United States v. Luke

PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.  No. 09-4543
CHINEDU CASHMIR LUKE,
Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore.
J. Frederick Motz, District Judge.
(1:08-cr-00071-JFM-1)

Argued: October 29, 2010

Decided: December 8, 2010

Before WILKINSON, KING, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Wilkinson wrote the
opinion, in which Judge King and Judge Agee joined.

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Robert Charles Bonsib, MARCUSBONSIB,
LLC, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellant. Sandra Wilkinson,
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Balti-
more, Maryland, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Megan E. Green,
MARCUSBONSIB, LLC, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appel-
2 UNITED STATES v. LUKE
lant. Rod J. Rosenstein, United States Attorney, Anthony V.
Teelucksingh, Special Assistant United States Attorney,
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Balti-
more, Maryland, for Appellee.

OPINION

WILKINSON, Circuit Judge:

Chinedu Cashmir Luke was convicted by a jury of conspir-
acy to commit identification document fraud in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 1028(f) and aggravated identity theft in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 1028A. Luke, along with several coconspira-
tors, engaged in a scheme to procure fraudulent U.S. pass-
ports. In particular, Luke and others submitted passport
applications in the name of innocent and unwitting third par-
ties. These applications included real identification documents
belonging to those innocent individuals alongside the conspir-
ators’ photographs and actual contact information. If issued,
the passports would have allowed Luke’s coconspirators to
pose as U.S. citizens (and more specifically, as those innocent
third parties) for purposes of international travel.

On appeal, Luke argues that the district court erred in deny-
ing his motion for judgment of acquittal on the ground that his
conduct was not prohibited by the statutes of conviction. We
disagree. The theory of Luke’s § 1028(f) conviction was that
he conspired to violate 18 U.S.C. §§ 1028(a)(2) and (a)(4).
But those provisions, like § 1028A, are broadly worded stat-
utes that are aimed at the precise type of criminal scheme that
Luke carried out. Finding that Luke was properly convicted
on all counts, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

I.

Chinedu Luke is a naturalized United States citizen who
originally hailed from Nigeria. In 1988, Luke fathered a son
 UNITED STATES v. LUKE 3
named Jonathan with Angela Lilly. Jonathan has lived with
Angela Lilly his entire life and had adopted her last name as
his own. However, while the exact dates are uncertain, Luke
(unbeknownst to Jonathan or his mother) changed his son’s
legal name to "Jonathan Osuagwu" for a portion of 2008.
Luke then obtained a variety of identification documents in
Jonathan Osuagwu’s name. In September 2008, Angela Lilly
changed Jonathan’s last name back to Lilly, but Luke retained
possession of the Osuagwu identification documents.

On November 19, 2007, a passport application was submit-
ted on behalf of an individual claiming to be Jonathan
Osuagwu at the U.S. Passport Agency in Philadelphia. The
application contained a Washington D.C. birth certificate, a
Maryland state identification card, a credit card, a Social
Security card, and a Selective Service registration certificate
– all of which were in Jonathan Osuagwu’s name. Michael
Persons, a fraud prevention manager at the office, decided to
schedule an interview with the applicant. Luke accompanied
the applicant to the interview and claimed that the applicant
was his son Jonathan, with whom he had recently grown reac-
quainted after a long period of separation. Luke further
claimed that the applicant needed the passport to visit family
in Nigeria. Luke even went so far as to execute an affidavit
stating that the applicant was actually Jonathan.

Nevertheless, Persons concluded that the applicant who
attended the interview simply did not match the photo submit-
ted along with the application. When Persons challenged the
applicant’s identity, the applicant left. Luke, however, called
him several times in an effort to get him to return. Moreover,
Luke continued to argue that the passport should be issued.
While Luke claims that he ultimately tried to withdraw the
application, the government asserts that Luke did precisely
the opposite, agitating to get the passport and leaving the
passport office only when it was clear he would not obtain it.
Either way, it was clear that Luke made several false state-
ments in support of the Philadelphia application: the applicant
4 UNITED STATES v. LUKE
was not actually Jonathan Osuagwu, meaning that the identifi-
cation documents submitted with the application did not
belong to him.

