FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION DEC 14 2010
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S . CO U RT OF AP PE A LS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ADAM SHELTON, Jr., No. 09-16259
Petitioner - Appellant, D.C. No. 2:07-cv-00172-FCD-
CHS
v.
MIKE KNOWLES, Warden; ATTORNEY MEMORANDUM *
GENERAL OF THE STATE OF
CALIFORNIA,
Respondents - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Franµ C. Damrell, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted August 31, 2010
San Francisco, California
Before: B. FLETCHER, TALLMAN and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges.
Appellant-Petitioner Adam Shelton, Jr., appeals the district court's denial of
habeas relief. Shelton was convicted of grand theft and burglary and was
sentenced under California's three-striµes law to thirty-one years to life in prison.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
Shelton argues that there was constitutionally insufficient evidence to convict him,
that his right to present a defense was violated when he was not allowed to present
evidence of his recidivism to the jury, and that his sentence constitutes cruel and
unusual punishment. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. yy 1291 and 2253(c)
and we affirm.
I. RELEVANT FACTS
A few minutes before closing on April 20, 2004, an alarm sounded at a
CompUSA store, indicating that the rear emergency exit door had been opened.
Two employees, Richard Robinson and Kevin Fuller, went out the rear emergency
exit door, which had been propped open. Robinson saw Shelton peeµ above the
dumpster. He recognized Shelton as a customer who he had seen in the store some
minutes earlier but had not seen leave through the front door.
As Shelton began walµing away, Robinson and Fuller followed him, telling
him to stop so they could talµ to him. Shelton continued to walµ away, and Fuller
called 911 as he and Robinson stayed in pursuit. Shelton scaled a nearby wall, but
police soon caught and detained him. Meanwhile, at CompUSA, an employee had
found three computer monitors behind the dumpster. They were lightweight and
had been stored near the rear emergency exit door.
2
Two police officers later watched CompUSA's surveillance tape from that
evening. The tape showed a man enter through the front door as the store was
getting ready to close and walµ toward the bacµ of the store. The man never exited
the front door.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
We review de novo a district court's decision to grant or deny a habeas
petition under 28 U.S.C. y 2254. Arnold v. Runnels, 421 F.3d 859, 862 (9th Cir.
2005). For a petition to be granted under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996 ('AEDPA'), a petitioner must demonstrate that the state court
decision on the merits was 'contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application
of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the U.S. Supreme Court,' or
'resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the
facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding.' 28 U.S.C. y
2254(d). Under AEDPA, an unreasonable application of law is not merely clearly
erroneous; it is 'objectively unreasonable.' Locµyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63,
75-76 (2003).
III. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
Shelton claims that his due process rights were violated because there was
insufficient evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could have found him
3
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the charged crimes. Shelton argues that the
state court unreasonably applied Jacµson v. Virginia, in which the Supreme Court
held that evidence is constitutionally sufficient to support a conviction as long as,
'after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt.' 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). 'After AEDPA,' we apply 'the
standards of Jacµson with an additional layer of deference.' Juan H. v. Allen, 408
F.3d 1262, 1274 (9th Cir. 2005).
A. Grand Theft
Shelton argues that the jury lacµed sufficient evidence from which to find
that it was he who committed the grand theft. However, two CompUSA
employees--Robinson and Fuller--identified Shelton as the man whom they saw
behind the dumpster and followed as he quicµly walµed away despite their requests
that he return. Robinson also testified that he remembered seeing Shelton in the
store shortly before closing. Shelton's behavior, combined with his proximity to
the monitors behind the dumpster, constitutes sufficient evidence of guilt to
support the jury's verdict.
B. Burglary
4
Shelton argues that there was insufficient evidence from which the jury
could have found that he entered the CompUSA store with the intent to commit
grand or petit theft. The jury was entitled to believe that Shelton was the man on
the videotape who walµed directly toward the bacµ of the store after entering, and
who was found soon afterward crouched behind the dumpster. From this evidence,
a rational factfinder could draw an inference beyond a reasonable doubt that
Shelton entered the store with the requisite intent.
Shelton's sufficiency of the evidence claim fails.
IV. EVIDENCE OF RECIDIVISM
Shelton also argues that his right to present a defense was violated when the
trial court prevented him from presenting evidence that he fled because he feared
application of the three-striµes law and consequent life imprisonment. A defendant
has a right to present relevant evidence, but that right may be balanced against
'other legitimate interests in the criminal trial process.' Rocµ v. Arµansas, 483
U.S. 44, 55 (1987) (citation and quotation marµs omitted).
Even though evidence of recidivism was relevant to the question of why
Shelton fled, its exclusion did not infringe upon Shelton's constitutional rights.
California's rule that a jury may not discuss or consider the question of punishment
in its determination of guilt serves a legitimate interest in the criminal trial process:
5
it prevents jurors from 'permit[ting] their consideration of guilt to be deflected by
a dread of seeing the accused suffer the statutory punishment.' People v. Nichols,
62 Cal. Rptr. 2d 433, 434 (Ct. App. 1997) (citation and quotation marµs omitted)
(three striµes case). This rule is not clearly contrary to clearly established Supreme
Court precedent so as to support a habeas claim under the deferential standards of
AEDPA.
V. CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT
Finally, Shelton claims that his sentence of thirty-one years to life in prison
is grossly disproportionate to his crimes and is therefore cruel and unusual
punishment under the Eighth Amendment. ''The Eighth Amendment does not
require strict proportionality between crime and sentence,'' but rather 'forbids
only extreme sentences that are grossly disproportionate to the crime.' Ewing v.
California, 538 U.S. 11, 23 (2003) (plurality opinion)(internal quotation marµs
omitted) (holding that Ewing's sentence of twenty-five years to life for grand theft
did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment).
Shelton's criminal history is longer and considerably more serious than
Ewing's. In addition, the shoplifting offense of which Shelton was convicted was
more serious than Ewing's. The fact that Ewing is at least arguably controlling
6
means that the California Court of Appeal's decision cannot be characterized as an
unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent.
VI. CONCLUSION
The district court's decision to deny Shelton's petition for habeas relief is
hereby AFFIRMED.
7
FILED
Shelton v. Knowles, Case No. 09-16259 DEC 14 2010
Rawlinson, Circuit Judge, concurring: MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S . CO U RT OF AP PE A LS
I concur in the result.