for transfer. See, e.g., Gueorguiev v. Max
Rave, LLC, 526 F. Supp. 2d 853, 857 (N.D. Ill. 2007); Kubin-
Nicholson Corp. v. Gillon, 525 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1075 (E.D.
Wis. 2007); Enviroplan, Inc. v. Western Farmers Electric
Cooperative, 900 F. Supp. 1055, 1064 (S.D. Ind. 1995); Kendall
U.S.A., Inc. v. Central Printing Co., 666 F. Supp. 1264, 1268-
69 (N.D. Ind. 1987). Here, however, while the district judge
determined that no one element clearly indicated that one
forum would be more convenient than the other, the
totality of the factors pointed to Virginia’s stronger nexus
to the relevant events.
Although the district court’s discretion is not unlimited,
we adhere to the Supreme Court’s directive that, “where
the court has considered all relevant public and private
interest factors, and where its balancing of these factors is
reasonable,” as in this case, “its decision deserves substan-
tial deference.” Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 257
(1981), citing Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 511-12
(1947). Even if we agreed with Research Automation that
the Northern District of Illinois would be a very convenient
forum, that is not enough to show that the district court
abused its discretion in concluding that the Western
District of Virginia is more convenient. And even if we
were inclined to reach a different outcome by way of our
own review of the record, we would still conclude that the
district court, by evaluating factors appropriate to resolve
both motions, did not abuse its discretion in deciding to
transfer.
10 No. 09-2232
II. The First-to-File Rule
In an effort to defeat the transfer analysis, Research
Automation maintains that Schrader-Bridgeport’s motion
must fail because a plaintiff’s choice of forum is afforded
deference so long as the chosen forum is related to the case.
See Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 508 (“[U]nless the balance is strongly
in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff’s choice of forum
should rarely be disturbed.”).2 But where, as here, the case
involves two identical suits in distinct venues, this factor
loses its significance entirely: each case has a plaintiff, and
one of them will necessarily be disturbed. The district court
was right to discount this element in this context.
Upon examining the facts and circuit precedent on the
issue, the district court was uncertain about whether a
first-to-file rule should apply, but it found that the transfer
analysis provided sufficient grounds for a transfer. Re-
search Automation argues that the district court erred by
not taking into account a presumption in favor of the first-
filed Illinois action, relying on this court’s “general rule” as
stated in Martin v. Graybar Electric Co., 266 F.2d 202, 204
(7th Cir. 1959), that, absent unusual circumstances, a party
filing later in time should be enjoined from further prose-
cution. We do not read Graybar Electric the same way.
2
Where this principle applies, certain behavior may count
against a plaintiff’s choice of forum, such as where there is
evidence of forum-shopping or bad faith by a litigant. See IFC
Credit Corp. v. Aliano Brothers General Contractors, Inc., 437
F.3d 606, 609-10 (7th Cir. 2006) (evaluating bad faith as a
consideration and discussing the dangers of forum-shopping).
No. 09-2232 11
Graybar Electric involved an action seeking coercive (as
opposed to declaratory) relief filed in the Northern District
of Illinois and a parallel declaratory judgment action in the
Northern District of Iowa filed six days later. The Illinois
district judge in that case expressed reluctance to issue an
injunction to block the Iowa action, believing erroneously
that he did not have the power to do so. We reversed and
remanded, holding that a district court has discretion to
issue an injunction where the parties are prosecuting
parallel actions in different districts. The “general rule”
prescribed in Graybar Electric was intended to empower the
district courts with respect to their injunctive authority, not
to mandate any particular standard or approach.
Since Graybar Electric, we have made clear that where the
facts of that case are replicated—that is, where the parallel
cases involve a declaratory judgment action and a mirror-
image action seeking coercive relief—we ordinarily give
priority to the coercive action, regardless of which case was
filed first. In those cases, we have repeatedly taught that
this circuit does not rigidly adhere to a first-to-file rule.
E.g., Trippe Manufacturing Co. v. American Power Conversion
Corp., 46 F.3d 624, 629 (7th Cir. 1995) (affirming dismissal
of first-filed declaratory judgment action in favor of later-
filed coercive action); Tempco Electric Heater Corp. v. Omega
Engineering, Inc., 819 F.2d 746, 749-50 (7th Cir. 1987)
(finding that the “mere fact” that a plaintiff filed its action
first “does not give it a ‘right’ to choose a forum”); see also
Tamari v. Bache & Co. (Lebanon), 565 F.2d 1194, 1203 (7th Cir.
