[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
NOVEMBER 24, 2010
No. 10-12786 JOHN LEY
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 1:09-cv-00071-JRH-WLB
LANA PARKER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
BOARD OF EDUCATION,
Defendant-Appellee.
__________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Georgia
_________________________
(November 24, 2010)
Before BLACK, HULL and MARTIN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Lana Parker, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s grant of
summary judgment in favor of her employer, the County Board of Education of
Richmond County, Georgia, (Board) in her retaliation suit brought under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). Parker asserts the district
court erred in granting summary judgment as to her claim that the Board directed
employees to physically abuse, intimidate, and harass her in retaliation for filing
discrimination claims with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) in 2003 and 2004. After review, we affirm.1
To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII, a plaintiff can
show “(1) [s]he engaged in statutorily protected activity; (2) [s]he suffered a
materially adverse action; and (3) there was a causal connection between the
protected activity and the [materially] adverse action.” Howard v. Walgreen Co.,
605 F.3d 1239, 1244 (11th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted).
Assuming, arguendo, Parker can establish the first two prongs, she can
offer no evidence to establish the third element of her prima facie case. The only
evidence Parker offered on this issue was in her response to the Board, in which
she stated that it seemed as though her co-workers who touched her were
1
“We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same
legal standard used by the district court.” Shiver v. Chertoff, 549 F.3d 1342, 1343 (11th Cir.
2008). The district court’s factual findings, however, warrant review for clear error only.
Robinson v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 595 F.3d 1269, 1273 (11th Cir. 2010).
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“following orders.” This bald assertion lacks evidentiary value, as she had no
basis to form this opinion. Moreover, this statement failed to show any causal
relationship between a protected activity and the adverse action.
Additionally, there was no temporal relationship between the statutorily
protected activity of filing an EEOC charge and the allegedly adverse series of
batteries by co-workers. The earliest battery alleged in Parker’s affidavits
occurred in January 2008 when Linda Ware “hit [Parker] twice in the office.”
Prior to the EEOC charge leading to this case, Parker filed her most recent EEOC
charge on April 2, 2004 and her most recent lawsuit on July 13, 2007. Her most
recent EEOC charge occurred 44 months prior to the earliest battery for which
evidence was provided. Her most recent lawsuit occurred approximately 6 months
prior to any battery for which evidence was provided. We have held that a
3-month delay between a protected activity and an adverse action did not establish
temporal proximity. See Wideman v. Wal-Mart Stores, 141 F.3d 1453, 1457 (11th
Cir. 1998); Thomas v. Cooper Lighting, 506 F.3d 1361, 1364 (11th Cir. 2007). As
there is no other evidence tending to show a causal relationship, prima facie
element three fails as a matter of law. See Higdon v. Jackson, 393 F.3d 1211,
1220 (11th Cir. 2004).
AFFIRMED.
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