That was not the only fraudulent application with which
Luke was involved. In October 2006, an unknown applicant
submitted a passport application in the name of Rendell Cook
at the U.S. Passport Agency in Catonsville, Maryland. The
application was immediately flagged for investigation because
it was rife with errors and omissions. In addition, the support-
ing identification documents (a Washington, D.C. birth certif-
icate and a Maryland state identification card) had been
recently issued. Despite containing Rendell Cook’s name and
Social Security number, the application listed Luke’s address
and home telephone number as Cook’s contact information
and contained a photograph of an unknown third party billed
as Cook himself.

Agent Matthew Souliere of the Diplomatic Security Service
at the Department of State began an investigation into this
application. The Department mailed a letter to Rendell Cook
at the address listed on the application, meaning that the letter
fell into Luke’s hands. Luke responded by sending a personal
reference letter in support of the Cook application, claiming
to be well acquainted with Cook by virtue of being married
to his half-sister, Julie. Souliere’s next step was to call the
phone numbers listed on the application, which again
belonged to Luke. This time, Luke pretended to be a man
named Mike Ward and claimed that he was Rendell Cook’s
employer during the end of 2006. Luke (posing as Ward) also
asserted that the address listed on the application was the last
known address for Rendell Cook. In a later phone call with
Souliere, Luke truthfully identified himself in order to com-
plain about the delay in processing the application.

As would later become clear, almost all of Luke’s state-
ments to Souliere and on the application were false. Cook had
not applied for a passport in 2006, or for that matter, at any
 UNITED STATES v. LUKE 5
point. Instead, from February to March of 2006, Cook had
actually been hospitalized for a brain injury. Cook did not
have a sister named Julie, much less one married to Luke.
And while Luke (who had been employed as a respiratory
therapist) provided care to Cook during his hospitalization,
the two men never actually met. That hospital stay, however,
had allowed Luke to gain access to Cook’s Social Security
number.

In February of 2008, ten agents, including Souliere and an
agent from the Social Security Agency, executed a search
warrant at Luke’s home address. Luke was the only person
present at the time. The investigators interviewed Luke and
asked him about the photograph submitted with the Catons-
ville, Maryland application. In response, Luke (thinking about
the Philadelphia application) stated that the photo was of his
son, Jonathan Osuagwu, and began to discuss the Philadelphia
passport application. This admission informed the agents
about the existence of that application; until then, they had
been unaware of its submission. The officers also questioned
Luke about his relation to Rendell Cook. Luke initially
claimed that he had dated Cook’s half-sister Grace. But he
quickly recanted that statement and instead asserted that he
met Cook at a party in April 2006. Luke further contended
that Cook had asked for Luke’s help in applying for a pass-
port. As Cook would confirm at trial, however, all of these
statements were false.

The agents also found a great deal of physical evidence
during the search. Among other things, the agents discovered
identification documents that had been used in support of the
Catonsville and Philadelphia applications, including the
Osuagwu documents. Additionally, they found copies of the
photographs that had accompanied the Rendell Cook applica-
tion and a receipt indicating that Luke had purchased travel
for Jonathan Osuagwu. Finally, the agents found identifica-
tion documents that had been issued to a male but that were
under the name of Luke’s long-deceased daughter, Adriane.
6 UNITED STATES v. LUKE
Luke would later concede that his brother, Edwin, had been
fraudulently using Adriane’s identity.

On June 17, 2008, a grand jury indicted Luke on four
counts: conspiracy to commit identification document fraud in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028(f) (count one), conspiracy to
make a false statement in a passport application in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 1542 (count two), fraudulent use of a Social
Security number in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 408(a)(7)(B)
(count three), and aggravated identity theft in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 1028A(1) (count four). The theory of count one was
that Luke had violated § 1028(f) – which punishes any con-
spiracy to commit a § 1028(a) offense – by conspiring to vio-
late §§ 1028(a)(2) and (a)(4). On March 23, 2009, the district
court granted Luke’s motion for judgment of acquittal on
counts two and three. That same day, a jury convicted Luke
of the remaining counts. On May 18, 2009, the district court
sentenced Luke to three months imprisonment on count one
and twenty-four months imprisonment on count four, to be
served consecutively. Luke now appeals his conviction.

II.