1977) (teaching that there is no rigid chronological rule but
that the timing of filing may be one factor affecting discre-
tion). Even in Graybar Electric, we noted that any mechani-
12 No. 09-2232
cal solution of such a problem would not be “[w]ise judicial
administration.” 266 F.2d at 203, quoting Kerotest Manufac-
turing Co. v. C-O-Two Fire Equipment Co., 342 U.S. 180, 183
(1952).
Courts have also departed from a first-to-file rule where
one party files its lawsuit in anticipation of an impending
suit by the opposing party. See, e.g., Schwarz v. National Van
Lines, Inc., 317 F. Supp. 2d 829, 833 (N.D. Ill. 2004) (finding
that where a plaintiff files an action “in the face of a clear
threat” that the opposing party will sue, a court will
dismiss a first-to-file argument). This type of behavior only
exacerbates the risk of wasteful litigation.3
This court has “never laid down an inflexible rule that
the prior filing controls.” Warshawsky & Co. v. Arcata
National Corp., 552 F.2d 1257, 1265 (7th Cir. 1977); see also
Graybar Electric, 266 F.2d at 203 (declining to lay down “a
judicial fiat that the prosecution of the subsequent suit
must or must not be enjoined as a matter of law”). Research
Automation relies on language from Asset Allocation &
3
Schrader-Bridgeport contends Research Automation’s
“improper anticipatory filing” should foreclose its first-to-file
argument. The district court found that it appeared from the
record that Schrader-Bridgeport had not yet breached the
parties’ amended agreement because time still remained for it to
make its final payment for the machine according to the terms
of the agreement. While the court noted that Research Automa-
tion had not submitted any evidence to support a theory of
anticipatory breach, the court proceeded with its analysis
nonetheless without ruling as to any impropriety in the timing
of Research Automation’s complaint. We do the same.
No. 09-2232 13
Management Co. v. Western Employers Insurance Co., 892 F.2d
566 (7th Cir. 1989), stating that there is a rebuttable pre-
sumption that the first case should proceed, “subject to the
principles that govern requests for transfer to a more
convenient forum.” 892 F.2d at 573. The Asset Allocation
opinion also said that a district court has “a power, [but]
not a duty,” to enjoin a second-filed case. Id. at 572. In our
view, the Asset Allocation court’s intended meaning is clear:
the first-filed case may proceed where the principles that
govern requests for transfer do not indicate otherwise. We
reiterate our holding in Tempco Electric that, although a
first-to-file rule would have the “virtue of certainty and
ease of application, . . . the cost—a rule which will encour-
age an unseemly race to the courthouse . . . —is simply too
high.” 819 F.2d at 750.
Our approach is not unique in this respect. The other
circuits have developed similar practices. Though the
Eleventh Circuit has made reference to a “strong presump-
tion across the federal circuits that favors the forum of the
first-filed suit under the first-filed rule,” and has
“require[d] that the party objecting to jurisdiction in the
first-filed forum carry the burden of proving ‘compelling
circumstances’ to warrant an exception” to the rule,
Manuel v. Convergys Corp., 430 F.3d 1132, 1135 (11th Cir.
2005) (citations omitted), we do not find as strong support
among our sister circuits. Most maintain the rule as a
guiding principle to be left to the discretion of the district
court. For example, though the Third Circuit refers to a
first-to-file rule, it is “not a mandate directing wooden
application of the rule . . . . District courts have always
had discretion to retain jurisdiction given appropriate
14 No. 09-2232
circumstances justifying departure from the first-filed
rule.” EEOC v. University of Pennsylvania, 850 F.2d 969, 972
(3d Cir. 1988). The Sixth and D.C. Circuits have adopted
the same reasoning. See Certified Restoration Dry Cleaning
Network, L.L.C. v. Tenke Corp., 511 F.3d 535, 551 (6th Cir.
2007) (finding that the first-to-file rule is “not a strict rule”
and that district courts “have the discretion to dispense
with [it] where equity so demands”), quoting AmSouth
Bank v. Dale, 386 F.3d 763, 791 n.8 (6th Cir. 2004), and Zide
Sport Shop of Ohio, Inc. v. Ed Tobergte Associates, Inc., 16 F.
App’x 433, 437 (6th Cir. 2001); Handy v. Shaw, Bransford,
Veilleux & Roth, 325 F.3d 346, 350 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (empha-
sizing that district courts should balance equitable consid-
erations rather than use “a mechanical rule of thumb”)
(citation and quotation marks omitted).
