RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206
File Name: 10a0384p.06
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
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Plaintiff-Appellee, -
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
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No. 09-3264
v.
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Defendant-Appellant. -
ANDRE JOHNSON,
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Ohio at Cincinnati.
No. 08-00061-001—Sandra S. Beckwith, District Judge.
Argued: December 9, 2010
Decided and Filed: December 16, 2010
Before: MARTIN and SILER, Circuit Judges; BELL, District Judge.*
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COUNSEL
ARGUED: Kevin M. Schad, FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER’S OFFICE, Cincinnati,
Ohio, for Appellant. Christopher K. Barnes, ASSISTANT UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY, Cincinnati, Ohio, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Kevin M. Schad,
FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER’S OFFICE, Cincinnati, Ohio, for Appellant.
Christopher K. Barnes, ASSISTANT UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Cincinnati, Ohio,
for Appellee.
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OPINION
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BOYCE F. MARTIN, JR., Circuit Judge. Defendant-appellant Andre Johnson
filed a pre-trial motion to suppress evidence and statements from a traffic stop, which
*
The Honorable Robert Holmes Bell, United States District Judge for the Western District of
Michigan, sitting by designation.
1
No. 09-3264 United States v. Johnson Page 2
was denied by the district court. He was convicted of being a felon in possession of a
firearm and possession of powder cocaine. Now, he appeals the district court’s denial
of his suppression motion, his convictions, and his sentence. For the following reasons,
we AFFIRM.
I. BACKGROUND
On the afternoon of April 2, 2008, undercover Officer Jason Bolte of the
Cincinnati Police Department was conducting surveillance in an unmarked car in a high-
crime area on the west side of Cincinnati. He observed a female driver and two male
passengers park behind his unmarked car in a gold Toyota Camry. He further observed
the passenger in the front of the car—a black man wearing a gray hooded sweatshirt and
a black baseball cap—exit and give a man money in exchange for two or three pieces of
a small, white substance before returning to the Camry and driving away.
Officer Bolte radioed his dispatcher with instructions for other officers to pull
over the Camry on suspicion that the front passenger had just purchased drugs. Officer
Chris Vogelpohl pulled over the Camry shortly thereafter and asked all three occupants
for identification. Johnson, a black man not wearing a sweatshirt, was the front
passenger. Officer Vogelpohl thought Johnson appeared nervous and asked him to step
out of the car. He asked Johnson to submit to a pat-down, but Johnson attempted to flee
on foot. Officer Vogelpohl tased Johnson twice causing him to fall to the ground and
reveal a gun in his waistband. Officer Vogelpohl yelled to Officer Greg Ventre, another
officer who had arrived on the scene, that Johnson had a weapon. Officer Ventre
handcuffed the driver and the other passenger of the Camry. After Johnson was placed
under arrest for unlawful possession of a firearm, Officer Ventre searched the front
passenger area of the Camry where Johnson had been sitting and found a gray sweatshirt
like the one seen earlier by Officer Bolte. Inside the pockets were a bag containing six
or seven pieces of crack cocaine and another bag containing powder cocaine.
Subsequently, Officer Bolte identified Johnson as the man from the Camry he saw
buying the white substance.
No. 09-3264 United States v. Johnson Page 3
A grand jury in United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio
indicted Johnson on June 4 with one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm in
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2), one count of using a firearm in
connection with drug trafficking in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i), one count
of possession of crack cocaine with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B)(iii), and one count of possession of powder cocaine in violation
of 21 U.S.C. § 844(a).
Johnson filed a motion to suppress evidence obtained from the traffic stop, which
was denied by the district court.
During trial, the court had a discussion outside the presence of the jury with
Johnson, his attorney, and the government. First, they discussed whether Johnson’s
attorney had incorrectly explained to him the Sentencing Guidelines range for a plea deal
offered by the government versus the potential range for the charges if he proceeded to
trial and was convicted. Johnson alleged that his attorney had given him incorrect
information, and that he would not have proceeded to trial if he had known what the
correct ranges were. To this, the court responded, “Mr. Johnson, you’re the person in
this room with felony convictions and that makes your credibility suspect. I know [your
attorney] to be a capable, talented, honest attorney whose intentions are always to
represent his client to the best of his ability.” The court added that this issue could be
properly raised as a collateral appeal if Johnson was convicted, but that the trial would
proceed instead of addressing the issue then.