Luke’s primary contention is that the district court erred in
denying his motion for acquittal on count one.1 According to
Luke, his conviction cannot stand because his conduct simply
does not fall within the ambit of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1028(a)(2) or
(a)(4) – the substantive offenses he is charged with having
conspired to commit. We shall address his arguments in turn.

Luke’s first argument is that he did not conspire to "know-
ingly transfer[ ] an identification document, authentication
feature, or a false identification document knowing that such
1
Luke also alleges various errors arising from the trial itself, some of
which pertain to evidentiary admissions and others of which relate to the
jury instructions in this case. We have reviewed these claims and find nei-
ther legal error nor an abuse of discretion on the part of the district court.
 UNITED STATES v. LUKE 7
document or feature was stolen or produced without lawful
authority." 18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(2). As a threshold matter,
Luke does not dispute that he conspired to "transfer" docu-
ments, and for good reason: the evidence clearly showed that
he conspired to have passports transferred to him and to trans-
fer those passports to the fraudulent applicants upon receipt.
Instead, Luke challenges other aspects of his conviction.

A.

As Luke points out, there is no evidence that the passport
he attempted to obtain was "stolen." 18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(2).
Thus, his conviction must be premised on the theory that the
passport was "produced without lawful authority." Id. But
according to Luke, a document is only "produced without
lawful authority" when the issuers and producers of the docu-
ment "knowingly acted in a way that would strip them of their
lawful authority." In other words, § 1028(a)(2) simply does
not apply in situations where individuals induce clerks, offi-
cials, or other governmental actors to unknowingly dole out
fraudulent identification documents. So long as the clerks or
officials thought they were acting lawfully, nobody can be
convicted under § 1028(a)(2) for "transfer[ring]" those docu-
ments.

This contention fails for several reasons. First, our prece-
dent undermines the very type of argument that Luke
advances. In United States v. Rashwan, 328 F.3d 160 (4th Cir.
2003), we confronted a situation where a defendant was con-
victed under 18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(1), which, at the time, pun-
ished any individual who "knowingly and without lawful
authority produces an identification document or a false iden-
tification document."2 See Rashwan, 328 F.3d at 165. Rash-
wan obtained a Virginia identification card, learner’s permit,
2
18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(1) has since been amended to punish anyone who
"knowingly and without lawful authority produces an identification docu-
ment, authentication feature, or a false identification document."
8 UNITED STATES v. LUKE
and drivers license by swearing to a false Virginia address on
his application. Id. at 162. We affirmed Rashwan’s conviction
on the theory that he had "aided and abetted the production of
false identification documents by providing false information
to the DMV with the specific intent that the agency would
then produce a false identification document for him." Id. at
165. But that theory itself rested on the premise that his driv-
ers license had been issued "without lawful authority" not-
withstanding the fact that the DMV clerk had no "intent to
commit the crime." Id.

Applied here, that premise is fatal to Luke’s claims. Just as
Rashwan (rather than the DMV clerk) could be convicted for
producing an identification document without lawful author-
ity, so too can Luke (rather than the passport officials) be con-
victed for conspiring to transfer an identification document
produced without lawful authority. Rashwan, in other words,
establishes that even when a clerk unknowingly creates a
fraudulent identification document, that document has been
produced without lawful authority.

Luke does not cite a single case that undercuts this straight-
forward analysis. There is a good reason for the paucity of
authority behind Luke’s position: Luke’s reading of the stat-
ute flies in the face of Congress’s purposes in enacting 18
U.S.C. § 1028. The goal of the statute was to address the
increasing use of false identification documents to facilitate
crimes. See H.R. Rep. No. 97-802, at 8 (1982) ("[The Act],
as reported, will . . . serve as a strong deterrent to false
identification-related crime and to the manufacturers and dis-
tributors of false identification in particular."). The text bears
out that purpose, applying by its very terms to anyone who
"knowingly transfers an identification document . . . knowing
that such document or feature was stolen or produced without
lawful authority." 18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(2). The text does not
state that it applies only to officials and clerks; on its face, it
has a much broader scope. Indeed, as the Sixth Circuit has
noted, "[a] reading of the several subsections of section
 UNITED STATES v. LUKE 9
1028(a) indicates a congressional desire to prohibit the unlaw-
ful use of identification documents in a wide variety of cir-
cumstances." United States v. Gros, 824 F.2d 1487, 1491 (6th
Cir. 1987).

