UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-4455
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
KAREN FRANCISCO MARTIN,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of Virginia, at Abingdon. James P. Jones, District
Judge. (1:03-cr-00104-jpj-1)
Submitted: November 30, 2010 Decided: December 6, 2010
Before WILKINSON, KEENAN, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Larry W. Shelton, Federal Public Defender, Brian J. Beck,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Abingdon, Virginia, for
Appellant. Timothy J. Heaphy, United States Attorney, Jennifer
R. Bockhorst, Assistant United States Attorney, Abingdon,
Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Karen Francisco Martin appeals from the revocation of
her supervised release. She raises two issues on appeal: (1)
whether the district court adequately explained its findings of
her Grade B violations, and (2) whether the court erred in
sentencing her to a twenty-four-month sentence. For the reasons
that follow, we affirm.
Martin was originally sentenced to thirty months of
imprisonment for bank fraud and related crimes. Her supervised
release was previously revoked, and she was sentenced to four
months. Thereafter, Martin was released for a second term of
supervised release. After approximately five months, Martin’s
probation officer filed a petition for revocation of supervised
release. The district court found that Martin had committed
all five of her supervised release violations and sentenced her
to a twenty-four-month term of imprisonment with no period of
supervised release thereafter.
On appeal, Martin only contests her two Grade B
violations for committing another crime, e.g., prescription
fraud under Virginia law. We review the district court’s
decision to revoke Martin’s supervised release for an abuse of
discretion, United States v. Davis, 53 F.3d 638, 642-43 (4th
Cir. 1995), noting that a district court need only find a
violation of a condition of supervised release by a
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preponderance of the evidence. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3583(e)(3) (West
Supp. 2010). Here, we find no abuse of discretion in the
district court’s findings that Martin violated state law by
engaging in prescription fraud. Thus, we affirm these
revocations.
Next, Martin contests her sentence. We will affirm a
sentence imposed after revocation of supervised release if it is
within the prescribed statutory range and not plainly
unreasonable. United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 439-40
(4th Cir. 2006). In determining whether a sentence is
procedurally or substantively unreasonable, id. at 438, we take
a more deferential posture concerning issues of fact and the
exercise of discretion than reasonableness review for non-
revocation sentences. United States v. Moulden, 478 F.3d 652,
656 (4th Cir. 2007). Only if we find the sentence procedurally
or substantively unreasonable must we decide whether it is
“plainly” so. Id. at 657.
The district court considered the Chapter Seven policy
statements and the statutory factors applicable to revocation
sentences under 18 U.S.C.A §§ 3553(a), 3583(e) (West 2000 &
Supp. 2010), calculated Martin’s advisory range as 4-10 months,
stated its reasons for sentencing her outside the advisory
range, and sentenced her below the statutory maximum. The court
explained that Martin’s previous four-month revocation sentence
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had failed to ensure her compliance with the terms of her
instant supervised release, that she failed to follow “hardly
any” (JA 128) of her probation officer’s directions, and that
the court believed the more structured environment of prison
would allow Martin a better chance to address her substance
abuse problem. (JA 126-30). Under these circumstances, we do
not find that Martin’s sentence was procedurally or
substantively unreasonable. See United States v. Thompson, 595
F.3d 544, 547 (4th Cir. 2010) (noting that a district court’s
statement of reasons for a revocation sentence need not be as
detailed or specific as other sentences).
Accordingly, we affirm Martin’s Grade B supervised
release violations and her sentence. We dispense with oral
argument as the facts and legal contentions are adequately
discussed in the materials before the court and argument would
not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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