Second, they discussed whether Johnson would testify in his own defense. When
Johnson’s attorney informed the court that Johnson would testify, the court asked the
attorney whether he and Johnson had discussed the potential consequences. Specifically,
the court discussed how testifying would allow the prosecution to introduce evidence of
Johnson’s past crimes and how the prosecution’s stipulation that it would not introduce
evidence regarding the nature of Johnson’s past crimes would be nullified. In response,
Johnson indicated that he would waive his right to testify, but the court instructed
No. 09-3264 United States v. Johnson Page 4
Johnson to discuss the matter with his attorney during an immediate break in the
proceedings. In the end, Johnson did not testify.
A jury convicted Johnson on October 22 on the counts of being a felon in
possession and possession of powder cocaine, but acquitted him on the other two counts.
The district court sentenced him on March 10, 2009.
II. DISCUSSION
On appeal, Johnson claims that: (1) comments made by the district court violated
his right to testify in his defense; (2) the district court erred in denying his suppression
motion; (3) the district court abused its discretion by failing to address his ineffective
assistance of counsel claim during trial; (4) the district court erred in denying him a two-
level adjustment to his total offense level for accepting responsibility; and (5) the district
court improperly sentenced him because it did not know that it had discretion to vary
downward from the Guidelines’ range for crack cocaine offenses and the Guidelines’
base offense level for felons in possession of a firearm.
A. Whether the District Court Chilled Johnson’s Right to Testify.
We review de novo allegations of constitutional violations at the trial stage.
United States v. Webber, 208 F.3d 545, 550 (6th Cir. 2000).
“The right of a defendant to testify at trial is a constitutional right of fundamental
dimension and is subject only to a knowing and voluntary waiver by the defendant.” Id.
(citing Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 52, 53 n.10 (1987)). A district court does not
chill a defendant’s right to testify by warning him about the consequences of perjury and
how his testimony may affect sentencing. See United States v. Stuart, 507 F.3d 391, 398
(6th Cir. 2007); see also Webber, 208 F.3d at 552-53.
Here, Johnson claims that he was dissuaded from testifying when the court
remarked how his status as a felon made him less credible than his attorney in the eyes
of the court, as well as when the court alerted him that if he testified, the government
could question him about past convictions that might have detracted from his credibility
No. 09-3264 United States v. Johnson Page 5
in the eyes of the jury. However, the majority of the district court’s comments to
Johnson merely attempted to explain that, should he choose to testify, the jury would be
able to learn of his past convictions, which could potentially damage his credibility. The
court also pointed out that testifying would nullify a stipulation agreed upon by the
parties that the nature of his prior convictions would not be revealed to the jury, the
effect of which could be damning. Furthermore, as in Webber, the district court
ultimately informed Johnson that the decision to testify was his to make with his
attorney, and gave him additional time to confer with his attorney. While all this may
have contributed to Johnson’s decision not to testify, it was information that he should
have taken into account in making his decision. What is more, the additional time given
to Johnson to discuss his decision during a recess enabled him to seek advice from his
attorney.
It might have been unnecessary for the district court to admonish Johnson that
his felonious past made him less credible than his attorney, but a comment like that one
does not rise to the level of unconstitutional judicial misconduct in the context of the
Sixth Amendment. Cf. United States v. Blood, 435 F.3d 612, 629 (6th Cir. 2006)
(finding that, in the context of judicial bias, “[a]lthough the judge’s inquiries exhibited
sarcasm and could have been phrased more diplomatically, they primarily evidence the
judge’s effort to seek additional information from witnesses and not any prejudice or
bias against [defendant]”).
Accordingly, the district court’s comments did not chill Johnson’s constitutional
right to testify.
B. Whether the District Court Wrongly Denied Johnson’s Suppression Motion.
“‘When reviewing decisions on motions to suppress, this Court will uphold the
factual findings of the district court unless clearly erroneous, while legal conclusions are
reviewed de novo.’” United States v. West, 520 F.3d 604, 609 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting
United States v. Weaver, 99 F.3d 1372, 1376 (6th Cir. 1996)). “Evidence should be
viewed in the light most favorable to the district court’s conclusion.” United States v.
