UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 09-5086
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
ERIC LAMONT EVANS,
Defendant – Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Greenville. Malcolm J. Howard,
Senior District Judge. (5:09-cr-00111-H-1)
Submitted: November 5, 2010 Decided: November 23, 2010
Before WILKINSON, GREGORY, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
J. Rafael Rodriguez, Miami, Florida, for Appellant. Jennifer P.
May-Parker, Assistant United States Attorney, Raleigh, North
Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Eric Lamont Evans pled guilty, pursuant to a written
plea agreement, to distribution of fifty grams or more of
cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2006). The
district court sentenced him to the mandatory minimum sentence
of 120 months. On appeal, Evans’ counsel has filed a brief
pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), in which
he examines Evans’ Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 hearing and questions
whether the district court complied with Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.
Counsel concludes, however, that there are no meritorious issues
for appeal. Evans has filed pro se briefs in which he contests
his sentence. * The Government has not filed a response. We
affirm.
Evans did not move in the district court to withdraw
his guilty plea; accordingly, any error in the plea hearing is
*
In his pro se filings, Evans seeks the benefit on appeal
of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 (FSA), Pub. L. No. 111-220,
124 Stat. 2372, which increased the amounts of crack cocaine
that trigger statutory mandatory minimum sentences in 21
U.S.C.A. § 841(b) (West 2000 & Supp. 2010). We conclude that
the FSA does not apply to Evans’ case. See United States v.
Gomes, __ F.3d __, __, 2010 WL 3810872, at *2 (11th Cir. Oct. 1,
2010) (No. 10-11225); United States v. Carradine, __ F.3d __,
__, 2010 WL 3619799, at *4-*5 (6th Cir. Sept. 20, 2010) (No. 08-
3220). To the extent Evans also argues that the sentencing
disparity between powder and crack cocaine offenses violates the
Equal Protection or Due Process Clause, we find his claim to be
without merit.
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reviewed for plain error. United States v. Martinez, 277 F.3d
517, 525 (4th Cir. 2002). Counsel has identified no error in
the plea colloquy, and our review of the record reveals that the
district court substantially complied with the requirements of
Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 in accepting Evans’ guilty plea.
Accordingly, we affirm Evans’ conviction.
We review sentences for procedural and substantive
reasonableness under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall v.
United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). Here, the record
indicates that the district court followed the necessary
procedural steps in sentencing Evans, and Evans’ sentence, which
is the lowest the court could statutorily impose, is plainly
substantively reasonable. Thus, we conclude that the district
court did not abuse its discretion in imposing Evans’ sentence.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record and found no meritorious issues for appeal. Accordingly,
we affirm the district court’s judgment. This court requires
that counsel inform his client, in writing, of his right to
petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further
review. If the client requests that a petition be filed, but
counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then
counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on the client. We dispense with oral argument
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because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented
in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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