PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 08-4199
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STEVEN MCGEE,
Appellant
v.
WARDEN JERRY MARTINEZ
____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
District Court No. 3-08-cv-01663
District Judge: The Honorable Richard P. Conaboy
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Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
June 21, 2010
Before: SMITH, FISHER, and COWEN, Circuit Judges
(Filed: December 2, 2010)
Dennis E. Boyle, Esq.
Boyle, Neblett & Wenger
4660 Trindle Road, Suite 200
1
Camp Hill, Pennsylvania 17101
Counsel for Appellant
Kate L. Mershimer, Esq.
Office of the United States Attorney
228 Walnut Street, P.O. Box 11754
220 Federal Building and Courthouse
Harrisburg, PA 17108
Counsel for Appellee
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OPINION
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SMITH, Circuit Judge.
The sole issue before the Court in this case is whether
petitioner Steven McGee, a federal inmate, may maintain this
suit as a habeas action under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, or whether he
must re-file it as a civil rights action under Bivens v. Six
Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
I
Following a guilty plea to federal drug charges,
McGee was sentenced in the United States District Court for
the Western District of Michigan to 120 months and a
$10,000 fine. He is indigent, and the judgment imposing the
sentence instructed that ―[p]ayment [of the fine] is to be made
from prison earnings at a rate of $20.00 per month,‖ with the
remaining balance to be paid at an increased rate upon his
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release from prison. McGee avers in his habeas petition that
his prison earnings presently amount to $5.25 per month.
McGee was initially housed at McKean Federal
Correctional Institution, where he stayed from July 2004
through December 2005. While at McKean, McGee was
introduced to the Inmate Financial Responsibility Plan
(―IFRP‖), 28 C.F.R. §§ 545.10–545.11. He agreed to pay a
minimum of $25 per quarter toward his fine in exchange for
not (1) being limited to spending $25 per month in the
commissary, (2) being ineligible for placement in a halfway
house prior to his release, (3) receiving an increased security
designation, and (4) receiving an undesirable housing
designation.1 At that time, McGee’s pursuit of habeas relief
from his underlying conviction and sentence was costing him
some $130 per month in the commissary on copying charges
and ―other related costs such as typewriter ribbons, legal
pads, etc.‖; he apparently borrowed money to pay for all of
this.
In December 2005, McGee was transferred to
Allenwood Low Security Correctional Institution, located in
the Middle District of Pennsylvania. He began on the same
$25 per quarter IFRP plan for the payment of his fine, but
after several months was asked to increase the payments to
$75 per quarter, apparently because the authorities learned
that he had a substantial sum of money in his bank account
(according to McGee, these were funds borrowed to pay the
costs associated with his habeas petition). He refused to
agree to the increase and was placed on ―IFRP refusal status,‖
1
Those are not the only possible consequences for refusing
the IFRP. See 28 C.F.R. § 545.11(d)(1)–(11).
3
which limited his commissary spending to $25 per month—
not enough to meet his needs as he pursues habeas relief from
the judgment against him. In August of 2008, disciplinary
segregation and a loss of good time were recommended for
failure to fulfill his IFRP requirements. The record is not
clear as to why these additional penalties were recommended
or whether they were ever imposed.
McGee filed the instant petition pro se under 28
U.S.C. § 2241, alleging that his rights were being violated by
―unconstitutional conditions of his confinement‖—to wit, the
restriction of his commissary spending and the hindrance this
imposed on his ability to pursue his original habeas action.
The District Court sua sponte dismissed the action without
prejudice the day after it was filed, concluding that because it
challenged the conditions of McGee’s confinement it should
have been filed as a civil rights action. McGee timely
appealed.2
II
The ―core‖ habeas corpus action is a prisoner
challenging the authority of the entity detaining him to do so,
usually on the ground that his predicate sentence or
conviction is improper or invalid. See Leamer v. Fauver, 288
F.3d 532, 542 (3d Cir. 2002). Title 28, section 2241 of the
2
This Court appointed counsel to represent McGee, and we
acknowledge and appreciate his exemplary service. The District
Court had subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a).
We have jurisdiction to review its dismissal under 28 U.S.C. §§
1291 and 2253(a). Our review is plenary. Woodall v. Fed. Bureau
of Prisons, 432 F.3d 235, 239 n.3 (3d Cir. 2005).
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United States Code ―confers habeas jurisdiction to hear the
petition of a federal prisoner who is challenging not the
validity but the execution of his sentence.‖ Coady v. Vaughn,
251 F.3d 480, 485 (3d Cir. 2001). See also Woodall v. Fed.
Bureau of Prisons, 432 F.3d 235, 241 (3d Cir. 2005). For
instance, the habeas petitioner in Woodall challenged a
Bureau of Prisons regulation that capped his end-of-sentence
time in a halfway house at ten percent of his total sentence
(there, eleven weeks); the judgment had specified that the
petitioner would spend six months in such a facility. We
observed that ―[c]arrying out a sentence through detention in
a [halfway house] is very different from carrying out a
sentence in an ordinary penal institution,‖ and therefore
concluded that ―Woodall’s petition crosses the line beyond a
challenge to, for example, a garden variety prison transfer.‖
432 F.3d at 243. That qualitative difference was sufficient to
mark Woodall’s challenge as one that went to the ―execution‖
of his sentence, and that was thus cognizable under § 2241.
Id.