No. 09-3264 United States v. Johnson Page 6
Gooch, 499 F.3d 596, 600 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing United States v. Jones, 159 F.3d 969,
973 (6th Cir. 1998)).
We have held that Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), “‘permits a police officer
briefly to detain a person or property for investigative purposes if the officer has a
reasonable suspicion, supported by articulable facts, that criminal activity has occurred
or is about to occur.’” United States v. Davis, 514 F.3d 596, 607-08 (6th Cir. 2008)
(quoting United States v. Davis, 430 F.3d 345, 354 (6th Cir. 2005)). This reasonable
suspicion must be judged by courts based on the “‘totality of the circumstances’ of each
case.” United States v. Paulette, 457 F.3d 601, 606 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting United
States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002)). Officers may “‘draw on their own
experience and specialized training to make inferences from and deductions about the
cumulative information available to them.’” Id. (quoting Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 273).
Furthermore, a police officer may have reasonable suspicion based upon information
from other officers. United States v. Barnes, 910 F.2d 1342, 1345 (6th Cir. 1990)
(holding that an agent with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms had
reasonable suspicion to make a valid Terry stop of the defendant because other agents
and police had provided him information about the defendant’s criminal activity). In
Paulette, we held that a search was supported by reasonable suspicion when police had
knowledge of drug crimes and observed the defendant in a hand-to-hand transaction with
a man in an area known for drug activity, and the defendant attempted to evade police.
Paulette, 457 F.3d at 602. The search for weapons was also valid because of “the
frequency with which drug dealers arm themselves.” Id. (citing Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 273).
Johnson was seen engaging in a hand-to-hand transaction with a man in a high-
crime area known for drug activity. While Johnson did not evade police before being
stopped, there was additional evidence that Officer Bolte actually saw cash and pieces
of a small, off-white substance being exchanged. Therefore, based upon Paulette and
the experience of Officer Bolte as a trained, undercover police officer, he had reasonable
suspicion to believe that Johnson had engaged in criminal activity sufficient to warrant
a Terry stop. Furthermore, if Officer Bolte had reasonable suspicion, Officer Vogelpohl
No. 09-3264 United States v. Johnson Page 7
did as well because Officer Bolte relayed sufficient information to him. Cf. Barnes, 910
F.2d at 1345.
Additionally, once Johnson had been arrested for possession of a firearm and
secured outside of the car, police safety was no longer a valid reason to search the
Camry, but the search of the passenger area where Johnson had been sitting was still
permissible because “circumstances unique to the vehicle context justify a search
incident to a lawful arrest when it is ‘reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime
of arrest might be found in the vehicle.’” Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1719 (2009)
(quoting Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 632 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring in
judgment)). Indeed, in some cases, “the offense of arrest will supply a basis for
searching the passenger compartment of an arrestee’s vehicle and any containers
therein.” Id. Police could have reasonably believed that ammunition or additional
firearms were in the car or in containers in the car, especially in the passenger area
searched by police that was formerly occupied by Johnson.
Accordingly, the district court did not err in denying Johnson’s suppression
motion.
C. Whether the District Court Should Have Considered Johnson’s Mid-Trial
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim.
Johnson claims that his trial counsel gave him incorrect advice regarding his
potential sentence when considering a plea agreement, and that he would have accepted
the agreement had he been given correct advice. Furthermore, he claims that he brought
this issue before the district court during trial and the court erred by not considering his
claim at that time. In order for a defendant to prevail on an ineffective assistance of
counsel claim, there must be a reasonable probability that the outcome of the
proceedings would have been different but for counsel’s deficient performance. Avery
v. Prelesnik, 548 F.3d 434, 437 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 694 (1984)). This analysis requires the existence of two outcomes—one actual
and one alternate. However, Johnson claims that the district court erred by not
considering his claim during trial when the court could not have known the outcome of
No. 09-3264 United States v. Johnson Page 8
the trial. Even if we assume that Johnson’s counsel was in fact deficient, the court did
not know the actual outcome of the proceedings and could not rule in favor of Johnson
until one existed. Furthermore, Johnson’s reliance upon the non-binding decision of the
Second Circuit in United States v. Brown, 623 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 2010), is misplaced
because the ineffective assistance claim in that case was brought to the district court’s
attention after the defendant had been convicted.
