United States v. Robinson

PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
 No. 09-4276
KEVIN ANGELO ROBINSON, a/k/a
Bone,
Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of South Carolina, at Aiken.
Margaret B. Seymour, District Judge.
(1:06-cr-01000-MBS-2)

Argued: September 24, 2010

Decided: December 1, 2010

Before WILKINSON, AGEE, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Wilkinson wrote the
opinion, in which Judge Agee and Judge Davis joined.

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Nicole Nicolette Mace, THE MACE FIRM, Myr-
tle Beach, South Carolina, for Appellant. Stanley Duane
Ragsdale, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTOR-
NEY, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF:
2 UNITED STATES v. ROBINSON
Kevin F. McDonald, Acting United States Attorney, Colum-
bia, South Carolina, for Appellee.

OPINION

WILKINSON, Circuit Judge:

Kevin Robinson led a crack cocaine distribution network in
which he and his associates repeatedly sold crack cocaine for
money, sex, and stolen firearms. He was convicted on numer-
ous drug trafficking and firearms charges and sentenced to
fifty years in prison. Robinson seeks a retrial because some of
the officers investigating him engaged in unrelated miscon-
duct. Like the district court we condemn their actions, but for
the reasons stated herein, we do not believe the trial court
abused its discretion in denying Robinson a new trial.

Robinson also seeks to benefit from the lack of doctrinal
clarity surrounding 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), which prohibits using
or carrying a firearm during and in relation to a drug traffick-
ing offense or possessing a firearm in furtherance of one.
Though his jury was, in hindsight, erroneously instructed that
his drugs-for-firearms trades satisfied the first prong of
§ 924(c), Robinson’s amply proven conduct nonetheless falls
squarely within the second. Accordingly, we affirm the judg-
ment.

I.

We begin by briefly summarizing the investigations that led
to Robinson’s trial and convictions. Because his retrial
request centers on subsequently discovered police miscon-
duct, we shall recount the alleged misconduct and the
involved officers’ roles in Robinson’s investigation and trial
with some care.
 UNITED STATES v. ROBINSON 3
A.

In the fall of 2005, the Criminal Investigation Division
("CID") of the Aiken County Sheriff’s Office in South Caro-
lina began investigating a string of residential firearm burgla-
ries. The investigation soon turned up several suspects, who
were arrested in early 2006. Investigator Stacey Prince of CID
then learned that some of the stolen firearms had been taken
out of state, so she contacted Special Agent Lee Baldwin of
the federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explo-
sives ("ATF") for assistance. Interviews with the suspected
burglars and others revealed that they had traded some of the
stolen firearms to Robinson in exchange for drugs. Special
Agent Baldwin then asked the Narcotics Division of the
Aiken County Sheriff’s Office to conduct a controlled buy
from Robinson’s house, which it did. Though both are part of
the Aiken County Sheriff’s Office, the Narcotics Division is
separate from CID, and CID does not have access to Narcot-
ics Division files.

Based in part on this purchase and on Special Agent Bald-
win’s interviews with the burglars and others, the ATF
obtained and executed a federal search warrant, with some
Narcotics Division assistance, in August 2006. Special Agent
Baldwin asked the Narcotics Division to help with another
controlled buy in September 2006, and this controlled buy,
along with information gleaned from interviews and from the
August 2006 buy and search, supported another federal search
warrant conducted with Narcotics Division help in September
2006. From these searches and interviews, investigators gath-
ered substantial evidence that Robinson led a crack cocaine
distribution ring, that he often traded drugs for stolen fire-
arms, and that he illegally possessed firearms. Robinson and
two co-defendants were indicted for various drug trafficking
and firearms charges on September 13, 2006.

Though CID and ATF investigators did not know it at the
time, Robinson’s house at 188 Easy Street had already
4 UNITED STATES v. ROBINSON
attracted the Narcotics Division’s independent attention. In
December 2005 the Narcotics Division had conducted its own
controlled buy and executed a state search warrant, finding
and seizing drug evidence and firearms. Robinson faced pend-
ing state charges from this incident, but Special Agent Bald-
win and the CID did not learn of them until a month prior to
Robinson’s federal trial. Robinson’s former cellmate
informed Special Agent Baldwin of the December 2005
search, and federal prosecutors added charges stemming from
that investigation in a third superseding indictment.

Robinson and his co-defendants received a five-day jury
trial. The government introduced the testimony of law
enforcement officers from CID, ATF, and the Narcotics Divi-
sion, the testimony of nineteen cooperating witnesses or co-
defendants, and the evidence obtained in the three buys and
searches. He was convicted on twelve counts:

• Conspiring to possess with intent to distribute,
and to distribute, fifty or more grams of crack
cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1),
841(b)(1)(A), and 846 (Count 1);

• Using and carrying firearms during and in rela-
tion to, and possessing firearms in furtherance of,
drug trafficking offenses on three occasions, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (Counts 3, 9 and
25);

• Conspiring to use and carry and possess firearms
as prohibited by § 924(c), in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 924(o) (Count 2);

• Possessing firearms as a convicted felon, in vio-
lation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (Counts 4, 13 and
26);

• Distributing crack cocaine, in violation of 21
U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (Counts 18, 19, and 23); and
 UNITED STATES v. ROBINSON 5
• Possessing crack cocaine with intent to distribute,
in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (Count 24).

B.

The week after Robinson’s trial, Investigator Crowell of the
Narcotics Division informed Special Agent Baldwin that he
and several other Narcotics Division officers who worked
Robinson’s case had committed misconduct. With Special
Agent Baldwin’s encouragement, Crowell reported these inci-
dents to the Aiken County Sheriff’s Office, beginning an
investigation that ultimately led to the termination or resigna-
tion of four officers on Robinson’s case: Crowell, Owenby,
Roberts, and Owens.1 Prior to these incidents, none of the
officers’ personnel files contained evidence of misconduct.
The South Carolina Law Enforcement Division investigated
and produced a report detailing four instances of misconduct:

• On May 3, 2007, Crowell and Owenby used "buy
money" —county funds used to purchase illegal
drugs in undercover operations—to gain entrance
to and buy alcoholic drinks at a club. The officers
repaid the funds prior to monthly budget recon-
ciliation. Crowell admitted this conduct, but
Owenby retained counsel and declined to be
interviewed.

