UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 09-4957
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
JAIME NOEL AYALA ARRIAZA,
Defendant – Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Alexandria. T. S. Ellis, III, Senior
District Judge. (1:09-cr-00190-TSE-1)
Submitted: September 2, 2010 Decided: November 24, 2010
Before MOTZ, DAVIS, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Michael S. Nachmanoff, Federal Public Defender, Todd Richman,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Caroline S. Platt, Research
and Writing Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant. Neil
H. MacBride, United States Attorney, Karen L. Dunn, Assistant
United States Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Jaime Noel Ayala Arriaza appeals his conviction and
seven-month sentence after entering a conditional guilty plea
pursuant to a plea agreement to one count of possession of a
firearm and ammunition by an illegal alien, in violation of
18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(5), 924(a)(2) (2006). Arriaza’s sole
argument on appeal is that the district court erred when it
denied his motion to suppress the fruits of a warrantless police
search on his impounded vehicle because he alleges that the
automobile exception to the warrant requirement did not justify
the search post-Arizona v. Gant, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S. Ct. 1710
(2009). Because we disagree, we affirm the district court’s
judgment.
In reviewing the district court’s denial of Arriaza’s
suppression motion, we review the district court’s factual
determinations for clear error and any legal determinations de
novo. United States v. Kelly, 592 F.3d 586, 589 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3374 (2010). Because the district
court denied Arriaza’s motion, we construe the evidence “in the
light most favorable to the government.” Id.
The Fourth Amendment guarantees “[t]he right of the
people to be secure . . . against unreasonable searches and
seizures . . . .” U.S. Const. amend. IV. This guarantee
requires that “searches be conducted pursuant to a warrant
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issued by an independent judicial officer.” California v.
Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 390 (1985). An established exception to
this rule is the “automobile exception.” Kelly, 592 F.3d at
589. Under this exception, police may search a vehicle without
a warrant if “probable cause exists to believe it contains
contraband” and the vehicle is “readily mobile.” Pennsylvania
v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938, 940 (1996). If both conditions are
met, police may conduct a warrantless search “that is as
thorough as a magistrate could authorize in a warrant[.]”
United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 800 (1982).
We conclude that the totality of the facts and
circumstances known to police were sufficient to support a
reasonable belief that Arriaza’s vehicle contained a firearm.
Moreover, a car is “readily mobile” for purposes of the
automobile exception so long as it is “‘being used on the
highways’ or is ‘readily capable of such use’ rather than, say,
‘elevated on blocks.’” Kelley, 592 F.3d at 591 (quoting Carney,
471 U.S. at 392-93). So long as a vehicle is “clearly
operational[,]” we have found the vehicle to be “readily mobile”
for purposes of determining whether a warrantless search of that
vehicle was constitutional. See United States v. Brookins, 345
F.3d 231, 238 (4th Cir. 2003). Accordingly, “[t]he
justification to conduct a warrantless search under the
automobile exception does not disappear merely because the car
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has been immobilized and impounded.” See United States v.
Gastiaburo, 16 F.3d 582, 586 (4th Cir. 1994) (upholding
warrantless search of a car impounded by the police for thirty-
eight days).
Despite the foregoing, Arriaza asserts that, like the
search-incident-to-arrest exception at issue in Gant, “[t]he
automobile exception to the warrant requirement has become
untethered from its original reasoning” and “has been
unconstitutionally expanded beyond its proper scope.” In Gant,
the Supreme Court determined that a search of a vehicle incident
to a recent occupant’s arrest is justified “only when the
arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance of the
passenger compartment at the time of the search” or when “it is
reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest
might be found in the vehicle.” Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1719
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
The Supreme Court nonetheless explicitly mentioned
that a broader application of the search-incident-to-arrest
exception was unnecessary “to protect law enforcement safety and
evidentiary interests” because “[o]ther established exceptions
to the warrant requirement authorize a vehicle search under
additional circumstances when safety or evidentiary concerns
demand.” Id. at 1721 (recognizing, for instance, that “[i]f
there is probable cause to believe a vehicle contains evidence
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of criminal activity, United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 820-
821[ ] (1982), authorizes a search of any area of the vehicle in
which the evidence might be found”). Thus, we hold that Gant
does not undermine this court’s jurisprudence pertaining to
warrantless searches of impounded vehicles. Cf. United States
v. Griffin, 589 F.3d 148, 154 n.8 (4th Cir. 2009) (declining to
apply Gant’s reasoning to protective searches where suspect had
not yet been arrested).
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the district court’s
judgment. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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