In reality, Luke seeks nothing less than to transfer the mens
rea requirement of the offense from himself to government
officials. But of course, the statute is not written in any such
fashion. Section 1028(a) was enacted in response to the find-
ings of a special Federal Advisory Committee on False Identi-
fication ("FACFI") convened in 1974 by the Attorney
General. H.R. Rep. No. 97-802, at 1-2. FACFI determined
that false identification documents were "facilitating drug
smuggling, illegal immigration, flight from justice, fraud
against business and the government, and other criminal
activity, at an estimated cost of over $16 billion each year,"
and that "genuine government identification documents could
be easily obtained from the issuing offices by means of simple
misrepresentations." Id. at 2. The purpose of § 1028, then,
was to combat the increasing use of such documents by giving
federal authorities broader power to punish the use of false or
fraudulent identification documents in facilitating other
crimes. Id. at 8.

As the jury found, Luke knew perfectly well that the docu-
ments in question should never have been produced, i.e. that
they could not be issued upon any lawful authority. Although
the U.S. Passport Agency certainly has "authority" to issue
U.S. passports, it must do so on a "lawful" basis, that is, on
the basis of authentic documentation and in the name of the
actual person who is applying for the passport. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 1028(a)(2). That did not happen here. Accordingly, it makes
little sense to limit § 1028(a)(2)’s application only to situa-
tions involving passport officials or government clerks acting
ultra vires. The text would not support so restrictive a reading,
which would be fundamentally at odds with § 1028(a)(2)’s
more comprehensive goals.
10 UNITED STATES v. LUKE
B.

Luke’s remaining argument with regards to § 1028(a)(2) is
likewise flawed. Luke contends that the passport he sought to
obtain is not an "identification document" within the context
of the statute. In his view, the identification document in
count one cannot "be the passport itself," but must instead be
"other documents used to obtain the passport." To the extent
Luke’s argument is that a passport is never an identification
document, that contention lacks merit. Passports plainly fall
within the statutory definition of an identification document:
"[A] document made or issued by or under the authority of the
United States Government . . . which, when completed with
information concerning a particular individual, is of a type
intended or commonly accepted for the purpose of identifica-
tion of individuals." 18 U.S.C. § 1028(d)(3).

If Luke is instead arguing that the statute does not permit
prosecutions in situations where a defendant conspires to have
a passport transferred to him by an agency, he is incorrect.
Such cases fall comfortably within the statute’s language. See
18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(2). And in any event, the evidence at trial
also established that Luke conspired to "transfer" those fraud-
ulent passports to the applicants upon receipt. See id. Viewed
from whatever perspective, Luke’s conduct represents the pre-
cise type of crime that § 1028(a)(2) was enacted to punish.

III.

Next, Luke argues that he did not conspire to "knowingly
possess[ ] an identification document (other than one issued
lawfully for the use of the possessor), authentication feature,
or false identification document, with the intent such docu-
ment or feature be used to defraud the United States." 18
U.S.C. § 1028(a)(4). Luke does not mount any challenge to
the government’s assertion that he conspired to possess identi-
fication documents. Nor can he: Luke submitted two false
passport applications, and, in Philadelphia, pressed for the
 UNITED STATES v. LUKE 11
issuance of a passport after the fraudulent applicant had aban-
doned his endeavors.

Instead, Luke argues that the government cannot prove that
he had any "intent . . . to defraud" because all the government
could offer was speculation about the possibility that Luke or
his coconspirators might use the passports to travel outside
the country. According to Luke, that evidence is simply not
enough. In the district court, Luke argued that the government
needed to provide evidence that he intended to defraud the
government out of "some tangible financial kind of benefit."
Now, Luke argues that the government must prove his intent
to commit an offense against the United States or to obstruct
the functions of government. Either way, however, Luke’s
consistent refrain has been that the evidence at trial was insuf-
ficient to prove his intent to defraud the government.

