FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION DEC 22 2010
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
TERRI HICKLIN, Nos. 08-55071
08-55522
Plaintiff-Appellee,
D.C. No. 2:06-cv-04543-GAF-JTL
v.
MEMORANDUM *
HARTFORD LIFE AND ACCIDENT
INSURANCE COMPANY, et al.,
Defendants-Appellants.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Gary A. Feess, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted December 8, 2010
Pasadena, California
Before: TROTT and WARDLAW, Circuit Judges, and MOSMAN, District
Judge.**
Terri Hicklin sued Hartford Life and Accident Insurance Company
(“Hartford”) for discontinuing her life insurance coverage and disability benefits.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The Honorable Michael W. Mosman, United States District Judge for
the District of Oregon, sitting by designation.
Ms. Hicklin’s policy with Hartford granted Hartford discretion to determine
eligibility for benefits. The district court reviewed Hartford’s decision to
discontinue benefits de novo and ordered Hartford to reinstate life insurance
coverage and disability benefits and to pay retroactive disability benefits. Hartford
appeals, arguing that its decision should have been reviewed only for abuse of
discretion.
We review an ERISA administrator’s decision de novo unless the plan
grants the administrator discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits;
then the review is for abuse of discretion. Metro. Life Ins., Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S
105, 111 (2008). However, if the administrator commits “wholesale and flagrant
violations of the procedural requirements of ERISA,” the standard of review
reverts back to de novo. Abatie v. Alta Health & Life Ins. Co., 458 F.3d 955, 971
(9th Cir. 2006) (en banc).
The procedural violations cited by the district court are insufficient to justify
reverting back to de novo review. But even when reviewed for abuse of discretion,
this standard must be “tempered with skepticism” given the structural conflict
presented by Hartford’s simultaneous funding of the plan and evaluation of claims.
See id. at 959. Reviewing the district court’s findings under the proper Abatie
standard, we conclude that the district court was justified in ordering reinstatement
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of life insurance coverage and disability benefits and retroactive payment. We also
conclude, given the evidence submitted by the parties in this case, that the district
court did not err in finding Hicklin was a manager, and thus entitled to the higher
level of benefits for managers. Nor did the district court abuse its discretion by
awarding Hicklin attorneys’ fees or in the amount of its award.
AFFIRMED.
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