09-5161-ag
Wu v. Holder
BIA
A078 731 360
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
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IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan
United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of
New York, on the 16 th day of December, two thousand ten.
PRESENT:
GUIDO CALABRESI,
ROBERT A. KATZMANN,
PETER W. HALL,
Circuit Judges.
_____________________________________
XUE JIN WU,
Petitioner,
v. 09-5161-ag
NAC
ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
_____________________________________
FOR PETITIONER: Xue Jin Wu, New York, N.Y.
FOR RESPONDENT: Tony West, Assistant Attorney
General; Jamie M. Dowd, Senior
Litigation Counsel; D. Nicholas
Harling, Trial Attorney, Office of
Immigration Litigation, Civil
Division, United States Department
of Justice, Washington, D.C.
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), it is
hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that the petition for
review is DENIED.
Xue Jin Wu, a native and citizen of the People’s
Republic of China (“China”), seeks review of a November 17,
2009, decision of the BIA denying her motion to reopen. In
re Xue Jin Wu, No. A078 731 360 (B.I.A. Nov. 17, 2009). We
assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts
and procedural history of this case.
We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen for
abuse of discretion. Ali v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 515, 517 (2d
Cir. 2006). We review for substantial evidence the BIA’s
evaluation of evidence of changed country conditions
submitted with a motion to reopen. Jian Hui Shao v.
Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 169 (2d Cir. 2008).
It is undisputed that Wu’s motion to reopen was
untimely and number-barred, because it was filed more than
four years after the agency’s order of removal became final,
and because Wu filed previous motions to reopen in June 2005
and October 2006. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). However,
the time and number limitations do not apply to a motion to
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reopen asylum proceedings that is “based on changed
circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in
the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such
evidence is material and was not available and could not
have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.”
Id. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). Wu claims that her motion falls
under this exception because she demonstrated changed
circumstances regarding the treatment of Christians in
China. Wu further claims that her case should be remanded
because the BIA erred in failing to explicitly consider in
its decision the country conditions evidence she submitted.
This Court presumes that the agency “has taken into
account all of the evidence before [it], unless the record
compellingly suggests otherwise,” Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t
of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 337 n.17 (2d Cir. 2006), and the
BIA need not “parse or refute on the record each individual
argument or piece of evidence offered by the petitioner,”
Jian Hui Shao, 546 F.3d at 169 (quoting Zhi Yun Gao v.
Mukasey, 508 F.3d 87, 87 (2d Cir. 2007)) (internal quotation
mark omitted). The record in this case does not compel the
conclusion that the BIA failed to consider any material
evidence demonstrating changed country conditions. See Xiao
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Ji Chen, 471 F.3d at 337 n.17.
Although the general country conditions evidence
submitted with Wu’s motion discusses intensified repression
of religion in some areas of China, it does not indicate
that increased repression occurred in Wu’s home province of
Fujian. See Jian Hui Shao, 546 F.3d at 154 (noting that the
agency requires a movant to show relevant changed country
conditions in her local province in order to excuse the time
limitation for filing a motion to reopen). Moreover, the
BIA was under no obligation to credit Wu’s individualized
evidence claiming a crackdown on underground churches in
Fujian Province, particularly in light of the IJ’s
underlying adverse credibility determination. See Qin Wen
Zheng v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 143, 146-47 (2d Cir. 2007)
(finding that the BIA reasonably declined to credit the
petitioner’s unauthenticated evidence based on the agency’s
underlying adverse credibility determination). Thus,
because the record evidence does not compel the conclusion
that the BIA failed to take into account material evidence,
see Xiao Ji Chen, 471 F.3d at 337 n.17, and further supports
the BIA’s determination that Wu failed to demonstrate
material changed country conditions excusing the time and
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numerical limits for filing her motion, see Jian Hui Shao,
546 F.3d at 154, we find no error in the BIA’s decision.
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
DENIED.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
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