Case: 09-40768 Document: 00511330565 Page: 1 Date Filed: 12/22/2010
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
December 22, 2010
No. 09-40768 Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
JAIME IBARRA-LUNA,
Defendant - Appellant
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
Before HIGGINBOTHAM, CLEMENT, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.
PATRICK E. HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judge:
In United States v. Morales-Sanchez, we held that a district court must
always “correctly calculat[e] the applicable Guidelines range” before imposing a
sentence.1 Today we address whether a sentence may be upheld if an error in
the calculation is shown to be harmless. We hold that under the discretionary
sentencing regime of Booker and progeny,2 the harmless error doctrine applies
1
609 F.3d 637, 641–42 (5th Cir. 2010) (citing Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49–50
(2007)).
2
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005); see also Gall, 552 U.S. 38; Rita v. United
States, 551 U.S. 338 (2007).
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only if the proponent of the sentence convincingly demonstrates both (1) that the
district court would have imposed the same sentence had it not made the error,
and (2) that it would have done so for the same reasons it gave at the prior
sentencing. On the facts before us, we conclude that this high hurdle has not
been cleared and remand for resentencing.
I
Defendant-appellant Jaime Ibarra-Luna (“Ibarra”) pleaded guilty to
illegally reentering the United States after having previously been deported.3
Ibarra was born in Mexico in 1973 and first entered the United States illegally
when he was a teenager. In 2003, he pleaded guilty to a Texas state felony
offense of delivery of cocaine and was subsequently deported to Mexico. Five
days after being deported, Ibarra reentered the country without permission and
returned to his family in Texas.
In April 2008, Ibarra was arrested again and charged with murder.
Although the record is sparse on details, it appears that Ibarra and a companion
were involved in a high-speed car chase in which Ibarra fired a number of shots
at another vehicle, one of which struck and killed the driver. Ibarra pleaded
guilty and received a 22-year sentence, which he is currently serving in state
custody.4
After the state proceedings were completed, Ibarra pleaded guilty in this
case. Although Ibarra’s illegal reentry is a separate crime from the murder and
3
See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1326(a)–(b).
4
Officers investigating Ibarra’s residence also discovered a small quantity of
marijuana, but the marijuana charges were dismissed as part of the plea negotiations over the
murder charge.
2
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the past drug offense, each of the prior convictions raised significant issues
bearing on his sentence.
A
The first disputed issue at Ibarra’s sentencing hearing concerned the effect
of his 2003 drug conviction, which the criminal information and plea agreement
identify as “delivery of cocaine, less than 1 gram.”5 Relying on a police report
alleging that Ibarra sold a quantity of cocaine to an undercover officer, the
Presentence Report (PSR) recommended that Ibarra receive the 12-level
sentence enhancement for a prior felony drug trafficking offense.6
The district court rejected this recommendation because, as we have
previously held, a conviction for delivery of a controlled substance did not qualify
as a drug trafficking offense under the Guidelines in effect at the time of Ibarra’s
crime. Applying the categorical approach of Taylor v. United States,7 we look
only to the elements of the prior offense, the charging document, and the jury
instructions or plea agreement.8 We thus consider only those facts that were
essential to the conviction; we may not assume the truth of any other facts, such
5
See TEX . HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 481.112(a)–(b) (“[A] person commits an offense
if the person knowingly manufactures, delivers, or possesses with intent to deliver a controlled
substance listed in Penalty Group 1.”).
6
See U.S.S.G.§ 2L1.2(b)(1)(B) & cmt. n.1(B)(iv).
7
495 U.S. 575, 602 (1990).
8
United States v. Garza-Lopez, 410 F.3d 268, 273 (5th Cir. 2005).
3
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as allegations in the police report9 or any description given in the PSR.10 Under
the Guidelines in effect during Ibarra’s crime, arrest, and indictment, a “felony
drug trafficking offense” required the defendant to possess the drugs or to cause
them to be transferred.11 But Texas law defines delivery of a controlled
substance to include “offer[s] to sell,” which reaches offers where the defendant
is not yet in possession of the drugs and the transaction is never consummated.12
That is, “the [Texas] language encompasses both conduct that does constitute a
drug trafficking offense (transferring cocaine) and conduct that does not (offering
to sell cocaine).”13 Consequently, Ibarra’s agreement to plead guilty to a charge
of “delivery of cocaine” does not establish the facts necessary to impose a drug
trafficking enhancement under the applicable Guidelines.14
We pause to note that the Guidelines have since been amended to add
“offers to sell” to the definition of a felony drug trafficking offense, closing this
9
Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 16 (2005).
