FILED
DEC 01 2010
NOT FOR PUBLICATION MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
LOWELL EDWARD JACKSON, No. 10-35046
Petitioner - Appellant, D.C. No. 3:08-CV-00895-KI
v.
MEMORANDUM *
JEAN HILL, Superintendent,
Respondent - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Oregon
Garr M. King, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted November 4, 2010
Portland, Oregon
Before: W. FLETCHER and FISHER, Circuit Judges, and JONES, District
Judge.**
Lowell Edward Jackson appeals the judgment of the district court denying his
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The Honorable James P. Jones, United States District Judge for the
Western District of Virginia, sitting by designation.
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28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition for habeas corpus. Jackson was convicted in an Oregon
bench trial of compelling and promoting the prostitution of a 15-year-old girl (“JB”).
As a threshold matter, Jackson contends that in rejecting his sufficiency claim,
the district court improperly relied on the reasoning of the state post-conviction court.
Although the district court endorsed the post-conviction court’s reasoning by
referencing it in its opinion, such a passing reference does not indicate that the district
court improperly abrogated its review of Jackson’s sufficiency claim. The district
court’s thorough opinion demonstrates that it extensively examined the record in
Jackson’s case. The brief reference to the post-conviction court’s similar
determination regarding the weight of the evidence served only to bolster the district
court’s independent analysis.
We conclude that, “after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Nevils, 598 F.3d 1158, 1163-64
(9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
Jackson admitted to driving JB to a motel where she had paid sex with a client
while he waited for her outside. The fact-finder could have credited evidence that
Jackson played a part in arranging JB’s meeting at the motel and in teaching JB the
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prostitution trade. JB’s inconsistent statements, her past history of engaging in
prostitution, the dramatic difference in age and maturity between Jackson and JB, their
close relationship, and their reactions to one another in the courtroom were before the
fact-finder. Finally, the fact-finder could have credited the testimony of two
investigating police officers that, based on their training and experience, they believed
Jackson to be JB’s pimp. This evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the
state, is sufficient to sustain Jackson’s conviction.
For similar reasons, we also reject Jackson’s claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel. To prevail on such a claim, a habeas petitioner must demonstrate (1) that
counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness as required
by the Sixth Amendment, and (2) that counsel’s deficient performance resulted in
prejudice. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984). Here, Jackson
challenges his attorney’s failure to object to a single instance of hearsay evidence that
referred to Jackson as JB’s “pimp.” Even assuming that Jackson’s counsel was
ineffective for failing to object, this failure did not prejudice the outcome of Jackson’s
trial, given the totality of other evidence presented.
AFFIRMED.
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