• On September 13-14, 2007, Crowell, Owenby,
and Roberts again used Crowell’s buy money to
purchase drinks, as well as pay dancers, at a club.
Crowell and Roberts left the club with a woman
to go to her house, with Owenby joining them
later. Crowell, Owenby, Roberts, and the woman
then left, and the officers used buy money to pur-
chase a hotel room for the night. Scared at the
1
For convenience we will refer to them collectively as the "dismissed
officers" even though one of them in fact resigned.
6 UNITED STATES v. ROBINSON
sight of a badge, the woman asked to be taken
home. Again, the funds were repaid prior to rec-
onciliation. Crowell admitted the conduct, but the
others involved declined interviews.

• In late 2005 or early 2006 Crowell improperly
disposed of cocaine purchased by an informant
after failing to log it. Crowell confessed and
Owens knew about the incident, but both officers
passed polygraphs indicating they committed no
other misconduct related to this evidence.

• Crowell, Owens, Owenby, and Roberts allegedly
drank alcohol purchased in underage alcohol
buys. Crowell admitted that he took such evi-
dence home on several occasions, and Owens
admitted taking some home with Owenby’s per-
mission. Crowell indicated that all of the officers
occasionally drank on the job, possibly even
drinking some of this evidence. Crowell did not
properly record his underage buys, but others did.

Although none of this misconduct related to Robinson’s
case, the dismissed officers were involved, in varying
degrees, with each of the buys and associated searches:

December 2005 buy and search: The Narcotics Division
wired Marty Baggott for an informant purchase. Owenby
searched Baggott before the purchase, drove Baggott to Rob-
inson’s house, and collected the drugs. Investigator Myers,
who did not take part in the misconduct, supervised the buy
and monitored the recording equipment with Crowell. Based
on the buy, Myers and other Narcotics officers received and
executed a search warrant for Robinson’s home. Owens took
photos, and he seized and bagged 4.03 grams of crack and
0.07 grams of powder cocaine. Crowell served as evidence
custodian and collected drug paraphernalia after Owens pho-
 UNITED STATES v. ROBINSON 7
tographed it. Owenby seized a revolver and ammunition. Fed-
eral officials played no role in either the buy or the search.

At trial, the government played the recording of the buy
and introduced the 0.18 grams of crack purchased in it.
Myers, Owenby, and Baggott testified to their involvement in
the buy, and Crowell, Owenby, and Owens testified to their
roles in the search. Myers later stated he saw no improprieties
during the search or during his time in the Narcotics Division.
The evidence gained in this buy and search formed the basis
for Counts 23 through 26.

August 2006 buy and search: At Baldwin’s direction, the
Narcotics Division conducted a controlled buy from Robinson
using informant Theresa Kelly. Roberts led the operation,
searched the undercover car before and after the buy, took the
0.459 grams of crack purchased, and checked the recording.
Crowell helped with surveillance, searched Kelly before and
after, and wired her. Owens and Owenby monitored the offi-
cer who drove Kelly to Robinson’s house. Based in part on
this buy and on statements from the robbers, Baldwin
obtained a federal search warrant for Robinson’s house. All
of the dismissed officers helped execute this warrant, though
Special Agent Baldwin was solely responsible for identifying,
seizing, and processing evidence. Moreover, Special Agent
Baldwin later stated that Narcotics Division officers would
have been paired with ATF agents. The search turned up a .22
rifle in Robinson’s closet, ammunition, and drug parapherna-
lia such as digital scales, baggies, and video monitoring
equipment.

Count 18 stemmed from this buy. The government played
the tape of the buy at trial, and Crowell and Roberts testified
to their involvement. The government also introduced the evi-
dence seized during the search and had Baldwin testify about
it.

September 2006 buy and search: Again at Baldwin’s direc-
tion, Kelly made a controlled purchase of crack from Robin-
8 UNITED STATES v. ROBINSON
son and his associate and co-defendant Thomas Price. Owens
led the operation, searched Kelly before and after, monitored
the tape, and got the crack from Kelly after the buy. Based in
part on this purchase, the August 2006 buy and search, and
the post-arrest statements of Robinson’s eventual co-
defendant Stacey Stevens, Baldwin secured another federal
search warrant. The search turned up some drug paraphernalia
and, in Robinson’s closet, a list of law enforcement radio fre-
quencies. While all of the dismissed Narcotics Division offi-
cers took part, Baldwin again was solely responsible for
evidence collection and ATF agents would have been paired
with them.

At trial, the government played the tape of the buy. The
drugs purchased formed the basis for Count 19. Owens testi-
fied to the buy and his role in it, but Baldwin testified about
the search and its results.

After learning of the dismissed officers’ misconduct, Rob-
inson moved for a new trial on all counts under Rule 33 of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The district court ini-
tially granted this motion in its entirety, finding that the mis-
conduct "[went] to the integrity of the investigation." Upon
reconsideration, the district court limited its grant of a new
trial. Because "the investigation was initiated by" the ATF
and CID, the counts "based on evidence gathered during this
investigation" and not the Narcotics Division investigation did
not require retrials. Those counts based on the Narcotics Divi-
sion’s investigation—18, 19, and 23 through 26—still
required retrial, but the government successfully moved to
withdraw them. Robinson was sentenced to 600 months on
the remaining counts and appealed.

II.

Robinson contends that because of the police misconduct
evidence he deserves a new trial on all counts under Federal
 UNITED STATES v. ROBINSON 9
Rule of Criminal Procedure 33, not just on the now-dismissed
ones.

