In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
No. 09-1960
U NITED S TATES OF A MERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
S TEVEN B OONE,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division
No. 07 CR 5—Ruben Castillo, Judge.
A RGUED JANUARY 14, 2010—D ECIDED D ECEMBER 27, 2010
Before F LAUM, R OVNER, and H AMILTON, Circuit Judges.
R OVNER, Circuit Judge. On April 3, 2008, Steven Boone
was indicted along with Alderman Arenda Troutman,
on a number of charges relating to a political corrup-
tion scheme run out of her aldermanic office, in which
housing developers were forced to pay bribes to her
office in order to secure the alderman’s support. Prior
to trial, Troutman pled guilty to two counts of the 15-
count indictment, and the government proceeded to
2 No. 09-1960
trial against Boone on four of the remaining counts:
Count IV—mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341
and 1346; Counts V and VI—bribery, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(B); and Count XIV—making false
statements to an agent of the Federal Bureau of Inves-
tigation (FBI), in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2). The
jury convicted Boone on the mail fraud count, but ac-
quitted him on the bribery charges. It also convicted him
of one count of making false statements to the FBI.
Boone appeals only his conviction for mail fraud.
The conviction for mail fraud in this case involved a
“pay-to-play” scheme. Boone was the housing coordina-
tor in Troutman’s aldermanic office, and he and Trout-
man engaged in a scheme that deprived the residents of
the 20th Ward of the honest services of their Alderman.
Pursuant to that scheme, developers who wanted to
build or rehabilitate property in the 20th Ward were
required to pay a bribe to Troutman’s office in order
to gain support that they needed to proceed, such as
letters of support from her for zoning changes, alley
access, and curb cutting. Although Troutman was the
central person in the scheme, Boone was a necessary
part of it through his role as housing coordinator.
We note that recently the Supreme Court in Skilling
v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S. Ct. 2896 (2010),
limited the use of the theft of honest services statute. The
Court recognized that, read broadly, § 1346 would raise
due process concerns underlying the vagueness doc-
trine. Id. at 2931. The Court analyzed the history of the
honest services cases, and noted that the “ ‘vast majority’ ”
No. 09-1960 3
of the cases involved offenders who participated in
bribery or kickback schemes in violation of a fiduciary
duty. Id. at 2930. The Court concluded that Congress
intended § 1346 to at least reach those types of cases. Id.
at 2931. Accordingly, the Court held that in order to
avoid vagueness problems, § 1346 must be read as
criminalizing only bribery and kickback schemes. Id.
at 2932-33.
That holding limiting the scope of § 1346 does not
impact the conviction in this case, and the parties do not
argue otherwise. The present case involves precisely
the type of claim that the Court retained. The allega-
tions were that a payment was made in order to obtain
the services that the alderman’s office is supposed to
provide. Thus, the allegations underlying the honest
services conviction in this case involved the type of
bribery conduct that the Court preserved in Skilling, and
which constitutes criminal conduct under § 1346.
In addition to the mail fraud charge, the government
also attempted to prove two counts of making false
statements to the FBI. One count centered on Boone’s
denial to the FBI that he had collected any donations
for Troutman’s fundraising activities. At trial, Boone
attempted to demonstrate that he was not in charge of
the financial bookkeeping and that any money sub-
mitted to the office was placed unopened in the inbox
for the person in charge of finances. The jury acquitted
Boone on that charge. The second false statement
charge related to Boone’s denial that he had any knowl-
edge as to a property at 6417 South Maryland Street
4 No. 09-1960
involved in Troutman’s scheme. The government intro-
duced substantial testimony regarding the dealings
between Troutman and others as to that property, and
Boone’s involvement in the events. The jury ultimately
convicted Boone of making a false statement in
denying knowledge of that property. Boone does not
appeal that conviction.
As to the mail fraud charge, Boone argues that the
district court erred in allowing testimony of shake-
downs which did not involve Boone and which occurred
after the mailing that formed the basis for the mail
fraud charge. He also argues that the court erred in al-
lowing expansive testimony as to the property at 6417
South Maryland Street. Although Boone acknowledges
that some evidence as to that property could be intro-
duced to prove the false statement charge, he argues
that the court should have limited it to events of which
Boone had personal knowledge.
