In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
No. 09-3873
W AYNE JACKSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
JOE D ORTHA P ARKER,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 08 C 1958—Suzanne B. Conlon, Judge.
A RGUED S EPTEMBER 13, 2010—D ECIDED D ECEMBER 3, 2010
Before E ASTERBROOK, Chief Judge, and P OSNER and
T INDER, Circuit Judges.
T INDER, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff-Appellant Wayne Jackson
brought a Fourth Amendment claim against Defendant-
Appellee Joe Dortha Parker for false arrest pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He claimed that Parker, a Chicago
police officer, did not have probable cause to arrest
him for driving under the influence and various other
minor traffic violations. Jackson presented evidence that
2 No. 09-3873
Parker framed him for DUI by falsifying the results of
his field sobriety tests as part of an ongoing scheme of
making phony DUI arrests to obtain increased overtime
pay. The district court granted summary judgment in
favor of Parker, based in part on its finding that there
was probable cause to arrest Jackson for driving a pro-
hibited vehicle on Lake Shore Drive in violation of a
city ordinance. The court correctly determined that a
finding of probable cause bars Jackson’s false arrest claim
even if Parker did not have probable cause to arrest
Jackson for a DUI and even though Jackson was not
ultimately charged with driving a prohibited vehicle.
Recognizing the weakness of his false arrest claim,
Jackson re-structures his argument on appeal to assert
that he was unreasonably detained in violation of the
Fourth Amendment because of the alleged DUI frame-up.
Jackson forfeited this argument by not raising it
below and accordingly, we affirm the district court’s
grant of summary judgment in favor of Parker.
I.
While on duty, Officer Parker observed Jackson’s
vehicle, a Chevrolet Silverado pickup truck, driving
southbound on Lake Shore Drive on May 10, 2006,
around 3:30 p.m. Jackson’s vehicle had “B Truck” license
plates, as opposed to passenger-type plates. Parker testi-
fied that he noticed Jackson’s vehicle was prohibited
from Lake Shore Drive under Chicago Municipal Code,
Ill. § 9-72-020, which makes it unlawful to operate “any
vehicle upon any boulevard . . . when such vehicle is
No. 09-3873 3
designed primarily for carrying freight or other goods and
merchandise” subject to an exception not at issue here.
Chi., Ill., Mun. Code § 9-72-020(b). Parker also testified
that he observed Jackson make an illegal lane change in
violation of Chicago Municipal Code § 9-12-050, which
makes it “unlawful for the driver of any vehicle to fail
or refuse to keep his vehicle within the designated bound-
aries of any . . . lane except when lawfully passing
another vehicle.” Id. § 9-12-050(b). Parker testified that
he saw Jackson abruptly move his vehicle twice from
the right to the left lane of Lake Shore Drive and then
back again.
Parker executed a traffic stop, approached Jackson,
and informed him that he was prohibited from operating
his truck on Lake Shore Drive. When Parker asked
Jackson if he was aware that he was not supposed to be
on Lake Shore Drive, Jackson said “yes.” Parker further
observed that Jackson’s windshield had a crack, an
alleged violation of Chicago Municipal Code § 9-40-170,
which makes it “unlawful for any person to drive . . . on
any roadway any vehicle . . . which is in such unsafe
condition as to endanger any person or property . . . or is
not equipped with . . . equipment in proper condition . . .
as required in the traffic code . . . .” Id. § 9-40-170.
After allegedly observing that Jackson had pinpointed
pupils, bloodshot eyes, a flush complexion, and
slurred speech, Parker asked Jackson if he had been
drinking and Jackson said “no.” Jackson testified that in
the twenty-four hour period before being pulled over,
he had not consumed any alcohol or drugs. Parker ad-
4 No. 09-3873
ministered several roadside field sobriety tests and re-
ported that Jackson failed each test. Parker arrested
Jackson and took him to the police station, where he
administered a breathalyzer test. Jackson testified that
he blew into the machine in accordance with Parker’s
instructions, but Parker manipulated the test to make
it appear that Jackson refused to submit to the test.
Parker, on the other hand, claimed that Jackson
attempted to circumvent the test. Jackson was detained
at the police station until his release at approximately
3:00 the next morning.
