NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT NOV 29 2010
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
CARLA PEDERSON, No. 09-35247
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 3:07-cv-01429-MO
v.
MEMORANDUM*
COMMISSIONER SOCIAL SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Oregon
Michael W. Mosman, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted October 7, 2010**
Portland, Oregon
Before: TASHIMA, PAEZ and CLIFTON, Circuit Judges.
Carla Pederson appeals the judgment of the district court affirming the
Commissioner's final decision that Pederson was not disabled and was not entitled
to disability benefits. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The district
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
court's decision is reviewed de novo. Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir.
2007). We affirm.
Pederson first argues that the Administrative Law Judge erred by not finding
degenerative disc disease to be a "severe impairment" at step 2 of the five-step
sequential analysis used to determine whether a claimant is disabled. See 20
C.F.R. § 404.1520. This argument is unpersuasive. Pederson was never diagnosed
with degenerative disc disease by any doctor. Moreover, the ALJ’s step 2
determination made no practical difference because the ALJ did not stop after step
2, as other impairments were found severe. Pederson’s limitations were covered
by the hypothetical ultimately presented to the vocational expert.
Pederson’s second argument, that the ALJ improperly rejected medical
source opinions from treating and examining physicians, also fails. The ALJ
satisfied the requirement to provide “specific and legitimate reasons supported by
substantial evidence in the record.” Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir.
1995) (internal quotations omitted). In rejecting the limitations identified by Dr.
McKellar, the ALJ noted, among other things, that those limitations had been
adopted based on Pederson’s subjective and unreliable description, that they were
not supported by objective evidence or clinical findings, and that Pederson’s own
performance during the examination in March 2006, which she desired to conclude
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quickly, demonstrated her ability to perform at a level above the described
limitations. Similarly, the ALJ gave specific and legitimate reasons for not
adopting the limitations contained in the medical source statement of Dr. Mims and
nurse practitioner Matuk stating Pederson was “not fit for employment of any
kind.” The ALJ noted that they also reported that Pederson required large doses of
medication, yet their clinical notes in February 2006 indicated that Pederson’s
condition improved when she was off the medication. Further, the limitations
appeared tied to their finding that Pederson suffered from anxiety consistent with
PTSD, but other examinations by specialists did not support such a diagnosis.
Pederson’s third claim, that the ALJ erred in failing explicitly to discuss the
lay witness testimony of Pederson’s friend, Tiesse Keller, does not warrant
reversal. Keller’s testimony essentially repeated Pederson’s self-imposed
limitations and reports of pain. The ALJ found Pederson’s subjective complaints
not generally credible, a finding Pederson did not challenge on appeal. Keller’s
testimony did not materially add to Pederson’s own statements and did not
overcome the lack of credibility. Although the ALJ should have referenced the
testimony, the failure to discuss it was harmless because no reasonable ALJ would
have reached a different result based on that testimony. Stout v. Soc. Sec. Admin.,
454 F.3d 1050, 1056 (9th Cir. 2006).
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Pederson’s final argument, that the vocational hypothetical was flawed for
failing to include all of her perceived impairments, fails because the ALJ may limit
a hypothetical to only those restrictions supported by substantial evidence in the
record. Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1217-18 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing
Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 756-57 (9th Cir. 1989)). The additional
limitations Pederson sought to include were not supported by substantial evidence.
AFFIRMED.
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