I.
We turn, then, to the facts presented at trial concerning
the victims of the scheme, beginning with Douglas
Greer. Greer owned property located at 5843 South State
Street near Troutman’s aldermanic office, and he began
renovating that property without obtaining the required
permit from the City. In Spring 2002, Boone saw Greer
renovating that property, and approached Greer, iden-
tifying himself as Alderman Troutman’s assistant. Boone
informed Greer that it was illegal to renovate a building
without first obtaining a permit, but assured him that
No. 09-1960 5
if Greer was willing to “take care of the office” then he
could proceed without the permit. Greer understood
that as a request for payment of a bribe to the office, but
he chose not to pay it at that time. Within a week, Boone
returned to the property with the police and attempted
to have Greer arrested. The police, however, refused to
arrest Greer for the failure to obtain a permit. A few days
after that incident, Greer went to Troutman’s office
and spoke with Boone, who informed him that for a
$10,000 cash payment he would be allowed to proceed
without a permit. Greer negotiated that amount down
to $8,000, and paid it out of drug proceeds he had ob-
tained as a drug dealer. He later received a receipt from
Troutman’s office for a “campaign contribution” in an
amount significantly less than the $8,000 he had pro-
vided. After paying the bribe, Greer was able to proceed
with the renovation of the property unhindered and
without any permit.
Boone requested a second payment from Greer in
Spring 2003. At that time, Greer had completed the re-
novation of the property, and intended to use the first
floor as a hair salon. He discovered, however, that it
was necessary to get the property rezoned in order to
use it for that commercial purpose. In order to obtain
that rezoning, Greer testified that he needed a letter of
support from the alderman’s office. Greer met with
Troutman, Troutman’s sister and brother, and Boone at
the office. Boone then stated that in order to obtain the
letter Greer would have to pay $15,000 to the office.
Greer again negotiated a lower amount, this time
$12,000, and subsequently made two cash payments of
6 No. 09-1960
$6,000 each. The day after making the second payment,
Greer retrieved the letter of support from the office.
As part of the procedure for obtaining that rezoning,
Greer sent a mailing to the neighbors in the area
informing them of the request. That mailing and the
scheme that it furthered forms the basis for the mail
fraud conviction.
The government also introduced evidence of other
persons who similarly were required to pay bribes to the
office in order to obtain the services that the alderman
is supposed to provide. In August 2004, Kalpana
Plomin sought help from the alderman’s office. She had
started a business called Homes with Heart, a non-
profit organization which sought to renovate dilapidated
buildings to provide affordable housing for low-
income residents. She was interested in purchasing a
large building at 4758 South Marshfield and converting
it to a 12-unit apartment building. The property was
zoned for use as a single family home or two-flat, and
therefore she sought Troutman’s support for a zoning
change before she proceeded with the acquisition of
the property. She met with Alderman Troutman and
approximately 6 or 7 other persons in Troutman’s office,
explaining her request. She did not identify Boone
as one of the individuals that she remembered at that
meeting. At the end of the meeting, Troutman expressed
enthusiasm for the project, and told Plomin that a
member of her staff, Reverend Gregory Hall, would
escort her from the office and explain the “political
things” that Plomin would need to do in order to obtain
No. 09-1960 7
the support. Hall informed Plomin that she had to make
a campaign contribution of $1,500 in order to obtain a
letter of support from Troutman. Plomin ultimately
decided against paying that money, and she did not
obtain the letter of support. As a result, Homes with
Heart did not obtain that property for its low-income
housing.
In a similar shakedown, in December 2003, James
Pattison sought a zoning change and alley access for a
property he was developing on Michigan Avenue. He
met with Troutman and a man whose name he could
not recall in order to seek Troutman’s support. At that
meeting, Troutman handed Pattison a stack of tickets for
a fundraising event for her campaign. Pattison stated
that he would do his best to sell the tickets, and
Troutman told him that he had already bought them.