10
United States v. Gonzales, 484 F.3d 712, 714 (5th Cir. 2007); Garza-Lopez, 410 F.3d
at 273–74.
11
U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 cmt. n.1(B)(iv) (2007); see United States v. Morales-Martinez, 496
F.3d 356, 358 (5th Cir. 2007); Gonzales, 484 F.3d at 714–15.
12
TEX . HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 481.002.
13
Morales-Martinez, 496 F.3d at 358.
14
The charging document for the 2003 offense nominally alleges that Ibarra “knowingly
delivered by actual transfer,” “by constructive transfer,” and “by offering to sell.”
Notwithstanding this language, a conviction would require the government to prove only one
of these allegations, not all three, and therefore we cannot say whether Ibarra’s guilty plea
was an admission to all three allegations or only to the allegation of offering to sell. See
Morales-Martinez, 496 F.3d at 358–61; accord United States v. Fuentes, 245 F. App’x 358 (5th
Cir. 2007); cf. Orin Kerr, The Strange Practice of Indicting in the Conjunctive, THE VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY (Sept. 25, 2009, 1:23 PM), http://volokh.com/posts/1253899387.shtml.
4
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apparent loophole.15 The government did not cross-appeal Ibarra’s sentence, and
so we do not consider whether the amended Guidelines would call for a longer
sentence or whether the new Guidelines could be applied retroactively to Ibarra’s
conduct.16
After determining that Ibarra’s drug conviction did not support the twelve-
level enhancement, the district court proceeded to consider two alternatives.
The government argued that the 2003 conviction qualifies as “an aggravated
felony” and is therefore subject to an eight-level enhancement.17 Ibarra’s counsel
disagreed and maintained that the drug conviction falls into the residual
category for “any other felony,” receiving only a four-level enhancement.18 The
district court applied the eight-level enhancement. After sentencing
adjustments not at issue here, the court calculated a Guidelines range of 12 to
18 months.
The government now concedes that applying the eight-level enhancement
was error, and Ibarra should instead have received only a four-level
enhancement. This was error because an “aggravated felony” must be
punishable as a felony under the Controlled Substances Act.19 The government
15
See U.S.S.G.§ 2L1.2 cmt. n.1(B)(iv) (2008).
16
See Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237, 244–45 (2008). But see United States
v. Castillo-Estevez, 597 F.3d 238, 241 (5th Cir. 2010) (holding that retroactive application of
amended Guidelines provision is not plain error).
17
U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(C) & cmt. n.3(A).
18
Id. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(D).
19
Id. § 2L1.2 cmt. n.3(A) (adopting definition of “aggravated felony” from 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(43), which in turn incorporates 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), which includes “any felony
punishable under the Controlled Substances Act”); Lopez v. Gonzales, 549 U.S. 47, 50 (2006)
(holding that conduct designated as a felony under state law but as only a misdemeanor under
5
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concedes that a mere offer to sell, without evidence of possession or transfer, is
tantamount to solicitation and is not proscribed by the Controlled Substances
Act.20 The correct Guidelines range was 6 to 12 months, not 12 to 18 months.
B
The other significant dispute at Ibarra’s sentencing hearing concerned his
recent murder conviction. Even before it finished calculating Ibarra’s Guidelines
range, the district court advised the parties that it thought the state murder
sentence was too lenient and that it planned to compensate by imposing an
above-Guidelines sentence for the federal immigration charges.
The district court understood the murder to involve “chasing some guy
down the highway . . . shooting at -- out the window until he kills a guy in the
middle of the road.” Ibarra’s attorney did not dispute this characterization,
instead asking for leniency based on personal factors. Although Ibarra received
a 22-year state sentence, the district court explained that it did not “really know
how much time he’ll do” because Texas allows some offenders to be released after
serving as little as half of the assigned sentence. The court thus surmised that
Ibarra “might serve [only] 11 years for killing this guy.”
Viewed against this backdrop, the district court determined that a
sentence in the 12 to 18 month range—what it mistakenly believed to be the
applicable Guidelines range—would not satisfy the Section 3553(a) factors.21
the Controlled Substances Act does not qualify as an aggravated felony); United States v.
Estrada-Mendoza, 475 F.3d 258, 260–61 (5th Cir. 2007) (same).