As indicated by Parker’s arrest report, Jackson was
arrested and charged with (1) driving under the
influence of narcotics (2 counts); (2) failing to notify the
Secretary of State of an address change; (3) failing to
keep in lanes; and (4) driving an unsafe vehicle. Jackson
was not charged with the prohibited vehicle violation,
but the arrest report does indicate that Jackson was
observed “operating a prohibited motor vehicle on
Lake Shore Drive.” Prior to trial in the Circuit Court of
Cook County, the prosecutor amended the charges to
eliminate the DUI counts and substituted a charge of
negligent driving. After a bench trial, the court found
that Jackson violated Chicago Municipal Code § 9-12-050
by engaging in improper traffic lane usage and failing
to notify the Secretary of State of an address change,1
but found him not guilty on the other charges. Jackson
1
Jackson’s guilty charge for failure to notify the Secretary of
State of an address change was not brought to the attention of
the district court and was disregarded by Parker on appeal.
No. 09-3873 5
was given a diversionary sentence; he was placed
under supervision and ordered to pay a $50 fine. He
satisfactorily completed his supervision.
Jackson brought suit against Parker under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, asserting a Fourth Amendment violation for
false arrest. Parker filed a motion for summary judg-
ment arguing, in part, that there was probable cause
to arrest Jackson for the lane change violation and prohib-
ited vehicle violation and that probable cause to arrest is
an absolute bar to a § 1983 claim for false arrest. In re-
sponse, Jackson argued that Parker did not have
probable cause to stop or arrest him for any traffic viola-
tion. Specifically, he presented evidence that he did not
make any abrupt lane changes and never changed lanes
illegally. He further denied that the vehicle he was
driving was a prohibited vehicle and instead asserted
that there was a genuine issue of material fact whether
he was driving a vehicle that violated the ordinance.
Jackson, however, did not present supporting evidence
or legal argument that probable cause was lacking to
arrest him for the prohibited vehicle violation. Rather,
he merely asserted that Parker did not present credible
or direct evidence of such a violation. Neither party
addressed the unsafe vehicle charge at the district court
or on appeal.
In his brief in opposition to Parker’s motion for sum-
mary judgment, Jackson further clarified that his com-
plaint “makes clear that his theory of liability is false
arrest for DUI.” In fact, he stated, “that is the only
criminal charge referenced in [the] complaint.” He
6 No. 09-3873
asserted that he passed his field sobriety test, that his
speech was not slurred during his encounter with
Parker, that his balance was perfect, and that he did not
sway, stagger, or swagger. He stated that there was no
evidence of any impairment to support an arrest for
DUI and instead, Parker falsified the results and wrong-
fully arrested him for DUI as part of an ongoing scheme
to increase his overtime pay. Jackson presented evi-
dence showing that Parker intentionally reported false
information in DUI reports in forty-nine other cases
by misrepresenting that arrestees failed their field
sobriety tests. Jackson also presented evidence that the
Public Corruption and Financial Crimes Unit of the
Special Prosecutions Bureau of the Cook County State’s
Attorney’s Office was involved in an ongoing investiga-
tion of Parker concerning his conduct as a police officer.
The district court agreed with Parker that Jackson’s
false arrest claim must fail because Parker had probable
cause to stop and arrest Jackson. The court determined
that Jackson could not contest probable cause on the
lane change violation under the principles of Heck v.
Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), because his state conviction
on that charge rested on Parker’s testimony that he ob-
served Jackson make an illegal lane change. Even if Jack-
son’s claim was not barred by Heck, the court found
that there was probable cause to arrest Jackson on the
prohibited vehicle violation. The court concluded that
a finding of probable cause for that offense defeated
Jackson’s false arrest claim whether or not there was
probable cause to substantiate the DUI charges. Jackson
appealed.
No. 09-3873 7
II.
Jackson re-structured his argument on appeal. He
now asserts that Parker violated his Fourth Amendment
rights by unreasonably detaining him after the initial
traffic stop so he could frame Jackson for DUI. He
contends that probable cause to arrest for a minor traffic
offense does not immunize an officer who, after making
the traffic stop, frames the motorist for a more serious
crime, thereby unreasonably prolonging the seizure.
Jackson points out that under Illinois law, a person ar-
rested for a minor traffic offense “shall” post bail in any
of three ways, one of which is “by depositing . . . a cur-
rent Illinois driver’s license.” Ill. Sup. Ct. R. 526(a). On
the other hand, a person arrested for driving under
the influence cannot deposit his driver’s license to
obtain release, but must post a cash bail. Ill. Sup. Ct. R.
526(c). Accordingly, Jackson asserts that because of the
frame-up he could not simply leave his driver’s license
with Parker at the scene of the traffic stop, but instead,
was placed under formal arrest, transported to the
police station, and held in custody for nearly twelve
hours before being released on a cash bond.