Rule 33 states that "the court may vacate any judgment and
grant a new trial if the interest of justice so requires." We
review the district court’s Rule 33 decision for abuse of dis-
cretion. See, e.g., United States v. Fulcher, 250 F.3d 244, 249
(4th Cir. 2001). In analyzing whether newly discovered evi-
dence requires a new trial, we look to five factors:

(a) the evidence must be, in fact, newly discovered,
i.e., discovered since the trial; (b) facts must be
alleged from which the court may infer diligence on
the part of the movant; (c) the evidence relied on
must not be merely cumulative or impeaching; (d) it
must be material to the issues involved; and (e) it
must be such, and of such nature, as that, on a new
trial, the newly discovered evidence would probably
produce an acquittal.

United States v. Custis, 988 F.2d 1355, 1359 (4th Cir. 1993)
(quoting United States v. Bales, 813 F.2d 1289, 1295 (4th Cir.
1987)). "Without ruling out the possibility that a rare example
might exist, we have never allowed a new trial unless all five
elements were established." Fulcher, 250 F.3d at 249.
Because the government concedes the first and second fac-
tors, we focus on the nature of the newly discovered evidence,
its materiality to Robinson’s case, and its likely effect at a
new trial.

A.

Robinson lays heavy emphasis on the district court’s pre-
liminary conclusion that the police misconduct evidence
"[went] to the integrity of the investigation." He argues that
because the dismissed officers controlled the December 2005
buy and search, played active parts in the others, and were
partially responsible for the physical evidence introduced
10 UNITED STATES v. ROBINSON
along with their testimony at trial, evidence of their impropri-
eties transcends mere impeachment and goes to the core of the
government’s case.

If Robinson is contending that his is the rare case in which
newly discovered impeachment evidence is enough for a
retrial, he is mistaken. Custis’s sketch of this category’s defi-
nition indicates its narrow scope:

If the government’s case rested entirely on the
uncorroborated testimony of a single witness who
was discovered after trial to be utterly unworthy of
being believed because he had lied consistently in a
string of previous cases, the district judge would
have the power to grant a new trial . . . .

Custis, 988 F.2d at 1359 (quoting United States v. Taglia, 922
F.2d 413, 415 (7th Cir. 1991)). It should go without saying
that Robinson’s situation does not resemble that one. The dis-
missed officers’ testimony was amply corroborated by that of
other law enforcement officials and Robinson’s associates.
Moreover, the officers’ misconduct, while serious, did not
relate to Robinson’s case or to the truth-finding function of
the criminal proceeding. We thus reiterate our reluctance to
order retrials because of subsequently discovered impeach-
ment evidence. To do so would invite fishing expeditions into
the backgrounds of witnesses and insubstantial Rule 33
motions resulting therefrom. Such a development could
deprive witnesses of a decent sense of closure and undermine
the finality of criminal proceedings to an unacceptable degree.

If Robinson is instead contending that the misconduct evi-
dence serves some purpose other than impeachment, we are
at a loss as to what that purpose could be. Unlike the evidence
in those few cases in which we have ordered or allowed a
retrial, the misconduct evidence does not directly support
some alternate theory of the crimes, nor does it provide any
legal justification for Robinson’s actions. See, e.g., Fulcher,
 UNITED STATES v. ROBINSON 11
250 F.3d at 250-51 (newly discovered evidence that a law
enforcement officer authorized the defendants’ criminal con-
duct required a retrial). Instead, the evidence is offered to cast
doubt on the testimony of the dismissed officers and the evi-
dence they helped to collect, about as textbook an example of
impeachment evidence as there could be. See Custis, 988 F.2d
at 1359-60 (the misconduct evidence was impeachment evi-
dence because it "involved . . . unrelated [matters], with issues
that had no bearing on those at [the defendant’s] trial");
Black’s Law Dictionary 820 (9th ed. 2009) (defining "im-
peach" as "[t]o discredit the veracity of (a witness)").

The evidence also throws into stark relief the problems
associated with unrelated misconduct evidence in general and
retrials based on such evidence in particular. Misconduct evi-
dence like this, which involved witnesses in Robinson’s case
but did not relate to those witnesses’ investigation of that
case, is likely to push the parties toward miniature credibility
trials and to cut into the limits the Rules of Evidence place on
information about diversionary and subsidiary issues. See
Custis, 988 F.2d at 1359 n.1; Fed. R. Evid. 403; Fed. R. Evid.
608(b). Retrials based on such evidence combine these inher-
ent problems with the added cost and delay of a new trial. The
district court was entitled to take cognizance of this as well
as the fact that second trials are often not as fresh, spontane-
ous, or reliable as first ones.

B.

Nor can Robinson demonstrate that the evidence is mate-
rial. He notes that the district court’s decision to require retri-
als on the now-dismissed counts demonstrates its view that
the misconduct evidence was material to some of his convic-
tions. According to him, the district court erred, however, in
thinking that the remaining counts—that is, the non-dismissed
ones— could be cleanly separated from the affected ones. The
dismissed officers played some role in obtaining evidence for
each count, and the jury was not presented with compartmen-
12 UNITED STATES v. ROBINSON
talized, count-by-count evidence but rather with an undiffer-
entiated mass of what he considers tainted and untainted
evidence.

Robinson again overstates the impact of the dismissed offi-
cers on his trial and undervalues the district court’s ultimate
conclusion. As the court found after gathering further infor-
mation and as the facts above illustrate, the remaining counts
stemmed largely from the separate CID/ATF investigation. As
a result, the misconduct evidence says little about Robinson’s
guilt or innocence on these counts. See Custis, 988 F.2d at
1359. Fulcher found materiality and awarded a retrial where
the newly discovered evidence went directly to the defen-
dants’ chief defense. See Fulcher, 250 F.3d at 254-55. By
contrast, the misconduct evidence here is material to the
remaining counts only if we ignore the district court’s sound
conclusion that the dismissed officers played only bit parts in
the separate CID/ATF investigation. The trial court had the
best vantage point in deciding what counts were tainted, and
we are loath to disturb the discretion of the judge most famil-
iar with the first trial on the matter of whether and to what
extent a second trial was necessary.

C.