20
See United States v. Rivera-Sanchez, 247 F.3d 905, 908–09 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc).
21
See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
6
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The court announced that, in order “to be certain that Mr. Ibarra doesn’t return
to society in this [c]ountry,” a longer sentence would be necessary. Stating that
it had considered Ibarra’s “convict[ion] of a murder of this type, degree, and the
circumstances behind it, as well as just the offense itself,” the court imposed a
36-month sentence and ordered that it run consecutive to the state murder
sentence. The court gave no further indication of precisely how it arrived at 36
months as the appropriate term of imprisonment.
II
We have applied the harmless error doctrine in several post-Booker
cases.22 In each, the district court considered the correct Guidelines range and
rejected it on Section 3553(a) grounds.23 We have not treated whether an error
in calculating the sentence may be harmless. We turn to the principles of Booker
and progeny.
A
It is established that a district court must consider the applicable
Guidelines range. Section 3553(a) lists the Guidelines range as one of seven
factors that the court must consider when deciding what sentence to impose.24
22
See United States v. Duhon, 541 F.3d 391, 396 (5th Cir. 2008); United States v.
Bonilla, 524 F.3d 647, 656 (5th Cir. 2008); United States v. Tzep-Mejia, 461 F.3d 522, 526 (5th
Cir. 2006).
23
In each case, the district court recognized some uncertainty over the proper
Guidelines calculation and therefore proceeded to consider and reject both possible Guidelines
ranges, including the correct range, in favor of a non-Guidelines sentence. Duhon, 541 F.3d
at 396; Bonilla, 524 F.3d at 655–657; Tzep-Mejia, 461 F.3d at 526–27.
24
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4); see Gall, 552 U.S. at 50 n.6.
7
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Indeed, the Supreme Court has instructed that, “as a matter of administration
and to secure nationwide consistency, the Guidelines should be the starting
point and the initial benchmark” in every case.25
For similar reasons, when a district court sentences outside the Guidelines
range, it must explain on the record why the range would not serve the goals
listed in Section 3553(a).26 This explanation is necessary “to allow for
meaningful appellate review and to promote the perception of fair sentencing.” 27
That is, review of sentencing decisions under an abuse-of-discretion standard
requires that the district court “clearly articulate” how the Section 3553(a)
factors apply to the facts of a particular case, because “[o]nly then can an
appellate court ascertain whether a district court has ignored or slighted a factor
that Congress has deemed pertinent.” 28
Treating the Guidelines as mandatory or failing to consider the Guidelines
at all is reversible error. Without attempting to identify the applicable
Guidelines range, a district court cannot meet its obligation to explain why a
sentence in that range would not be adequate. We cannot find a frustration of
this core statutory command to be harmless.
25
Gall, 552 U.S. at 49.
26
Id. at 51 (identifying “failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence—including
an explanation for any deviation from the Guidelines range” as a “significant procedural
error”).
27
See id. at 50.
28
United States v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326, 336–37 (1988); see also id. at 342–43
(explaining in a Speedy Trial Act case that “the necessity for thorough appellate review
require[s] that a district court carefully express its decision . . . in terms of the guidelines
specified by Congress” and that failure to offer such an explanation constitutes an abuse of
discretion).
8
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B
Elaborating on these standards in Gall, the Supreme Court observed that
a district court commits procedural error by “failing to calculate (or improperly
calculating) the Guidelines range.”29 In referring to both failure to calculate the
Guidelines range and improperly calculating that range as a single form of
procedural error, the Court thought them problematic for the same reasons.
As a result, an incorrect Guidelines calculation will usually invalidate the
sentence, even when the district court chose to impose a sentence outside the
Guidelines range. Although it may well be that the same explanation the court
gave for imposing a sentence outside the miscalculated range could also support
a sentence outside the correctly calculated range, the harmless error doctrine
requires the proponent of the sentence to convincingly demonstrate that the
court actually would have followed the very same reasoning absent the error.30
This is a heavy burden.31
That is not to say that it is not possible to show that the district court
would unquestionably have rejected the correct Guidelines range for the very
same reason it rejected the incorrect range. This case provides one such
example. The district court explained that it was imposing an above-Guidelines
sentence because it thought a sentence in the 12-to-18-month range was not long
29
Gall, 552 U.S. at 51.