The Fourth and Fifth Circuits have also indicated that
courts should consider the filing chronology as part of the
transfer calculus. See West Gulf Maritime Association v. ILA
Deep Sea Local 24, 751 F.2d 721, 728-32 (5th Cir. 1985)
(discussing first-to-file as a general principle for the
discretion of the district court in deciding whether to
transfer); Ellicott Machine Corp. v. Modern Welding Co.,
502 F.2d 178, 181-82 (4th Cir. 1974).
The Ninth Circuit has noted that the first-to-file rule is
“not a rigid or inflexible rule to be mechanically applied,
but rather is to be applied with a view to the dictates of
sound judicial administration.” Pacesetter Systems, Inc. v.
Medtronic, Inc., 678 F.2d 93, 95 (9th Cir. 1982). The Eighth
Circuit has likewise treated the timing of filing as an
element “to be applied in a manner best serving the
No. 09-2232 15
interests of justice,” serving as a guide to the court’s
discretion “absent compelling circumstances.” Northwest
Airlines, Inc. v. American Airlines, Inc., 989 F.2d 1002, 1005
(8th Cir. 1993), quoting United States Fire Insurance Co. v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 920 F.2d 487 (8th Cir. 1990).
The First, Second, and Tenth Circuits maintain substan-
tial support for the rule, but they too have left room for
discretion. See Coady v. Ashcraft & Gerel, 223 F.3d 1, 11 (1st
Cir. 2000) (noting that the first-filed action is “generally
preferred”), quoting Cianbro Corp. v. Curran-Lavoie, Inc.,
814 F.2d 7 (1st Cir. 1987); Hospah Coal Co. v. Chaco Energy
Co., 673 F.2d 1161, 1164 (10th Cir. 1982) (holding that “the
court which first obtains jurisdiction should be allowed to
first decide issues of venue,” but that this “does not
necessarily mean that it should decide the merits of the
case”). The Federal Circuit, on the other hand, applies the
rule more strictly than the other circuits in the context of
patent infringement actions, which present a unique set of
concerns not relevant to our determination. See, e.g.,
Genentech, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 998 F.2d 931 (Fed. Cir.
1993), overruled in part on other grounds by Wilton v.
Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 289 (1995) (holding that district
court decisions on whether to exercise jurisdiction in
declaratory judgment actions are subject only to abuse-of-
discretion appellate review).
Research Automation relies on Citigroup Inc. v. City
Holding Co., 97 F. Supp. 2d 549 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), to argue
that the party filing second has a burden to demonstrate
“special circumstances” in order to overcome the first-to-
file rule. We decline to impose such a burden. Notwith-
16 No. 09-2232
standing that the Second Circuit adheres more closely to a
first-to-file principle than other circuits, Research Automa-
tion would not prevail even under the Citigroup approach.
The Citigroup court also acknowledged that the factors to
be weighed in a first-to-file analysis are the same factors
that apply to the decision of whether transfer is appropri-
ate under section 1404(a). 97 F. Supp. 2d at 555-63. Despite
attributing a “priority” to first-filed cases, the Citigroup
court outlined factors for departing from a default prefer-
ence for the first-filed case, including through a balancing
of convenience. 97 F. Supp. 2d at 560-63. We have upheld
the use of the same factors in prior cases without giving the
first-filed case any supplementary weight, and we decline
to augment the weight it receives here.
In this case, the district court followed our consistent
practice of evaluating the order of filing as part of the
section 1404(a) transfer analysis. At oral argument, Re-
search Automation seemed to agree with this approach,
acknowledging that the section 1404(a) factors “clearly”
apply to a determination of whether the first-filed case
should proceed. Research Automation maintains, however,
that none of the factors is sufficient on these facts to
overcome a preference for the forum where the first case
was filed. We disagree and hold that there is no such
preference. Where a case is filed first should weigh no
more heavily in the district court’s analysis than the
plaintiff’s choice of forum in a section 1404(a) calculation.
We apply the same standard to a section 1404(a) motion
regardless of whether there is a second-filed case. The
statutory language provides the ultimate touchstone, while
the considerations gleaned from judicial glosses will also
No. 09-2232 17
be applicable to many cases of this type in the sound
discretion of the district judge.
Conclusion
As the Supreme Court acknowledged more than thirty
years ago, there is “no precise rule” for resolving the
problem created by mirror-image lawsuits in two different
federal courts. Colorado River Water Conservation District v.
United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976). We hold that where
a district court faces one of two identical lawsuits and one
party moves to transfer to the other forum, the court
should do no more than consider the order in which the
suits were filed among the factors it evaluates under 28
U.S.C. § 1404(a).
Because we find the district court did not abuse its
discretion, either in the manner in which it approached the
parties’ competing motions or in the analysis it applied, we
affirm its decision to deny an injunction stopping the
Western District of Virginia case and to transfer the Illinois
case to that district.
11-23-10