[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS
U.S.
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
NOV 24, 2010
No. 10-12267 JOHN LEY
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 3:08-cv-01129-MCR
HILDA GRIFFIS,
lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,
lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
________________________
(November 24, 2010)
Before PRYOR, MARTIN and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Hilda Griffis appeals a decision that affirmed the denial of her application
for supplemental security income from the Social Security Administration. 42
U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3). Griffis argues that the administrative law judge erred by
using the term “moderate” to describe Griffis’s functional limitations and posed an
incomplete hypothetical to the vocational expert. We affirm.
We review the decision of the Commissioner “‘with deference to the factual
findings and close scrutiny of the legal conclusions.’” Ingram v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec. Admin., 496 F.3d 1253, 1260 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Cornelius v. Sullivan,
936 F.2d 1143, 1145 (11th Cir. 1991)). We review de novo the legal conclusions
of the Commissioner, and we treat its findings of fact as conclusive if supported
by substantial evidence. Id. Substantial evidence consists of “‘relevant evidence
[that] a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Id.
(quoting Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983)).
The administrative law judge did not err by using the term “moderate” to
describe Griffis’s limitations. Griffis argues that the term was “not sufficiently
descriptive” and might have been misunderstood by the vocational expert, but the
record does not support Griffis’s argument. The administrative law judge defined
“moderate” as “able to function satisfactorily,” and the vocational expert did not
express any confusion or uncertainty about that definition.
The administrative law judge also presented a complete hypothetical to the
vocational expert. Griffis argues that the administrative law judge failed to
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include in the hypothetical that the claimant had moderate limitations in
completing a normal work schedule because of psychological symptoms, but the
hypothetical encompassed that limitation and, in fact, presumed the claimant had a
more severe limitation. The administrative law judge told the vocational expert
that the claimant had a “marked limitation” in “respond[ing] appropriately to work
pressures in the usual work setting” and a moderate limitation in “respond[ing]
appropriately to changes in [the] routine work setting.” Although the
administrative law judge omitted from the hypothetical that Griffis was limited in
her ability to work at a consistent pace without an unusual number and length of
rest periods, that omission was, at most, harmless error. Because the
administrative law judge found that Griffis had “moderate difficulties” and could
“function satisfactorily” at her pace, the omission of the limitation about her work
pace and rest periods would not have changed the testimony of the vocational
expert.
The denial of Griffis’s application for supplemental security income
benefits is AFFIRMED.
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