Finally, Robinson cannot demonstrate that the evidence, if
introduced at a new trial, would "probably produce an acquit-
tal." Custis, 988 F.2d at 1359. He suggests the dismissed offi-
cers were so central as to alter the government’s whole case:
by his account, the search warrants and their fruits would
have been thrown out because some of the dismissed officers
testified in support of the warrants upheld at the suppression
hearing, the testimony of the dismissed officers would be
questioned, and the testimony of witnesses who had previous
contact with the dismissed officers would be called into ques-
tion. This argument has a number of problems.

First, it overemphasizes the importance of the officers’ tes-
timony and the likely effect of including evidence of their
 UNITED STATES v. ROBINSON 13
misconduct. As the district court specifically found and as the
discussion above illustrates, CID and ATF did the lion’s share
of the work on the remaining convictions. The offending Nar-
cotics Division officers played only minor or subordinate
roles. Evidence that some of those officers engaged in wrong-
ful conduct unrelated to Robinson’s case would do little to
undermine the largely separate investigation’s results, espe-
cially where unaffected officers were paired with the dis-
missed ones and where Special Agent Baldwin supervised the
evidence gathering.

Second, Robinson’s contention ignores the impressive
amount of evidence against him from other sources. Even
when one eliminates all traces of evidence from the dismissed
officers, there remains overwhelming evidence of Robinson’s
guilt. Nineteen co-defendants and cooperating witnesses testi-
fied that Robinson conspired to traffic drugs. For example,
Dorothy Blitchington stated that she and her burglar friends
sold numerous guns to Robinson and his associates for crack,
testimony echoed by Anthony Clark, Crystal Newsome, and
Christopher Arthur. Stacey Stevens testified that he had pur-
chased crack from Robinson and for him and that he had
observed at least four others selling drugs for Robinson. Mar-
qual Cunningham testified that he and Robinson would sell
each other cocaine when they ran low on supplies and identi-
fied four of Robinson’s drug runners. And that was just the
beginning. We know that the jury credited much of it; the jury
held Robinson accountable for fifty or more grams of crack,
though the physical evidence introduced amounted to less
than ten.

So too for Robinson’s other remaining convictions. Robin-
son’s first § 924(c) conviction (Count 3) and a felon-in-
possession conviction (Count 4) stemmed from his trade of
crack cocaine to Chris Arthur in exchange for one of two
stolen Glock .40 pistols. The pistols’ owner, a retired police
officer, testified to their theft; Arthur testified that he stole
and traded one of the specially marked pistols to Robinson;
14 UNITED STATES v. ROBINSON
Newsome testified that she accompanied Arthur to Robin-
son’s and watched the trade; and several of Robinson’s co-
conspirators testified to seeing the distinct weapon in Robin-
son’s possession.

Similarly overwhelming evidence supported Robinson’s
second § 924(c) conviction (Count 9). The firearms’ owner
testified to their theft, Arthur again testified to stealing them
and trading one to Robinson’s co-conspirator Gilstrap, and
Gilstrap testified to trading drugs for firearms with Arthur.
And though Robinson’s second felon-in-possession convic-
tion (Count 13) stemmed from a .22 rifle seized in the August
2006 search, Robinson’s possession of it was amply demon-
strated by testimony from several of Robinson’s co-
conspirators. It strains credulity to claim that evidence regard-
ing the unrelated misconduct of a few of the officers who tes-
tified at Robinson’s trial could have undermined Robinson’s
thoroughly demonstrated guilt.

Robinson cannot demonstrate Custis’s third, fourth, or fifth
factors on his remaining convictions. The district court there-
fore did not err, let alone abuse its discretion, in partially
denying him a retrial.

III.

Robinson does not pin his retrial hopes on Rule 33 alone.
He also argues that he deserves an entirely new trial because
the government suppressed the misconduct evidence in viola-
tion of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). Because pros-
ecutors did not actually or constructively possess knowledge
of the officers’ misconduct for Brady purposes and because
Robinson cannot meet Brady’s materiality requirement, we
reject his attempt to recast his defunct Rule 33 claim in Brady
terms.

A.

Robinson argues that basic Brady principles compel the
conclusion that the prosecution suppressed the misconduct
 UNITED STATES v. ROBINSON 15
evidence. First, unlike Custis and Rule 33 generally, Brady
covers impeachment as well as exculpatory evidence. See,
e.g., Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972). Sec-
ond, Brady applies wherever evidence is suppressed, regard-
less of the prosecutor’s motivations. See, e.g., United States
v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 110 (1976). Finally, Brady’s com-
mands do not stop at the prosecutor’s door; the knowledge of
some of those who are part of the investigative team is
imputed to prosecutors regardless of prosecutors’ actual
awareness. See, e.g., Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437
(1995) ("[T]he individual prosecutor has a duty to learn of
any favorable evidence known to the others acting on the gov-
ernment’s behalf in the case, including the police."). Because
the dismissed officers obviously knew about their own mis-
conduct and because they were working on the government’s
behalf, Robinson argues the prosecution violated its duty to
disclose those improprieties even though no prosecutor actu-
ally knew about them.

Whatever the proper scope of Brady’s imputed knowledge
doctrine, it cannot be this broad. If it were, every case analyz-
ing retrials for subsequently discovered police misconduct
under Rule 33 would be thrown into question. On Robinson’s
view, they should all have instead been Brady cases because
the officers necessarily knew of their own misconduct and
that knowledge is imputed to prosecutors, and therefore the
courts’ Rule 33 restrictions on retrials are at best unnecessary.

Robinson’s view would not only undermine the framework
of Rule 33. It would also impose unacceptable burdens on
prosecutors and the police. Courts have routinely refused to
extend Brady’s constructive knowledge doctrine where doing
so would cut against the agency principles underlying
imputed knowledge and would require prosecutors to do full
interviews and background checks on everyone who touched
the case. See, e.g., United States v. Stewart, 433 F.3d 273 (2d
Cir. 2006) (refusing to impute knowledge from expert witness
who was not involved with the actual investigation); Moreno-
16 UNITED STATES v. ROBINSON
Morales v. United States, 334 F.3d 140, 146-47 (1st Cir.
2003) (refusing to impute knowledge from Puerto Rico’s Sen-
ate); United States v. Beers, 189 F.3d 1297, 1304 (10th Cir.
1999) (refusing to impute knowledge from state investigators
to federal prosecutors). And with good reason: it is one thing
to require prosecutors to inquire about whether police have
turned up exculpatory or impeachment evidence during their
investigation. It is quite another to require them, on pain of a
possible retrial, to conduct disciplinary inquiries into the gen-
eral conduct of every officer working the case.

