UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-4088
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
RANDY LEE BOSO,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern
District of West Virginia, at Wheeling. Frederick P. Stamp,
Jr., Senior District Judge. (5:06-cr-00002-FPS-2)
Submitted: November 18, 2010 Decided: November 29, 2010
Before SHEDD and AGEE, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Brendan S. Leary, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Wheeling,
West Virginia, for Appellant. Betsy C. Jividen, United States
Attorney, Randolph J. Bernard, Assistant United States Attorney,
Wheeling, West Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Randy Lee Boso appeals from the twelve-month sentence
imposed pursuant to the revocation of his supervised release.
Counsel has filed a brief in accordance with Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that there are no
meritorious issues for appeal, but raising the issue of whether
the district court erred in imposing the sentence. Boso has
filed a pro se supplemental brief and the United States filed a
reply brief affirming that there were no meritorious issues for
appeal. We affirm.
A sentence imposed after revocation of supervised
release should be affirmed if it is within the applicable
statutory maximum and is not plainly unreasonable. United
States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 439-40 (4th Cir. 2006). In
making this determination, we first consider whether the
sentence is unreasonable. Id. at 438. “This initial inquiry
takes a more deferential appellate posture concerning issues of
fact and the exercise of discretion than reasonableness review
for guideline sentences.” United States v. Moulden, 478 F.3d
652, 656 (4th Cir. 2007). In making our review, we “follow
generally the procedural and substantive considerations that
[are] employ[ed] in [the] review of original sentences, . . .
with some necessary modifications to take into account the
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unique nature of supervised release revocation sentences.”
Crudup, 461 F.3d at 438-39.
A sentence imposed upon revocation of release is
procedurally reasonable if the district court considered the
Chapter Seven policy statements and the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
(2006) factors that it is permitted to consider. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 3583(e); Crudup, 461 F.3d at 438-40. A sentence imposed upon
revocation of release is substantively reasonable if the
district court stated a proper basis for concluding that the
defendant should receive the sentence imposed, up to the
statutory maximum. Crudup, 461 F.3d at 440. We will affirm if
the sentence is not unreasonable. Id. at 439. Only if a
sentence is found procedurally or substantively unreasonable
will we “decide whether the sentence is plainly unreasonable.”
Id. Because Boso did not request a sentence different from the
one imposed, review is for plain error. See United States v.
Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 580 (4th Cir. 2010).
We conclude that Boso failed to make the requisite
showings. The court explicitly considered the Sentencing
Guidelines range (eight to fourteen months) as well as many of
the statutory factors that it was permitted to consider when
arriving at a sentence. In this regard, the court mentioned the
need to promote respect for the law, Boso’s continuing criminal
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conduct, the need to deter future violations, and Boso’s
unsatisfactory conduct while on supervised release.
Boso filed a pro se supplemental brief raising the
following issues: that counsel should have filed a brief on the
merits instead of an Anders brief, ineffective assistance of
counsel for failing to object to the alleged double jeopardy for
supervised release violations based on multiple urine
screenings, and the district court erred in calculating the
Sentencing Guidelines range. We have reviewed these claims, and
the entire record, in accordance with Anders, and have found no
meritorious issues. We therefore affirm Boso’s conviction and
sentence. This court requires that counsel inform Boso, in
writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court of the
United States for further review. If Boso requests that a
petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition
would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for
leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must
state that a copy thereof was served on Boso. We dispense with
oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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