UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 09-4966
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
TRENELL D. MURPHY,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. Benson Everett Legg, Chief District
Judge. (1:09-cr-00098-BEL-1)
Submitted: November 30, 2010 Decided: December 21, 2010
Before NIEMEYER, KING, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
M. Gordon Tayback, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant. Rod J.
Rosenstein, United States Attorney, Philip S. Jackson, Assistant
United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Trenell D. Murphy pled guilty to possession with
intent to distribute cocaine and was sentenced to 240 months of
imprisonment. In his plea agreement, Murphy reserved the right
to appeal the district court’s order denying his motion to
suppress evidence found as a result of a warrantless search of
his vehicle. The propriety of that ruling is the sole issue
Murphy raises on appeal. For the reasons that follow, we
affirm.
In reviewing the district court’s denial of Murphy’s
suppression motion, we review the district court’s factual
determinations for clear error and any legal determinations de
novo. United States v. Kelly, 592 F.3d 586, 589 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3374 (2010). Because the district
court denied Murphy’s motion, we construe the evidence “in the
light most favorable to the government.” Id.
The Fourth Amendment guarantees “the right of the
people to be secure . . . against unreasonable searches and
seizures” and requires that “searches be conducted pursuant to a
warrant issued by an independent judicial officer.” California
v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 390 (1985). An established exception
to the warrant requirement is the “automobile exception.”
Kelly, 592 F.3d at 589. Under this exception, police may search
a vehicle without a warrant if “probable cause exists to believe
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it contains contraband” and the vehicle is “readily mobile.”
Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938, 940 (1996).
Considering the totality of the circumstances, we find
that police had probable cause to believe that the readily
mobile truck contained contraband. Maryland v. Pringle, 540
U.S. 366, 370-71 (2003). We note that officers may “draw on
their own experience and specialized training to make inferences
from and deductions about the cumulative information available
to them that might well elude an untrained person.” United
States v. Johnson, 599 F.3d 339, 343 (4th Cir.) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted), cert. denied, ___ S. Ct.
___, 2010 WL 3236748 (U.S. Oct. 4, 2010) (No. 10-5913).
Accordingly, we affirm Murphy’s conviction. ∗ We
dispense with oral argument as the facts and legal contentions
∗
The Supreme Court’s recent opinion in Arizona v. Gant, ___
U.S.___, 129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009), does not alter our decision.
We have declined to apply the Supreme Court’s rationale in Gant
beyond the search-incident-to-arrest exception. See, e.g.,
United States v. Rumley, 588 F.3d 202, 205-06 (4th Cir. 2009)
(upholding search of a vehicle and seizure of a pistol in the
face of a Gant challenge because of the “plain-view” exception
to the warrant requirement), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 2123
(2010); United States v. Griffin, 589 F.3d 148, 154 n.8 (4th
Cir. 2009) (declining to apply Gant’s reasoning to protective
searches where suspect had not yet been arrested) pet. for cert.
filed (Jul. 16, 2010) (No. 10-6372).
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are adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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