We draw no hard and fast lines here about the scope of
Brady imputation, and we reiterate that prosecutors have a
duty to learn of exculpatory evidence gathered by those acting
on the government’s behalf. But on the facts of this case —
where the affected officers and the prosecutors worked across
state/federal lines, where no one other than the officers them-
selves had any idea of any impropriety, and where the mis-
conduct evidence was unrelated to Robinson’s own
investigation — the principle of imputed knowledge cannot
be said to apply.

B.

Even if Brady did cover the alleged "suppression" at issue
here, Robinson cannot show that there is a "reasonable proba-
bility" that he would not have been convicted had the miscon-
duct evidence been introduced. Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S.
263, 296 (1999). Brady’s materiality requirement asks
whether the suppressed evidence, including impeachment evi-
dence, "could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in
such a different light as to undermine confidence in the ver-
dict." Kyles, 514 U.S. at 435.

The misconduct evidence here pales in comparison with
that suppressed in cases where Brady’s materiality require-
ment was actually met. The dismissed officers were not "the
only witness[es] linking [Robinson] with the crime[s]."
 UNITED STATES v. ROBINSON 17
Giglio, 405 U.S. at 151. Rather, numerous other law enforce-
ment officers and more than a dozen co-defendants or cooper-
ating witnesses corroborated each other’s testimony and the
physical evidence demonstrating Robinson’s crimes. Nor did
the misconduct evidence cut into a "somewhat thin and
entirely circumstantial" government case. Monroe v. Ange-
lone, 323 F.3d 286, 302 (4th Cir. 2003); see also Spicer v.
Roxbury Corr. Inst., 194 F.3d 547, 559-61 (4th Cir. 1999)
(suppressed impeachment evidence was material because no
physical evidence existed and eyewitness testimony was
weak). Instead, physical evidence, whose collection was
largely supervised by Special Agent Baldwin, and the eyewit-
ness accounts of numerous co-conspirators and others amply
proved the government’s contentions. Evidence regarding a
few officers’ unrelated misconduct could do little to damage
the extensive physical and testimonial foundation of the case.

IV.

Robinson also argues that his § 924(c)-related convictions
require reversal because of incorrect jury instructions and
insufficient evidence. Section 924(c) contains two prongs, the
"use or carry" prong and the "possession" prong. The first
provides a mandatory minimum sentence for anyone who
"during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug traf-
ficking crime . . . uses or carries a firearm." 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c)(1)(A). The second provides a mandatory minimum
for anyone who "in furtherance of any such crime[ ] possesses
a firearm." Id.2 Robinson was indicted under both prongs in
2
In full, § 924(c) states:
Except to the extent that a greater minimum sentence is otherwise
provided by this subsection or by any other provision of law, any
person who, during and in relation to any crime of violence or
drug trafficking crime (including a crime of violence or drug traf-
ficking crime that provides for an enhanced punishment if com-
mitted by the use of a deadly or dangerous weapon or device) for
which the person may be prosecuted in a court of the United
18 UNITED STATES v. ROBINSON
each of Counts 2, 3 and 9. The district court instructed the
jurors that "the trading of a firearm for a controlled substance
constitutes use of such firearm during and in relation to a drug
trafficking crime." Robinson did not object.

At the time, this instruction fully accorded with the law in
a majority of our sister circuits, see Watson v. United States,
552 U.S. 74, 78 n.5 (2007) (noting which circuits agreed and
disagreed), as well as with our unpublished decisions, see, e.g,
United States v. Belcher, No. 98-4845, 1999 WL 1080103
(4th Cir. Nov. 29, 1999) (per curiam). Before Robinson’s
appeal, however, the Supreme Court held that one who trades
drugs for firearms does not "use" those firearms under
§ 924(c). Watson, 552 U.S. at 83. Robinson contends that
Watson upends his convictions in two ways. First, he argues
that the erroneous instruction itself requires reversal. Second,
he argues that because Watson precludes a conviction under
§ 924(c)’s use prong, the government’s evidence, which
largely demonstrated that he traded drugs for firearms, was
insufficient.

A.

Robinson did not object to the jury instructions at the time.
His counsel rightly acknowledged at oral argument that this
failure means we review those instructions for plain error.
Rule 30 requires that defendants object to instructions "before
the jury retires to deliberate" or face plain error review under
Rule 52(b). Fed. R. Crim. P. 30(d). This rule applies even
where settled law at the time of trial rejected the defendant’s

States, uses or carries a firearm, or who, in furtherance of any
such crime, possesses a firearm, shall, in addition to the punish-
ment provided for such crime of violence or drug trafficking
crime . . . be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than
5 years . . . .
18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i) (subsection division omitted).
 UNITED STATES v. ROBINSON 19
position. See Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461 (1997)
(applying plain error review to an unchallenged jury instruc-
tion error where the law at trial was clear but had been
reversed prior to appeal). This rule is necessary to avoid
casual reversal of district courts who follow settled law to
which no objection was raised at trial.

Under the plain error standard, Robinson must establish
that the district court erred, that the error was plain, and that
it "affect[ed] [his] substantial rights." United States v. Olano,
507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993) (quoting Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b)).
Even if Robinson makes this showing, we retain discretion to
deny relief; plain errors should only be corrected where not
doing so would result in a "miscarriage of justice," Olano,
507 U.S. at 736 (quotation omitted), or would otherwise "seri-
ously affect[ ] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of
judicial proceedings," id. at 736 (quotation omitted).