We have not, to date, construed the term "intent . . . to
defraud" in § 1028(a)(4) or determined what kind of proof the
government must bring forth to satisfy that element. That
said, there is ample reason to reject Luke’s argument that the
government must prove his intent to defraud the government
of "some tangible financial kind of benefit." There is no tex-
tual indication of any such limitation, and construing the stat-
ute to require such proof would effectively vitiate it. As the
Tenth Circuit observed in discussing 18 U.S.C. § 505, a
"common sense and common definition of fraudulent intent
demands the perpetrator act for personal benefit or to deprive
the other person of something," but "[t]hat something need
not be money." United States v. Barber, 39 F.3d 285, 288
(10th Cir. 1994); see also United States v. Goldsmith, 68 F.2d
5, 7 (2d Cir. 1933) (discussing 18 U.S.C. § 72 and stating that
"[i]t is clearly established that, to defraud the United States,
pecuniary loss is not necessary; any impairment of the admin-
istration of its governmental functions will suffice").

We need not provide a further definition of the term "intent
. . . to defraud," however, as there was sufficient evidence to
12 UNITED STATES v. LUKE
prove that Luke’s conduct fit within any reasonable definition
of the term. Both the Philadelphia and Catonsville applica-
tions asserted that the applicants wanted passports to enable
them to travel outside the United States. The Philadelphia
application was more particular: the applicant there sought a
passport in order to travel to Nigeria in December of 2007.
Luke confirmed that statement of purpose during his meeting
with Michael Persons, the fraud prevention manager at the
U.S. Passport Agency in Philadelphia. Indeed, at trial, Persons
testified that Luke told him that he was seeking a passport to
allow Luke’s "son" (the man masquerading as Jonathan
Osuagwu) to travel to Nigeria. There was also weighty cir-
cumstantial evidence on this point as well: Luke’s passport
revealed that he himself traveled to Nigeria in December
2007, and a receipt uncovered during the search of his home
established that he had purchased travel for Jonathan
Osuagwu.

This evidence was more than enough to establish Luke’s
intent to defraud. While Luke argues that the district court
merely "speculat[ed]" as to what he or his coconspirators
might do with the passport, there was sufficient evidence to
turn any speculation into fact: they planned to use the pass-
ports to travel. That use would "defraud" the United States. 18
U.S.C. § 1028(a)(4). After all, using a fraudulently obtained
passport "obstruct[s] functions of the government," namely
the government’s duty to police entry and exit from the coun-
try. See H.R. Rep. 97-802, at 11. Traveling under a false pass-
port is also a federal crime. See 18 U.S.C. § 1543 (punishing
any person who "willfully and knowingly uses, or attempts to
use, or furnishes to another for use any such false, forged,
counterfeited, mutilated, or altered passport or instrument pur-
porting to be a passport"); 18 U.S.C. § 1544 (punishing any-
one who "willfully and knowingly uses, or attempts to use,
any passport issued or designed for the use of another" or
"willfully and knowingly furnishes, disposes of, or delivers a
passport to any person, for use by another than the person for
whose use it was originally issued and designed"). A person
 UNITED STATES v. LUKE 13
who possesses a passport for any of these criminal uses
plainly possesses an "intent . . . to defraud" the United States
under § 1028(a)(4).

Moreover, Luke conspired to violate § 1028(a)(4) in yet
another way: by possessing the Social Security and Selective
Service cards issued to Jonathan Osuagwu with the intent to
defraud the United States by submitting those documents in
support of a fraudulent passport application. We have previ-
ously held that "Social Security cards are identification docu-
ments" under 18 U.S.C. § 1028(d), see United States v.
Quinteros, 769 F.2d 968, 969-70 (4th Cir. 1985), and the
same logic applies to Selective Service cards. Indeed, it is dif-
ficult to think of any reason for Luke to have submitted the
Osuagwu Selective Service card along with the Philadelphia
application if not as further proof of Osuagwu’s identity. See
18 U.S.C. § 1028(d)(3) (defining "identification document[s]"
as being "of a type intended or commonly accepted for the
purpose of identification of individuals"); Quinteros, 769 F.2d
at 969-70.

