FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
December 1, 2010
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
KULWINDER SINGH RAJU,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v. No. 10-9525
(Board of Immigration Appeals)
ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., United States
Attorney General,
Respondent-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before HARTZ, ANDERSON, and TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judges. **
Kulwinder Singh Raju, a native and citizen of India, seeks review of the
Bureau of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) denial of his motion to reopen his
immigration proceedings. For the following reasons, we deny the petition for
review.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
Cir. R. 32.1.
**
After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this three-judge
panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of material
assistance in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th
Cir. R. 34.1(G). The cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
I. Background
Raju entered the United States in 2002 without proper admission or parole
and was placed in removal proceedings. After conceding removability, he
requested asylum, restriction on removal, and protection under the Convention
Against Torture (CAT).
In 2007, at his removal hearing, Raju testified that in October 2001 he was
forced at gunpoint to give material support to Sikh militants. The Indian police
arrested him, accused him of being involved with militants, and beat him with a
belt and metal-tipped staff that caused him to bleed and become unconscious. In
November 2001, Raju again provided material support to the militants under
threat of harm and then fled to avoid arrest.
The immigration judge (IJ) found inconsistencies in Raju’s testimony and
made an adverse credibility finding. Specifically, the IJ found three areas of
Raju’s testimony inconsistent. First, Raju testified the severe beating he received
required an operation to drain fluid from his back and produced a significant scar.
But at his removal hearing the IJ observed Raju’s back and found no scars, which
the IJ believed the alleged beating would have left. Second, Raju gave
inconsistent statements regarding the number of his siblings. He initially testified
to having only one brother and no other siblings, but later stated he had five
siblings. Finally, Raju gave varying testimony concerning his route to the United
States. He initially testified to traveling through Ecuador, Guatemala, and then
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Mexico, but later included Malaysia and Cuba. On cross-examination, he stated
he traveled through Russia, Cuba, Ecuador, Guatemala, and then Mexico before
entering the United States. In light of these inconsistencies, the IJ denied Raju’s
asylum petition and ordered him removed to India.
Raju appealed to the BIA and argued the adverse credibility finding was
error because any inconsistencies in his testimony related to incidental matters
not at the heart of his claims. The BIA rejected Raju’s argument and affirmed the
IJ’s decision. Raju appealed to this court and again argued the IJ improperly
discredited his testimony based on incidental inconsistencies. We rejected his
argument and denied his petition for review. See Raju v. Holder, 336 F. App’x
814, 819 (10th Cir. 2009).
Raju filed a motion to reopen his proceedings before the BIA, asserting a
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on the basis his counsel failed to submit
certain evidence and witness testimony. Specifically, Raju asserts his counsel
failed to (1) call his brother, Sodhi Singh, to offer corroborating testimony, (2)
offer Raju’s passport as evidence, and (3) secure statements from individuals in
India.
The BIA determined Raju had not shown prejudice as a result of his
counsel’s actions in the removal proceedings. First, the BIA found Sodhi’s
testimony related to persecution he suffered in 1993 in India that would not have
corroborated Raju’s testimony regarding his persecution in 2001. Additionally,
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Sodhi stated he was forced to leave India and did not claim to have been in India
in 2001.
Next, Raju submitted a copy of his passport with his motion to reopen. The
BIA examined the passport and found only one stamp, from Ecuador,
corresponding to the time frame during which Raju claims to have traveled to the
United States. The passport added no new information that would assist in
reconciling Raju’s inconsistent testimony regarding the countries he passed
through.
Finally, Raju failed to identify specific statements from individuals in India
that his counsel should have offered as evidence. He also did not explain to the
BIA how the statements would corroborate his claims.
The BIA concluded Raju failed to offer any new evidence that would
overcome the IJ’s adverse credibility determination. Finding Raju failed to
demonstrate any prejudice suffered as a result of ineffective assistance, the BIA
denied his motion to reopen.
II. Discussion
We have jurisdiction to review the denial of a motion to reopen and our
review is for abuse of discretion. Infanzon v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 1359, 1362 (10th
Cir. 2004). We will reverse the BIA only “when its decision provides no rational
explanation, inexplicably departs from established policies, is devoid of any
reasoning, or contains only summary or conclusory statements.” Id. The BIA
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does not abuse its discretion when its “decision is succinct, its rationale is clear,
there is no departure from established policies, and its statements are a correct
interpretation of the law.” Id.
Removal proceedings are civil in nature and therefore a claim for
ineffective assistance of counsel arises only from the due process guarantees of
the Fifth Amendment. See Akinwunmi v. INS, 194 F.3d 1340, 1341 n.2 (10th Cir.
1999). To succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, an alien must
demonstrate he suffered prejudice as a consequence of the ineffective assistance.
See id. (“[A]n alien must show that his counsel’s ineffective assistance so
prejudiced him that the proceeding was fundamentally unfair.”).
At the outset, it is not clear from Raju’s brief that he argues the BIA abused
its discretion. He argues the IJ’s adverse credibility determination resulted from
the alleged ineffective assistance of counsel, which, if true, could be a basis for
showing prejudice. To the extent Raju challenges the BIA’s determination, we
find the BIA did not abuse its discretion because Raju has failed to demonstrate
he suffered any prejudice from his counsel’s allegedly ineffective assistance.
Raju’s counsel made the tactical decision not to call Sodhi as a witness
because she believed his testimony would harm Raju’s case. In another tactical
decision, Raju’s counsel decided not to offer statements from individuals in India
because she believed they were fraudulent. These tactical decisions were all
within the realm of sound strategy. Finally, his counsel stated she was never
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given Raju’s passport, his asylum application indicated he had no passport, and
the passport does not contain any information that would resolve Raju’s
inconsistent testimony regarding his route to the United States.
Raju has failed to demonstrate the evidence and testimony he contends his
counsel should have offered would have materially affected the IJ’s adverse
credibility determination. Thus, Raju has not shown he suffered prejudice from
the omission of this evidence. He also has failed to explain how the BIA abused
its discretion when it determined he suffered no prejudice from any alleged
ineffective assistance of counsel.
III. Conclusion
For these reasons, the BIA did not abuse its discretion when it denied
Raju’s motion to reopen. The petition for review is denied.
Entered for the Court,
Timothy M. Tymkovich
Circuit Judge
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