[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10-12250 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
Non-Argument Calendar DECEMBER 15, 2010
________________________ JOHN LEY
CLERK
D.C. Docket No. 0:08-cr-60252-JIC-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff-Appellee,
versus
LEONARD MITCHELL,
a.k.a. Skinner,
lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
________________________
(December 15, 2010)
Before BLACK, WILSON and MARTIN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Leonard Mitchell appeals his 151-month sentence imposed after he pled
guilty to two counts of possession with intent to distribute a detectable amount of
cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). He challenges the substantive
reasonableness of his sentence. After careful review, we affirm.
I.
We review the substantive reasonableness of a sentence under a deferential
abuse of discretion standard. United States v. Villarreal, 613 F.3d 1344, 1357
(11th Cir. 2010). “To determine whether a sentence is substantively reasonable,
we consider whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the sentence achieves
the sentencing goals stated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” United States v. Culver, 598
F.3d 740, 753 (11th Cir. 2010); see also United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179,
1191 (11th Cir. 2008). We may vacate a defendant’s sentence only if we “‘are left
with the definite and firm conviction that the district court committed a clear error
of judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors by arriving at a sentence that lies
outside the range of reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of the case.’”
United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1190 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (quoting
Pugh, 515 F.3d at 1191); see also United States v. Hunt, 526 F.3d 739, 746 (11th
Cir. 2008) (“Although we do not automatically presume a sentence within the
guidelines range is reasonable, we ordinarily . . . expect a sentence within the
2
Guidelines range to be reasonable.” (quotation marks omitted)); United States v.
Talley, 431 F.3d 784, 788 (11th Cir. 2005) (The party challenging the sentence
“bears the burden of establishing that the sentence is unreasonable in the light of
both th[e] record and the factors in section 3553(a).”).
Mitchell was sentenced as a career offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1. He
does not challenge his status as a career offender. Instead, Mitchell argues that his
151-month within guidelines sentence is substantively unreasonable because the
career offender range was overly harsh. He asserts that a downward variance was
warranted because his qualifying convictions either involved small scale drug
transactions or were committed when he was 16 years old. Given Mitchell’s
extensive criminal history, we cannot say that his sentence is substantively
unreasonable. Mitchell’s failure to cease criminal activity in the past could
reasonably lead the sentencing court to conclude that a significant sentence was
necessary to deter him from committing future crimes. No error occurred.
AFFIRMED.
3