It is undisputed that Luke submitted the Social Security and
Selective Service cards along with the Philadelphia applica-
tion in order to obtain a passport for someone pretending to
be Jonathan Osuagwu. In submitting those cards, however,
Luke defrauded the United States by attempting to induce the
creation of a false passport. Indeed, obtaining a passport by
submitting fraudulent documents would constitute an offense
against the United States. See 18 U.S.C. § 1542 (punishing
anyone who "willfully and knowingly makes any false state-
ment in an application for passport with intent to induce or
secure the issuance of a passport under the authority of the
United States, either for his own use or the use of another");
see also Goldsmith v. United States, 42 F.2d 133, 134-35 (2d
Cir. 1930) (affirming conviction for submitting a counterfeit
"writing" to a consular official "for the purpose of defrauding
the United States" where the defendant submitted a forged let-
ter in support of his visa application).
14 UNITED STATES v. LUKE
In response to this argument, Luke makes the odd assertion
that he did not intend to defraud the government with the
Osuagwu documents because he never used his son Jonathan
Lilly’s actual identifying information. This hardly helps. The
evidence established that Luke changed his son’s name to
Jonathan Osuagwu for a short period of time in order to
obtain identification documents in that name. Luke then pos-
sessed those documents with the intent to submit them in sup-
port of a fraudulent passport application by an unknown third
party. The fact that Luke used now-invalid identifying docu-
ments to support a fraudulent passport application does not
make his conduct less worthy of condemnation than if he had
used real documents to support the same illegal goals. The
evidence thus established that Luke’s state of mind fell within
the ambit of the term "intent . . . to defraud" in § 1028(a)(4),
meaning that his conviction under § 1028(f) must stand.3

IV.

Luke’s final argument is that his conviction on count four
(aggravated identity theft under 18 U.S.C. § 1028A) must fall.
That statute imposes a two-year prison sentence for any per-
son who, "during and in relation to any felony violation enu-
merated in subsection (c), knowingly transfers, possesses, or
uses, without lawful authority, a means of identification of
another person." 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1). Subsection (c), in
3
Luke may be correct that the government could have charged him
under different provisions, namely 18 U.S.C. § 1542, which punishes any-
one who makes false statements in the application or use of a passport, and
18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(7), which punishes anyone who "knowingly transfers,
possesses, or uses, without lawful authority, a means of identification of
another person with the intent to commit, or to aid or abet, or in connec-
tion with, any unlawful activity that constitutes a violation of Federal law,
or that constitutes a felony under any applicable State or local law." But
the fact that other statutory provisions might cover Luke’s conduct does
not mean that his conduct is outside the ambit of §§ 1028(a)(2) and (a)(4).
At its core, Luke’s argument amounts to little more than a request for us
to second-guess the prosecutor’s charging decisions. We decline that invi-
tation.
 UNITED STATES v. LUKE 15
turn, includes within its scope violations of § 1028(f) that are
predicated upon acts covered by §§ 1028(a)(2) and (a)(4). 18
U.S.C. § 1028A(c)(4). Luke’s first contention is that his con-
viction on count four should be vacated because his § 1028A
conviction is predicated upon his infirm § 1028(f) conviction.
But because we affirm Luke’s § 1028(f) conviction, we will
not disturb his § 1028A conviction on that ground.

Luke’s only other argument stems from the fact that
§ 1028A(c) excludes violations of "section 1028(a)(7)" from
1028A’s scope. See 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(c)(4). According to
Luke, his conduct could fall within the scope of § 1028(a)(7),
meaning that his conviction under § 1028A cannot stand. But
while Luke is right that his conduct might be punishable
under § 1028(a)(7), the fact remains that he was not actually
charged or convicted under that provision. His "felony viola-
tion" for purposes of § 1028A was his conviction under
§ 1028(f), and that provision – like §§ 1028(a)(2) and (a)(4)
– is not excluded from § 1028A’s scope. In other words,
§ 1028A does not speak in terms of hypothetical offenses, but
instead looks to the actual underlying offense of conviction.
Because Luke’s § 1028(a)(7) argument is premised on such a
hypothetical, it cannot withstand scrutiny.
V.
All of Luke’s arguments can be boiled down to one basic
source: his attempt to read 18 U.S.C. § 1028 as restrictively
as possible. But Congress enacted the statute to stem the prev-
alent use of false identification documents in facilitating dan-
gerous and destructive crimes. Luke committed all sorts of
fraud against the government, and the acts he conspired to
commit fall precisely within the parameters of §§ 1028(a)(2)
and (a)(4). To read the provisions as Luke wishes would quite
simply emasculate the intent of the body that passed them.
Because Luke’s challenges are without merit, the judgment of
the district court is hereby affirmed.
AFFIRMED