30
See, e.g., Morales-Sanchez, 609 F.3d at 641 (citing United States v. Delgado-Martinez,
564 F.3d 750, 753 (5th Cir. 2009)); United States v. Tello, 9 F.3d 1119, 1129–30 (5th Cir. 1993).
31
Delgado-Martinez, 564 F.3d at 753 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Langford,
516 F.3d 205, 215–17 (3d Cir. 2008) (“[T]he improper calculation of the Guidelines range can
rarely be shown not to affect the sentence imposed.”)).
9
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enough to prevent Ibarra from returning to society while he is still dangerous.
Had the Guidelines range been correctly calculated, the range would have been
6 to 12 months. Yet if a sentence of 12 to 18 months is not long enough, then
plainly a 6-to-12-month sentence also would not be long enough, for precisely the
same reason that the district court gave. In these circumstances, the error may
be harmless. But there is more.
C
Our past cases also make clear that a sentencing error may not be found
harmless unless the proponent of the sentence “proffer[s] sufficient evidence to
convince the appellate court that the district court would have imposed the same
sentence, absent the error.”32 To satisfy that burden, the proponent “must point
to evidence in the record that will convince us that the district court had a
particular sentence in mind and would have imposed it, notwithstanding the
error.” 33
Even when the district court ultimately decides to impose a sentence
outside the Guidelines range, an error in its Guidelines calculation may still
taint the non-Guidelines sentence. For instance, the district court might settle
upon a particular non-Guidelines sentence by doubling the maximum Guidelines
range, or by starting with the Guidelines range and adding or subtracting a fixed
number of years. In such cases it may be clear that the district court’s reasons
for rejecting a sentence in the Guidelines range are unaffected by the error, but
32
Tello, 9 F.3d at 1130; see also, e.g., Delgado-Martinez, 564 F.3d at 753.
33
United States v. Huskey, 137 F.3d 283, 289 (5th Cir. 1998).
10
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the error nevertheless is not harmless because the district court would not have
imposed the very same sentence.
The burden of showing that a particular sentence was not derivative of the
Guidelines recommendation is a difficult burden if the district court fails to
indicate why it selected a sentence of a particular length. It may be prudent
when imposing a non-Guidelines sentence to state whether the magnitude of
that sentence rests on factors independent of the Guidelines, thereby permitting
a reviewing court to consider claims of harmless error.34
III
We now turn to applying these principles to the facts before us. As we
have explained, the calculation error in Ibarra’s sentencing may not be excused
as harmless error unless two requirements are met. First, the government must
convincingly demonstrate that the district court would have imposed a sentence
outside the correct Guidelines range for the same reasons it gave for imposing
a sentence outside the miscalculated Guidelines range. Second, it must show
that the 36-month sentence the district court imposed was not influenced in any
way by the erroneous Guidelines calculation.
As noted earlier, we are convinced that the explanation the district court
gave for imposing an above-Guidelines sentence would have led it to do so even
if it had considered the correct Guidelines range. The district court clearly
indicated than an above-Guidelines sentence was necessary because a sentence
of 12 to 18 months was not sufficiently long to protect the public from further
34
Cf. Gall, 522 U.S. at 50–51 (discussing the need for district courts to follow certain
sentencing procedures “to allow for meaningful appellate review”).
11
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crimes by Ibarra or, given his status as a repeat offender, to promote respect for
the law.35 Because the correct Guidelines recommendation of 6 to 12 months
would have been even lower, an above-Guidelines sentence still would have been
necessary for these same reasons.
We cannot state with the requisite certainty, however, that the district
court would have imposed precisely the same sentence. The district court did
not indicate how it selected a sentence of 36 months, and it did not state whether
this sentence was influenced by its Guidelines calculations or based instead on
independent factors. Notably, the district court was careful to insist that “I need
to understand where he comes out on the Guidelines, and then make my
variance,” which suggests that, quite properly, the Guidelines recommendation
affected the sentence it selected.36 We also note that, compared to the 12-to-18-
month range the court did consider, the 36-month sentence it imposed is exactly
double the Guidelines maximum and exactly triple the Guidelines minimum.
On these facts, the government has not met its burden to convincingly
demonstrate that the court would have imposed the very same sentence if it had
not made an erroneous calculation. We must therefore VACATE Ibarra’s
sentence and REMAND to the district court for resentencing.37
35
See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a)(2)(A), (C).
36
This statement admittedly is not conclusive, as it may be that the court insisted on
first finishing the Guidelines calculation because this is the process prescribed by Gall.
37
In light of this disposition, we do not reach Ibarra’s arguments that his sentence was
procedurally or substantively unreasonable.
12