Jackson does not contend on appeal that probable
cause for the stop and arrest was lacking and implicitly
concedes that he was lawfully arrested. Jackson
rightfully concedes this issue; we find no error in the
district court’s probable cause determination. To prevail
on a claim of false arrest, the plaintiff must show there
was no probable cause for his arrest. Williams v. Rodriguez,
509 F.3d 392, 398 (7th Cir. 2007). If probable cause to
8 No. 09-3873
arrest is found to exist, it “is an absolute defense to
any claim under Section 1983 against police officers
for wrongful arrest.” Mustafa v. City of Chicago, 442
F.3d 544, 547 (7th Cir. 2006). “Probable cause exists
if an officer reasonably believes, in light of the facts
known to [him] at the time, that a suspect had com-
mitted or was committing an offense.” United States v.
Reed, 443 F.3d 600, 603 (7th Cir. 2006). A probable cause
determination “relies on the common-sense judgment
of the officers based on the totality of the circum-
stances.” Id.
Parker had probable cause to stop Jackson for driving
a prohibited vehicle on Lake Shore Drive. Jackson has
not refuted that he was driving a pickup truck with
“B Truck” license plates southbound on Lake Shore
Drive when Parker pulled him over. While Jackson
argued below that his truck was not a prohibited
vehicle under the ordinance, he did not present sup-
porting evidence or legal argument for this defense.
Further, he did not present legal argument that probable
cause was lacking, nor did he raise this issue on appeal.
Based on the facts known to Parker at the time, it was
reasonable for him to believe that Jackson was violating
Chicago Municipal Code § 9-72-020(b) by driving a
vehicle designed “primarily for carrying freight or other
goods and merchandise” on a boulevard. Because Parker
had probable cause to stop Jackson for the prohibited
vehicle violation, it is unnecessary to determine whether
the principles in Heck bar Jackson from arguing that
probable cause was lacking to stop him for the lane
change violation.
No. 09-3873 9
Even if Parker’s motivation in stopping Jackson was
to frame him for DUI, the constitutional reasonable-
ness of a traffic stop does not depend on the subjective
motivations of the individual officer involved. Whren
v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996). Instead, the
Fourth Amendment’s focus on reasonableness dictates
an objective analysis, under which, “the fact that the
officer does not have the state of mind which is hypothe-
cated by the reasons which provide the legal justifica-
tion for the officer’s action does not invalidate the
action taken as long as the circumstances, viewed objec-
tively, justify the action.” Id. (quotation omitted). As
such, it is irrelevant that Jackson was not charged with
the prohibited vehicle violation but instead with other
violations. “[A]n arrest is reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment so long as there is probable cause to
believe that some criminal offense has been or is being
committed, even if it is not the crime with which the
officers initially charge the suspect.” Fox v. Hayes, 600
F.3d 819, 837 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing Devenpeck v. Alford,
543 U.S. 146, 153-56 (2004)). In Devenpeck, the Supreme
Court rejected “[t]he rule that the offense establishing
probable cause must be ‘closely related’ to, and based
on the same conduct as, the offense identified by the
arresting officer at the time of arrest.” 543 U.S. at 153; see
also Holmes v. Vill. of Hoffman Estate, 511 F.3d 673, 682
(“[P]robable cause to believe that a person has com-
mitted any crime will preclude a false arrest claim, even
if the person was arrested on additional or different
charges for which there was no probable cause.”).
10 No. 09-3873
In Williams v. Rodriguez, the plaintiff brought a false
arrest claim, arguing that there was no probable cause
to arrest him for DUI. 509 F.3d at 398-99. The court dis-
agreed because there was probable cause to arrest him
for violation of other traffic laws. Id. The court ex-
plained that the probable cause analysis “need not be
limited solely to whether probable cause existed to
arrest [the plaintiff] for driving under the influence.” Id.
at 399. “Although [the officer] arrested [the plaintiff] for
driving under the influence, an officer’s ‘subjective
reason for making the arrest need not be the criminal
offense as to which the known facts provide probable
cause.” Id. (quoting Devenpeck, 543 U.S. at 153). “[T]he
issue is whether a reasonable officer, with the same
information known to [the officer] at the time, would
have had probable cause to arrest [the plaintiff] for any
offense.” Id. The officer in that case had probable cause
to arrest the plaintiff for parking his vehicle along the
roadway. Id. at 399-400. Because of the objective nature
of the probable cause analysis, it did not matter that
the officer’s subjective reason for making the arrest was
driving under the influence rather than a violation of
the parking offense. Id. at 401; see also Jaegly v. Couch,
439 F.3d 149, 154 (2d Cir. 2006) (“Following Devenpeck,
we conclude here that a claim for false arrest turns only
on whether probable cause existed to arrest a defendant,
and that it is not relevant whether probable cause existed
with respect to . . . any charge actually invoked by the
arresting officer at the time of arrest.”).