In contrast, ―when the challenge is to a condition of
confinement such that a finding in plaintiff’s favor would not
alter his sentence or undo his conviction, [a civil rights]
action under § 1983 is appropriate.‖ Leamer, 288 F.3d at
542. That is, the fact that a civil rights claim is filed by a
prisoner rather than by an unincarcerated individual does not
turn a § 1983 case or a Bivens action into a habeas petition.
This is true even where the complained-of condition of
confinement creates, as a secondary effect, the possibility that
the plaintiff will serve a longer prison term than that to which
he would otherwise have been subject. The petitioner in
Leamer was a state prisoner whose behavioral problems had
led to his placement on ―Restricted Activities Program‖
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status, which barred him from attending therapy sessions that
were a condition precedent to his parole eligibility. We
concluded that, even though a ruling in the petitioner’s favor
would have assisted him in obtaining parole eligibility and
thus a shorter prison stint, the action was ―aimed at a
condition of his confinement.‖ Id. at 543. Where the petition
is couched as a challenge to the duration of a prisoner’s
sentence, we held, ―[t]he operative test . . . is not whether
Leamer would, if successful, be able to appear before the
Parole Board. It is whether a favorable determination of
Leamer’s challenge would necessarily imply that he would
serve a shorter sentence . . . .‖ Id. Taking Woodall and
Leamer together, the question to be asked is whether granting
the petition would ―necessarily imply‖ a change to the fact,
duration, or execution of the petitioner’s sentence.
The IFRP is meant to ―encourage[] each sentenced
inmate to meet his or her legitimate financial obligations.‖ 28
C.F.R. § 545.10. Those financial obligations generally
consist of a fine, an order for restitution, and/or a special
assessment imposed as part of a criminal judgment. Under
the IFRP, prison staff ―shall help th[e] inmate develop a
financial plan and shall monitor the inmate’s progress in
meeting‖ his obligations. 28 C.F.R. § 545.11. Thus, the goal
of the IFRP is to achieve compliance with a provision of each
convict’s criminal judgment—namely, the timely payment of
whatever sum the court has ordered him to pay. Through the
IFRP, then, the Bureau of Prisons is ―putting into effect‖ and
―carrying out‖ the fine portion of McGee’s sentence. The
IFRP is therefore part of the Bureau’s means of ―executing‖
the sentence, and McGee’s lawsuit challenging the legality of
the IFRP and his placement in ―refusal‖ status sounds in
habeas.
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While McGee’s briefing invokes the phrase
―unconstitutional conditions of confinement,‖ the
complained-of conditions have been imposed as a means of
enforcing a financial obligation that is part of his sentence.
He has not challenged, say, the denial of kosher meals—
though we suppose that if he had been denied kosher meals
because he refused to pay his fine in accordance with the
IFRP, he might have a habeas cause of action. In other
words, McGee’s petition should not be conceptualized as a
direct challenge to the various ―conditions of confinement‖
that have been inflicted upon him. The core of the petition is
the claim that the ―imposition of [IFRP] restrictions . . . is a
sanction that violates the terms of petitioner McGee’s
criminal Judgment,‖ and a demand that ―the Bureau of
Prisons vacate its decision to place McGee in [IFRP] refusal
status.‖ The petition is, at bottom, a challenge to the IFRP
and its requirement that McGee pay $75 per quarter when his
sentence (i) requires only $20 per month (i.e. $60 per
quarter), and (ii) specifically directs that such payments be
made out of his prison earnings (which allegedly come to
substantially less than $75 per quarter). The Warden
acknowledges that ―[i]f McGee was challenging who could
set the payment plan for his criminal fine—the sentencing
court or the [Bureau of Prisons] under the IFRP—the
Government would concede that habeas corpus is the proper
way for him to proceed.‖ This is in fact what McGee has
done: he argues that the payment terms imposed by the
Bureau (in the IFRP) are illegal in that they conflict with the
terms imposed by the sentencing court (in the judgment). If
the IFRP’s payment requirement is illegal, then so are
McGee’s placement in refusal status and the restrictions that
come with it. The imposition of those restrictions is a means
of enforcing the payment schedule, and they will disappear if
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McGee wins and is placed on (and complies with) a new
schedule.
Our sister courts of appeals have reached the same
conclusion that we reach today. In United States v. Diggs,
578 F.3d 318 (5th Cir. 2009), a prisoner enrolled in the IFRP,
but later wished to reduce his payments. He filed a motion
with the sentencing court under 18 U.S.C. § 3664(k), which
allows a defendant to file a motion to amend the payment
schedule for restitution as made in the judgment. The
sentencing court denied relief on the merits. The Fifth Circuit
vacated that decision, holding that the challenge to the IFRP
should have been brought under § 2241. (We note that the
Fifth Circuit adopted the government’s argument that § 2241
is the proper vehicle to challenge an IFRP payment schedule.)
And the Eighth Circuit has ruled that, where the ―claims of
the petitioners challenge the IFRP’s payment schedule for
their respective financial obligations,‖ those claims ―concern
the execution of sentence, and are therefore correctly framed
as § 2241 claims brought in the district where the sentence is
being carried out.‖ Matheny v. Morrison, 307 F.3d 709, 711–
12 (8th Cir. 2002). We agree with these decisions.
The IFRP payment schedule and the sanctions imposed
for noncompliance are part of the execution of McGee’s
sentence. Accordingly we hold that the claim that they are
illegal and invalid falls under the rubric of a § 2241 habeas
petition. We will vacate the judgment of the District Court,
and remand for consideration on the merits.
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