In light of Watson, the district court’s use instruction was
plainly erroneous. See Johnson, 520 U.S. at 468 ("[W]here the
law at the time of trial was settled and clearly contrary to the
law at the time of appeal," the trial court’s use of the prior set-
tled law is plain error.). But Robinson cannot prove that the
error "actual[ly] prejudiced" him as required under Olano’s
third prong. United States v. Myers, 280 F.3d 407, 414 (4th
Cir. 2002). In United States v. Hastings, 134 F.3d 235 (4th
Cir. 1998), we discussed how plain error review’s prejudice
requirement applies where a defendant was indicted under
multiple prongs of an offense but subjected to erroneous jury
instructions on one of those prongs. We held that such a
defendant "must demonstrate that the erroneous . . . instruc-
tion given . . . resulted in his conviction," not merely that it
was impossible to tell under which prong the jury convicted.
Id. at 243-44.

Applying this standard, Hastings upheld the defendant’s
§ 924(c) conviction despite an erroneous use instruction
because the jury’s conviction under that instruction necessar-
20 UNITED STATES v. ROBINSON
ily included findings sufficient to convict under the also-
charged carry portion of § 924(c). See id. at 244. Therefore,
Hastings could not demonstrate that the erroneous use instruc-
tion actually prejudiced him. If the possession prong—added
to § 924(c) after Hastings — merely adds another way of
committing an offense, Hastings squarely applies and Robin-
son must prove that his conviction must have stemmed from
the erroneous use instruction and the erroneous use instruction
alone.

But there is a possible wrinkle in applying Hastings to Rob-
inson’s case. The circuit courts are divided on whether
§ 924(c) creates one offense or two. Compare United States
v. Gamboa, 439 F.3d 796 (8th Cir. 2006) (two offenses), and
United States v. Combs, 369 F.3d 925 (6th Cir. 2004) (same),
with United States v. Haynes, 582 F.3d 686 (7th Cir. 2009)
(one offense), and United States v. Arreola, 467 F.3d 1153
(9th Cir. 2006) (same). There is a formal difference between
requiring proof that a general verdict did not stem exclusively
from an erroneously instructed prong of one offense, as Has-
tings did, and requiring proof that a general verdict did not
stem exclusively from an erroneously instructed offense,
though the situations are analogous, see Griffin v. United
States, 502 U.S. 46, 49-50 (1991). The question is whether
that difference matters here.

We do not think that it does, and so we need not decide
how many offenses § 924(c) creates. Where the two offenses
were combined in one count there is little functional differ-
ence between a general verdict that could have been based on
an erroneous offense instruction and one that could have been
based on an erroneous means of offense instruction; in both
cases the defendant may have been convicted on a legally
inadequate ground, but we cannot tell because of the general
verdict.3
3
Robinson contends that his indictment duplicitously charged him with
multiple offenses in single counts. Whatever duplicity problems result
from indictments such as his should be dealt with directly rather than
through modifications of plain error doctrine.
 UNITED STATES v. ROBINSON 21
In keeping with plain error review’s placement of the bur-
den on the defendant, and in view of Hastings’s teaching that
the error must have actually resulted in prejudice and not
merely possible or speculative prejudice, see Hastings, 134
F.3d at 243-44, such a defendant would still have to show that
the erroneously instructed offense underlies his conviction,
not the proper one. In other words, Robinson must show not
only that he could have been convicted under the erroneous
use instruction, but also that he was not convicted under the
properly-instructed possession prong. Given the evidence and
the jury instructions, Robinson could have been convicted
under the erroneous use instruction. But the fact that he was
convicted under § 924(c) at all demonstrates that his convic-
tions also satisfied the properly instructed possession prong.
To convict, the jury must have found that Robinson traded
drugs for firearms. But because we hold that trading drugs for
guns constitutes possession in furtherance within the meaning
of § 924(c), Robinson could also have been convicted under
the properly instructed possession prong. He therefore cannot
show that his conviction resulted from the erroneous charge.

By holding that § 924(c)’s possession prong covers drugs-
for-firearms trades, we align ourselves with a growing and
consistent body of post-Watson precedent. Though Watson
itself refrained from deciding the issue, see Watson, 552 U.S.
at 83, every circuit court to have reached the question has
agreed that such trades constitute possession in furtherance.
See United States v. Gurka, 605 F.3d 40 (1st Cir. 2010);
United States v. Gardner, 602 F.3d 97 (2d Cir. 2010); United
States v. Doody, 600 F.3d 752 (7th Cir. 2010); United States
v. Mahan, 586 F.3d 1185 (9th Cir. 2009); see also United
States v. Sterling, 555 F.3d 452 (5th Cir. 2009) (assuming
without deciding that such trades constitute possession in fur-
therance).

The striking uniformity here is no surprise, as this interpre-
tation flows naturally from § 924(c)’s text. Those who trade
drugs for firearms necessarily "possess" those weapons, as
22 UNITED STATES v. ROBINSON
every successful trade of this type results in a drug dealer
acquiring, at least temporarily, a firearm. See, e.g., Doody,
600 F.3d at 756. Such trades are also clearly "in furtherance
of" drug trafficking crimes. Firearm possession occurs "in fur-
therance of" drug trafficking where it "further[s], advance[s],
or help[s] forward" the offense. United States v. Lomax, 293
F.3d 701, 705 (4th Cir. 2002). Trading drugs for guns does
just that. If drug dealers refused to do drug-for-firearm swaps
some trafficking crimes, likely including some of those
between Robinson and the burglars, would never occur. See
United States v. Frederick, 406 F.3d 754, 764 (6th Cir. 2005).
Trading drugs for firearms also furthers the underlying crime
even where dealers and purchasers would be happy to use
cash instead. Coming into possession during such trades com-
pletes (and thus necessarily furthers) each particular drug-for-
firearm trafficking offense. See Mahan, 586 F.3d at 1189.
Because his conduct falls squarely within § 924(c)’s posses-
sion prong, Robinson thus cannot demonstrate that his sub-
stantial rights were affected by the erroneous use instruction.

