09-4213-ag
Ba v. Holder
BIA
Bukszpan, IJ
A078 344 080
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY
ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan
United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of
New York, on the 3 rd day of December, two thousand ten.
PRESENT:
PIERRE N. LEVAL,
ROBERT A. KATZMANN,
RICHARD C. WESLEY,
Circuit Judges.
_______________________________________
ALY BA,
Petitioner,
v. 09-4213-ag
NAC
ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
_______________________________________
FOR PETITIONER: Aly Ba, pro se, Brooklyn, N.Y.
FOR RESPONDENT: Tony West, Assistant Attorney
General; Melissa Neiman-Kelting,
Senior Litigation Counsel; Anna
Nelson, Trial Attorney, Office of
Immigration Litigation, United
States Department of Justice,
Washington, D.C.
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED, that the petition for review
is DENIED.
Aly Ba, purportedly a native and citizen of Mauritania,
seeks review of a September 10, 2009 decision of the BIA
affirming the December 3, 2007 decision of Immigration Judge
(“IJ”) Joanna M. Bukszpan, which denied his applications for
asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the
Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Aly Ba, No. A078
344 080 (B.I.A. Sept. 10, 2009), aff’g No. A078 344 080
(Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Dec. 3, 2007). We assume the parties’
familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history
in this case.
“Where, as here, the BIA agrees with the IJ’s
conclusion that a petitioner is not credible and, without
rejecting any of the IJ’s grounds for decision, emphasizes
particular aspects of that decision, we will review both the
BIA’s and IJ’s opinions — or more precisely, we review the
IJ’s decision including the portions not explicitly
discussed by the BIA.” Yun-Zui Guan v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d
391, 394 (2d Cir. 2005). The agency’s factual findings,
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including adverse credibility findings, are reviewed under
the substantial evidence standard, id., and will be upheld
“unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to
conclude to the contrary,” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). “When
evaluating credibility determinations for substantial
evidence, we afford ‘particular deference’ to the IJ.” Xiu
Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 165-66 (2d Cir. 2008)
(quoting Zhou Yung Zhang v. INS, 386 F.3d 66, 73 (2d Cir.
2004)). An IJ’s adverse credibility determination must be
based on “specific, cogent reasons” that “bear a legitimate
nexus” to the finding. Secaida-Rosales v. INS, 331 F.3d
297, 307 (2d Cir. 2003).
Here, the IJ reasonably determined that Ba, asserting
past persecution because of his Fulani ethnicity, did not
meet his burden of establishing that he had a well-founded
fear of future persecution on account of his race,
nationality or membership in a particular social group, if
removed to Mauritania. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42),
1158(b)(1)(B).
Ba’s vague testimony, coupled with the lack of
corroboration for his assertions, provided a sufficient
basis to support the IJ’s adverse credibility determination.
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Specifically, Ba was unable to answer basic questions
regarding the geography of Mauritania, such as the location
and terrain of the capital city in which he had lived for
eighteen years, nor was he able to describe with any detail
the military camp at which he was purportedly detained for
three years before being deported to Senegal. When the IJ
attempted to solicit additional details and Ba’s answers
remained vague, the IJ was entitled to conclude that Ba’s
testimony was not credible. See Shunfu Li v. Mukasey, 529
F.3d 141, 147 (2d Cir. 2008); see also Jin Shui Qiu v.
Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 140, 152 (2d Cir. 2003) (where testimony
is “very spare,” IJ may “probe for incidental details” to
support adverse credibility finding).
Given Ba’s vague testimony, the IJ did not err in
finding corroborating evidence was necessary for Ba to meet
his burden of proof, and that his failure to provide any
reliable identity documentation, family documents, or
personal documents further undermined the veracity of his
claim. See Biao Yang v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 268, 273 (2d
Cir. 2007) (“An applicant’s failure to corroborate his or
her testimony may bear on credibility, because the absence
of corroboration in general makes an applicant unable to
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rehabilitate testimony that has already been called into
question”). The IJ determined that Ba’s only corroboration
– a “declaration of birth” – was not entitled to any
evidentiary weight because it was unauthenticated, unsigned,
and only partially translated. See Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S.
Dep’t of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 342 (2d Cir. 2006) (finding
that the weight afforded to evidence “lie[s] largely within
the discretion of the IJ” (alteration in original) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
Because the IJ’s adverse credibility determination was
supported by substantial evidence and Ba’s claims, all based
on the same factual predicate, depended on the same
testimony found to be lacking in credibility, the agency did
not err in denying Ba’s applications for asylum, withholding
of removal, and CAT relief. See Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d
148, 156 (2d Cir. 2006); Xue Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, 426 F.3d 520, 523 (2d Cir. 2005).
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
DENIED.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
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