While we decline to extend our discussion to all situations where a defendant
raises a mid-trial claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, or the situation in Brown
where an ineffective assistance claim is raised after conviction but before sentencing, the
district court here did not err in refraining from deciding Johnson’s claim. Because the
court did not know the outcome of the trial at the time the claim was made, it could not
have possibly decided that the outcome of Johnson’s case would have been different but
for any alleged deficiency of counsel.
D. Whether the Court Should Have Reduced Johnson’s Total Offense Level for
Accepting Responsibility.
Johnson specifically claims that he did accept responsibility for possessing a
firearm, and that he only challenged at trial whether he used the firearm in furtherance
of drug trafficking. If the facts are uncontested, the Sixth Circuit affords deference to
a district court’s decision regarding a reduction for acceptance of responsibility and
reviews the decision for clear error. United States v. Brown, 367 F.3d 549, 556 (6th Cir.
2004) (citing United States v. Webb, 335 F.3d 534, 537-38 (6th Cir. 2003)).
The offense level reduction for acceptance of responsibility under section
3E1.1(a) of the United States Sentencing Guidelines “is not intended to apply to a
defendant who puts the government to its burden of proof at trial by denying the
essential factual elements of guilt, is convicted, and only then admits guilt and expresses
remorse.” U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a) cmt. n.2. The sentencing court’s decision whether to
apply the reduction “will be based primarily upon pre-trial statements and conduct.” Id.
Here, it is uncontested that Johnson did not admit to possessing the gun until the
closing argument of his trial. Up to that point, he had put the government to its burden
No. 09-3264 United States v. Johnson Page 9
of proving that he possessed the gun. The district court decided that Johnson’s
revelation at closing arguments was too late to deserve a reduction under section
3E1.1(a). Indeed, granting a reduction based solely upon a closing argument would be
inconsistent with the Guidelines, which direct courts to rely mainly upon pre-trial
statements and conduct in making this decision. Id. at cmt. n.2.
Accordingly, the district court did not commit clear error in declining to award
Johnson a two-level reduction for accepting responsibility.
E. Whether the District Court Was Aware of Its Ability to Vary from the
Guidelines.
At the sentencing hearing, the district court gave both parties an opportunity to
object to any part of the sentence. Johnson objected to “everything.” Because Johnson
objected broadly to all aspects of his sentence without making any particular objections,
his claims on appeal regarding procedural sentencing errors are reviewed for plain error.
United States v. Simmons, 587 F.3d 348, 358 (6th Cir. 2009) (holding that plain error
review is required “where a party answers the Bostic question in the affirmative, but at
such a high degree of generality that the district court has no opportunity to correct its
purported error and the court of appeals has been deprived of a more detailed record to
review”). A finding of plain error requires a defendant “to show (1) error (2) that ‘was
obvious or clear,’ (3) that ‘affected defendant’s substantial rights’ and (4) that ‘affected
the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings.’” United States
v. Vonner, 516 F.3d 382, 386 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Gardiner, 463
F.3d 445, 459 (6th Cir. 2006)). The bar for plain error is extremely high and overcome
“‘[o]nly in exceptional circumstances’” when “‘the error is so plain that the trial judge
. . . was derelict in countenancing it.’” Id. (quoting Gardiner, 463 F.3d at 459).
Regarding Johnson’s crack cocaine claim, the district court did not commit plain
error. In fact, that Johnson even makes this claim on appeal is bizarre because he was
not convicted of, or sentenced for, a crack cocaine offense. Indeed, he was acquitted of
that charge and the only drug charge of which he was convicted was possession of
powder cocaine.
No. 09-3264 United States v. Johnson Page 10
Turning to Johnson’s claim regarding his base offense level as a felon in
possession of a firearm, he has not cleared the extremely high hurdle of plain error
review. The district court held a lengthy sentencing hearing, was familiar with
Johnson’s background, discussed the need to deter Johnson from any further criminal
behavior, and talked about the seriousness of Johnson’s criminal history. Therefore,
there is no obvious and clear error in Johnson’s sentence.
Accordingly, the district court did not commit plain error when sentencing
Johnson.
III. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the holdings of the district court.