Even if Robinson somehow satisfied Olano’s third prong,
we would not disturb his convictions. Plain error review exists
to correct only the most grievous of unnoticed errors. See
United States v. Reid, 523 F.3d 310, 316-17 (4th Cir. 2008).
In making this "case-specific and fact-intensive" determina-
tion, Puckett v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1423, 1433 (2009),
Robinson’s actual guilt or innocence is not the only consider-
ation, but it is the most important, see, e.g., United States v.
Jeffers, 570 F.3d 557, 570 (4th Cir. 2009) (looking primarily
to actual guilt under Olano’s fourth prong). In light of our
conclusion that trading drugs for firearms is possession in fur-
therance and considering the evidence of those trades detailed
above, there is no question that Robinson is guilty and would
have been convicted anyway had the erroneous instruction not
been given. We have repeatedly refused to notice errors in
such circumstances. See, e.g., United States v. Foster, 507
F.3d 233, 251-52 (4th Cir. 2007); United States v. Williams,
152 F.3d 294, 300 (4th Cir. 1998).
 UNITED STATES v. ROBINSON 23
Sustaining the convictions here fully accords with Con-
gress’s intent in § 924(c) to criminalize the sorts of drugs-for-
guns swaps that regularly transpired in this case. Indeed, if we
narrowed § 924(c)’s possession prong not to cover this behav-
ior, the provision would be vitiated. Drugs-for-firearms swaps
squarely present all of the aggravated risks that stem from
mixing drugs and guns—they increase the number of traffick-
ing offenses that occur and, by putting firearms in the hands
of criminal and often dangerous drug traffickers, they raise
the already high risk of violence in trafficking to a new level.
When Robinson’s conduct so clearly falls under Congress’s
strong condemnation, we must decline to overturn his convic-
tions. See Williams, 152 F.3d at 300 (reversing a use or carry
conviction where the defendant was guilty under either
because of an erroneous use instruction would impugn the
criminal justice system).

B.

Robinson further contends that the government introduced
insufficient evidence to support his § 924(c)-related convic-
tions. Though framed as an insufficiency claim, this argument
also stems from Watson and the erroneous jury instructions.
The government’s evidence centered on Robinson’s drugs-
for-firearms trades, and throughout the proceedings the gov-
ernment and the district judge stated that these trades consti-
tuted "use" under § 924(c). Since Watson eliminates the
possibility of convicting Robinson for these trades under the
use prong, Robinson argues that the government did not intro-
duce sufficient evidence that he violated § 924(c).

When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we ask
whether, viewed most favorably to the government, there is
substantial evidence supporting the verdict. See United States
v. Smith, 451 F.3d 209, 216 (4th Cir. 2006). As noted earlier,
the indictment’s § 924(c)-related counts each charged him
under both prongs, a fact as fatal to Robinson’s insufficiency
claim as to his jury instruction claim. "As a general rule . . .,
24 UNITED STATES v. ROBINSON
‘when a jury returns a guilty verdict on an indictment charg-
ing several acts in the conjunctive . . . the verdict stands if the
evidence is sufficient with respect to any one of the acts
charged." United States v. Hawkes, 753 F.2d 355, 357 (4th
Cir. 1985) (second omission in original) (quoting Turner v.
United States, 396 U.S. 398, 420 (1970)).

This sufficiency claim, like many of the claims before it,
runs directly into the wealth of evidence detailing Robinson’s
activities. Given that evidence, which we have reviewed at
length, the jury necessarily found that Robinson traded drugs
for firearms. This finding, as the district court noted, had
more than enough support. As we held above, Robinson could
not help but possess firearms in furtherance of trafficking.
Because there was sufficient evidence to convict under the
possession prong, there was sufficient evidence for Robin-
son’s § 924(c)-related convictions despite the erroneous use
instruction.

V.

Robinson also takes issue with the § 924(c)-related aspects
of his indictment and with the district court’s treatment of
them. He alleges that his indictment was duplicitous, charging
multiple offenses within single counts. He also argues the dis-
trict court constructively amended the indictment: the indict-
ment’s § 924(c)-related counts charged him with using and
carrying and possessing in violation of § 924(c), but the dis-
trict court instructed the jury that it could convict under either
prong. We address these contentions in turn.

A.

Duplicitous indictments present the risk that a jury divided
on two different offenses could nonetheless convict for the
improperly fused double count. See, e.g., United States v.
Spencer, 592 F.3d 866, 874-75 (8th Cir. 2010). But Robinson
did not present this objection prior to the trial as called for by
 UNITED STATES v. ROBINSON 25
Rule 12(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. To
enforce this requirement, the Rules add that "[a] party waives
any Rule 12(b)(3) defense, objection, or request not raised by
[the proper deadline]" unless it can show good cause. Fed. R.
Crim. P. 12(e); see also United States v. Colton, 231 F.3d
890, 909 (4th Cir. 2000) (enforcing waiver of a multiplicity
claim); United States v. Price, 763 F.2d 640, 643-44 (4th Cir.
1985) (same). Robinson fails to raise any argument approach-
ing a showing of good cause.

Several courts, however, have held that newly raised
duplicity claims that go beyond technicalities to allege that
the conviction could have rested on an impermissibly divided
jury deserve plain error review. See, e.g., United States v.
Lloyd, 462 F.3d 510, 514 (6th Cir. 2006); United States v.
Hammen, 977 F.2d 379, 382 (7th Cir. 1992); United States v.
Gordon, 844 F.2d 1397, 1400-01 (9th Cir. 1988). Out of an
abundance of caution, we address and reject Robinson’s
duplicity claim under that standard as well. Even assuming
that § 924(c) creates separate offenses and that the indict-
ment’s conjunctive charges were plainly duplicitous,4 there is
considerable doubt whether Robinson can demonstrate an
impact upon his substantial rights and no doubt at all that he
cannot demonstrate a miscarriage of justice.

