IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 98-40665
Summary Calendar
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
SAUL ROBERTO LOPEZ,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
USDC No. L-98-CR-37-1
July 7, 1999
Before EMILIO M. GARZA, DeMOSS, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.
*
PER CURIAM:
Saul Roberto Lopez was convicted on his plea of guilty of
having illegally reentered the United States after having been
deported, and he appeals. We AFFIRM.
Lopez contends that he is entitled to reversal on grounds that
the district court abused its discretion by not holding a
competency hearing for him sua sponte, in accordance with 18 U.S.C.
§ 4241(a). He bases this on the bizarre reasons he gave for
returning to the United States from Mexico.
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under
the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
“Whether ‘reasonable cause’ exists to put the court on notice
that the defendant might be mentally incompetent is left to the
sound discretion of the district court.” United States v. Davis,
61 F.3d 291, 304 (5th Cir. 1995). Accordingly, this court reviews
the district court’s decision not to hold a competency hearing for
abuse of discretion. Id. “In determining whether there is a ‘bona
fide doubt’ as to the defendant’s competence, the court considers
three factors: (1) any history of irrational behavior, (2) the
defendant’s demeanor at trial, and (3) any prior medical opinion on
competency.” Id.
“[T]he standard for competence to stand trial [or to plead
guilty] is whether the defendant has sufficient present ability to
consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational
understanding and has a rational as well as factual understanding
of the proceedings against him.” Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389,
396-97 (1993) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Lopez
demonstrated at his rearraignment and his sentencing hearing that
he possessed the requisite ability and understanding.
Lopez does not have a significant history of irrational
behavior. Nor do prior medical opinions concerning his competency,
one of which was formed shortly prior to Lopez’s sentencing,
support his contention. Accordingly, the district court did not
abuse its discretion by not holding a competency hearing sua
sponte. See Davis, 61 F.3d at 304.
Lopez contends that he is entitled to relief on grounds that
the district court did not specifically advise him that if he
pleaded guilty, he would waive his privilege against
self-incrimination. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(3).
A defendant-appellant’s “Rule 11 challenges are reviewed under
a harmless-error analysis.” United States v. Crow, 164 F.3d 229,
233 (5th Cir. 1999). “Under the harmless-error analysis, this
Court must determine (1) whether the sentencing court in fact
varied from the procedure required by Rule 11 and (2) if so, did
such variance affect the substantial rights of the defendant.”
United States v. Suarez, 155 F.3d 521, 524 (5th Cir. 1998).
The district court adequately complied with Rule 11. Implicit
in the court’s advice that if he went to trial, the Government
would have to prove his guilt and that he “would not have to do
anything except to show up,” is the advice that Lopez could not be
compelled to incriminate himself. See United States v. Bachynsky,
949 F.2d 722, 726 (5th Cir. 1991). Accordingly, Lopez’s Rule 11
claim has no merit.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.