Pattison understood that to mean “that if I wanted to
get what I needed to get done for my building, I was
going to have to purchase these tickets.” There were
50 tickets at $100 each, costing him a total of $5,000.
Pattison issued three checks totaling $5,000 after
being instructed by someone in Troutman’s office as to
how to fill out the checks. Once the checks were cashed,
Pattison received the letter of support from Troutman.
Finally, the government introduced testimony re-
garding a property located at 6417 South Maryland
Street, which formed the basis for the conviction for
making false statements to the FBI. At trial, the govern-
ment introduced substantial testimony regarding the
dealings concerning the alderman’s office and that Mary-
8 No. 09-1960
land property between December 2003 and Novem-
ber 2005. The testimony indicated that the City had
begun demolition proceedings on the Maryland building.
Troutman sought to purchase the property with her then-
boyfriend Donnell Jehan, a leader in the Black Disciples
street gang, but wanted his identity concealed in the
transaction. In December 2003, Boone approached Andy
Roman, a real estate developer in the area, and asked
him to come to Troutman’s office for a meeting. At that
meeting, Troutman and Boone asked Roman to pur-
chase the Maryland building and then resell it to
Troutman and an “undisclosed partner.” To facilitate the
transaction, Troutman assured Roman that she would
write a letter asking the City to vacate the demolition
order on the building.
Roman agreed to proceed, and he received the letter of
support from Troutman which he believed was faxed to
him by Boone. Roman closed on the property, and sub-
sequently prepared a sales contract with a blank “pur-
chaser” line that Troutman could complete later. Jehan
began renovating the building before that sales contract
was executed, but then fled the city when law enforcement
attempted to arrest him for drug trafficking, and there-
fore the sale to Troutman was never completed.
Roman, then, remained in ownership of a property
he did not want, and the court that had issued the
original demolition order began fining him for failure
to complete the renovations. To alleviate that problem,
Troutman asked Andy Pacult, another real estate devel-
oper, to complete some repairs on the building. Pacult
No. 09-1960 9
paid his construction crew approximately $5,600 for the
repair work, but received no money from Troutman for
the work. He testified that he did the repair work for
free because it was obvious to him that he had to do so
in order to get Troutman’s support in his future real
estate dealings.
On Troutman’s instruction, Pacult then falsely in-
formed the court that he intended to buy the property.
Roman eventually sold the property to a third party for
a profit. Troutman then demanded $20,000 in cash
from Roman for the renovations that she and Jehan had
made to the building. Roman ultimately complied
with that request in order to maintain a good working
relationship with her. He provided a $5,000 payment in
cash in April 2005. Troutman and Boone called him
repeatedly after that payment seeking the additional
$15,000 Troutman had demanded. After those calls,
Roman left a $10,000 cash payment in an envelope at
his office to be picked up, ostensibly by Boone although
Roman testified that he could not be sure if Boone was
the one who retrieved it. Troutman personally collected
the final payment of $5,000. Troutman never paid any
of that money to Pacult for the repairs he made on her
behalf.
Testimony at trial indicated that Boone’s duties in
the office included serving as Troutman’s housing co-
ordinator and working on real estate development is-
sues. In that capacity, one of Boone’s jobs was to issue
the aforementioned letters of support for the alderman,
and those letters bore his name as the contact person
10 No. 09-1960
should the recipients have any concerns, and also bore
both his and Troutman’s initials.
II.
At trial, Boone objected to the introduction of evi-
dence regarding Plomin and Pattison, and to some of
the evidence regarding the Maryland property. The
trial court denied those motions, and Boone now argues
that the district court abused its discretion in allowing
the government to offer testimony regarding Plomin
and Pattison. Boone emphasizes that he was not
present during the interactions with Plomin and Pattison.
Moreover, because those incidents occurred after the
mailing, he argues that they do nothing to establish
that the mailing was in furtherance of the scheme. Ac-
cordingly, he argues that the evidence was unfairly
prejudicial and confusing to the jury.