It is not a violation of the Fourth Amendment to arrest
an individual for even a very minor traffic offense. The
No. 09-3873 11
Supreme Court has held that “[i]f an officer has
probable cause to believe that an individual has com-
mitted even a very minor criminal offense in his
presence, he may, without violating the Fourth Amend-
ment, arrest the offender.” Atwater v. City of Lago Vista,
532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001) (holding that police may make
full custodial arrests for even fine-only offenses); see also
People v. Taylor, 902 N.E.2d 751, 759-60 (Ill. App. Ct.)
(finding that officer could lawfully place bicyclist
under custodial arrest after observing him violating two
municipal ordinances regarding bicycle use), appeal
denied, 910 N.E.2d 1131 (2009). The Court in Atwater
noted that individualized review may be appropriate
“when a defendant makes a colorable argument that an
arrest . . . was conducted in an extraordinary manner,
unusually harmful to [his] privacy or even physical
interests.” Atwater, 532 U.S. at 352-53 (internal quota-
tions and citation omitted). In that case, the Court deter-
mined that the arrest may have been humiliating, but
it was no more harmful to the plaintiff’s privacy or physi-
cal interests “than the normal custodial arrest.” Id. at
354. Jackson has similarly not made an adequate
showing that his arrest was more harmful than the
normal custodial arrest. See, e.g., Chortek v. City of Mil-
waukee, 356 F.3d 740, 745-46 (7th Cir. 2004).
Further, even though Illinois law may have allowed
Jackson to post bail by depositing his current Illinois
driver’s license had he been arrested for the traffic
offenses and not for DUI, state law does not control the
reasonableness inquiry under the Fourth Amendment.
Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 176 (2008). In Moore,
12 No. 09-3873
officers arrested the plaintiff for a minor traffic offense
instead of issuing him a summons as required by
Virginia law. Id. at 167. The Court held that officers do not
violate the Fourth Amendment when they make an
arrest that is based on probable cause but prohibited by
state law. Id. at 175-76. A state’s choice of a more restric-
tive search-and-seizure policy does not render less re-
strictive ones unreasonable, and hence unconstitutional.
Id. at 174. The Court concluded that “warrantless arrests
for crimes committed in the presence of an arresting
officer are reasonable under the Constitution, and that
while States are free to regulate such arrests however
they desire, state restrictions do not alter the Fourth
Amendment’s protections.” Id. at 176.
Recognizing the principles set forth above, Jackson’s
counsel readily admitted at oral argument that if this
case is analyzed as a false arrest case, Jackson loses. As a
result, and as noted above, Jackson re-structured his
argument on appeal to assert a Fourth Amendment claim
for unreasonable detention arising from the false DUI
arrest. “In civil litigation, issues not presented to the
district court are normally forfeited on appeal.” Russian
Media Group, LLC v. Cable Am., Inc., 598 F.3d 302, 308 (7th
Cir. 2010). If the interests of justice require, we may
consider the forfeited argument, “but it will be a ‘rare case
in which failure to present a ground to the district court
has caused no one—not the district judge, not us, not the
appellee—any harm of which the law ought to take
note.’ ” Id. (quoting Amcast Indus. Corp. v. Detrex Corp.,
2 F.3d 746, 749-50 (7th Cir. 1993)). As such, while the
plain error doctrine is often applied in criminal cases, it
No. 09-3873 13
is rarely applied in civil cases. Moore ex. rel. Estate of
Grady v. Tuelja, 546 F.3d 423, 430 (7th Cir. 2008). “Plain
error is only available in civil cases if a party can demon-
strate that: (1) exceptional circumstances exist; (2) sub-
stantial rights are affected; and (3) a miscarriage of
justice will occur if plain error review is not applied.” Id.
This is not such a rare civil case where exceptional
circumstances exist. Jackson did not sufficiently develop
the record below for review of his claim of unreasonable
detention. Further, the district court did not have the
opportunity to address Jackson’s argument because
he clearly set forth his only claim as one for false ar-
rest. “[T]o reverse the district court on grounds not pre-
sented to it would undermine the essential function of
the district court.” Domka v. Portage Cnty. Wis., 523 F.3d
776, 784 (7th Cir. 2008) (quotation omitted). The appellee
also did not have the opportunity to develop the record
to respond to this newly developed theory, which was
not set forth in Jackson’s complaint or his response to
Parker’s motion for summary judgment. Finally, Jackson
has not made an attempt—either in his briefs or at oral
argument—to show that the elements for plain error
review have been satisfied. We, therefore, decline to
review for plain error.
Accordingly, for the reasons stated, the judgment of the
district court is A FFIRMED.
12-3-10