Robinson likely cannot demonstrate prejudice because the
jury necessarily credited the drugs-for-firearms evidence in
convicting Robinson and because such trades constitute pos-
session in furtherance. As a result, a juror willing to convict
under the erroneous use instruction would have been willing
4
Both of these assumptions are debatable, particularly the second.
Regarding error, as mentioned above the number of offenses in § 924(c)
is unsettled. Regarding plainness, the question was open at the time of trial
and remains so now. See, e.g., United States v. Kilbride, 584 F.3d 1240,
1255 (9th Cir. 2009) (no plain error where "the relevant law . . . was
highly unsettled"); United States v. Gamez, 577 F.3d 394, 400 (2d Cir.
2009) ("Typically, we will not find plain error where the operative legal
question is unsettled.") (internal quotation omitted).
26 UNITED STATES v. ROBINSON
to convict under the possession prong. See, e.g., United States
v. Davis, 306 F.3d 398, 416 (6th Cir. 2002) (rejecting duplic-
ity claim under plain error review where unanimity was
assured). Although the use instruction was itself erroneous,
we have already rejected Robinson’s independent challenge to
that error and will not accept it here under the guise of a
duplicity challenge.

We would also reject Robinson’s duplicity claim under
Olano’s fourth prong. To overturn Robinson’s conviction
because of a good-faith charging mistake—one that might not
even have been a mistake—where the evidence demonstrated
he traded drugs for firearms and thereby violated the posses-
sion prong would place form above substance and lessen pub-
lic confidence in the criminal justice system.

B.

Robinson also argues that by charging the jury that it could
convict Robinson if he violated either the use or carry prong
or the possession prong, the district court constructively
amended his indictment. That is, because the indictment
charged that he violated both prongs, Robinson argues that the
district court’s instructions inappropriately broadened the pos-
sible bases for conviction from both prongs to just one or the
other. Robinson failed to raise this issue below, but in this cir-
cuit constructive amendments are erroneous per se and require
reversal regardless of preservation. See United States v. Fos-
ter, 507 F.3d 233, 242-43 (4th Cir. 2007); United States v.
Floresca, 38 F.3d 706, 714 (4th Cir. 1994) (en banc).

We can easily reject Robinson’s constructive amendment
claim. Well-settled precedent supports the district court’s
instructions. "[W]hen the Government charges in the conjunc-
tive, and the statute is worded in the disjunctive, the district
court can instruct the jury in the disjunctive." United States v.
Perry, 560 F.3d 246, 256 (4th Cir. 2009). Moreover, agreeing
with Robinson here would upend settled duplicity doctrine
 UNITED STATES v. ROBINSON 27
and let his already denied duplicity claim in through the back
door. It is black letter law that duplicitous indictments can be
cured through appropriate jury instructions. See, e.g., United
States v. Mauskar, 557 F.3d 219, 226-27 (5th Cir. 2009);
United States v. Kakos, 483 F.3d 441, 445 & n.1 (6th Cir.
2007). If Robinson is right, though, all successful attempts at
fixing duplicity are per se reversible constructive amend-
ments. Floresca does not command any such result.

VI.

Robinson makes a few final contentions. First, he argues
that under the Double Jeopardy Clause his § 924(c) convic-
tions bar his § 924(o) conspiracy conviction. Because the for-
mer require proof the substantive crime was actually
committed while the latter does not, and the latter requires
proof of agreement but the former do not, these convictions
satisfy the Double Jeopardy Clause. See Blockburger v.
United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932).

He also argues that his consecutive § 924(c) sentences
accord with neither § 924(c)’s own meaning nor the prohibi-
tion against double jeopardy because his convictions had the
same underlying predicate offense and stemmed from the
same underlying course of criminal conduct. We rejected this
argument in United States v. Camps, 32 F.3d 102 (4th Cir.
1994). Just as the defendant in Camps was properly sentenced
for each individual act in violation of § 924(c), Robinson was
properly sentenced for the separate drugs-for-firearms trades
alleged in Counts 3 and 9.

Robinson argues further that he is not subject to mandatory
minimums under § 924(c) because he was subject to a twenty-
year mandatory minimum for the crack conspiracy. The stat-
ute reads: "Except to the extent that a greater minimum sen-
tence is otherwise provided by this subsection or by any other
provision of law, any person who" violates the use or posses-
sion prongs is subject to at least a five-year mandatory mini-
28 UNITED STATES v. ROBINSON
mum. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). As Robinson notes, we have
already disagreed with his interpretation of the "except"
clause. In United States v. Studifin, 240 F.3d 415, 423 (4th
Cir. 2001), we held that the clause creates a "safety valve" for
higher punishments: if "any other provision of law" imposes
a higher sentence for conduct violating § 924(c), the district
court should impose that sentence, not the lower one specified
in § 924(c).

Though Robinson raised this claim to preserve it for possi-
ble further review, the Supreme Court’s recent decision in
Abbott v. United States, No. 09-479 (U.S. Nov. 15, 2010),
eliminates that possibility. The Court held that § 924(c)’s "ex-
cept" clause only applies where "another provision of law
directed to conduct proscribed by § 924(c) imposes an even
greater mandatory minimum." Id., slip op. at 3. In other
words, the Court agreed with Studifin’s "safety valve" reading
of the provision. See id., slip op. at 17 (quoting Studifin, 240
F.3d at 423). Because Robinson’s greater mandatory mini-
mum stems from the crack conspiracy rather than any
§ 924(c) firearm violation, he cannot benefit from § 924(c)’s
"except" clause and was therefore properly sentenced.

VII.

Robinson calls our attention to a host of categories, tests,
and frameworks: Rule 33 factors, two-pronged Brady analy-
sis, constructive amendments, the Blockburger test, and the
like. We have conscientiously reviewed each claim. None of
them, properly employed, provides Robinson his requested
relief. But it is well also to take a step back and not lose the
forest for the trees. Viewed from this broader perspective, two
facts stand out. First, Congress has strongly condemned the
precise kind of conduct for which Robinson stands accused—
conduct that destroys communities, families, and individual
lives. Second, overwhelming evidence presented at a fair trial
demonstrated Robinson’s guilt.
 UNITED STATES v. ROBINSON 29
Robinson asks us to discount these facts and focus myopi-
cally on particular details—the unrelated misconduct of police
officers marginally involved with his remaining convictions
and the various technical aspects of the indictment and
instructions to which he did not even object. To accept his
invitation would contravene Congress’s intent, value form
over substance, and elevate doctrinal technicalities over com-
mon sense. The judgment below is therefore affirmed.

AFFIRMED