We review only for abuse of discretion the district
court’s decision to admit evidence, and will reverse and
order a new trial only if any evidentiary errors are not
harmless. United States v. Gorman, 613 F.3d 711, 717
(7th Cir. 2010); United States v. Useni, 516 F.3d 634, 651-
52 (7th Cir. 2008); United States v. Owens, 424 F.3d 649,
653 (7th Cir. 2005). “Indeed, we afford ‘great deference
to the trial court’s determination of the admissibility of
evidence because of the trial judge’s first-hand exposure
to the witnesses and the evidence as a whole, and
because of the judge’s familiarity with the case and
ability to gauge the impact of the evidence in the context
of the entire proceeding.’ ” United States v. Ryan, 213 F.3d
No. 09-1960 11
347, 350 (7th Cir. 2000) quoting United States v. Van Dreel,
155 F.3d 902, 905 (7th Cir. 1998). Boone argues that the
court abused its discretion because the evidence
was not relevant, in that it did not make it more likely
that the mailing occurred in April 2003, nor did it shed
light on whether the mailing was in furtherance of the
alleged scheme. In the alternative, Boone argues that
even if relevant, the evidence was nevertheless unduly
prejudicial and confusing and therefore should have
been excluded under Federal Rule of Evidence 403.
In considering the admissibility of the evidence, the
district court began by rebuking the defense counsel for
filing the motion on the eve of trial although counsel
was aware of the possibility of such testimony for quite
some time. The court nevertheless considered the
request and ultimately denied it. The court held that it
was a classic situation of a scheme that involved
other uncharged crimes that were inextricably inter-
twined with the charged offense. Although the district
court recognized that the admission of such evidence
prejudiced Boone, the court concluded that it was not
undue prejudice under Rule 403, and the court further
expressed its willingness to give a limiting instruction
and invited the defense to propose such an instruction.
The government argues for affirmance on the same
basis, contending that the evidence regarding Plomin
and Pattison was inextricably intertwined with the
scheme and therefore properly admitted on that basis.
We have long criticized the admissibility of evidence
based on the inextricably intertwined doctrine. That
12 No. 09-1960
doctrine allowed evidence of uncharged acts to be intro-
duced if that evidence was inextricably intertwined
with the charged offense, such as where: it was neces-
sary to provide the jury with a complete story of the
crime on trial; its absence would create a chronological
or conceptual void in the narrative of the charged
offense; or it is so blended or connected that it inci-
dentally involves, explains the circumstances sur-
rounding, or tends to prove any element of the charged
offense. United States v. Simpson, 479 F.3d 492, 500-
01 (7th Cir. 2007); United States v. Lane, 323 F.3d 568,
580 (7th Cir. 2003). We repeatedly noted, however, that
the doctrine was “unhelpfully vague,” and was often
used as a basis to admit evidence that was more properly
admissible either as direct evidence or as evidence
under Rule 404(b). United States v. Conner, 583 F.3d 1011,
1019 (7th Cir. 2009); United States v. Taylor, 522 F.3d 731,
734 (7th Cir. 2008). We reiterated those concerns in
our recent decision in United States v. Gorman, 613 F.3d
711, 719 (7th Cir. 2010), characterizing the inextricable
intertwinement doctrine as “overused, vague and quite
unhelpful.” We concluded that the doctrine had out-
lived its usefulness, and that “[h]enceforth, resort to
inextricable intertwinement is unavailable when deter-
mining a theory of admissibility.” Id.
The present case illustrates the concerns that caused us
in Gorman to reject the inextricable intertwinement doc-
trine. Although the evidence in this case was ap-
parently admitted based on that doctrine, it more
properly should have come in as direct evidence, and
as evidence of intent under Federal Rules of Evi-
No. 09-1960 13
dence 404(b). See Foster-Miller, Inc. v. Babcock & Wilcox
Canada, 210 F.3d 1, 13-14 (1st Cir. 2000) (noting that we
can affirm the admission of evidence on any proper
basis regardless of whether that was the ground relied
upon by the district court); United States v. Burke, 781
F.2d 1234, 1243 (7th Cir. 1985) (same).
In order to prove mail fraud, the government was
required to establish: (1) that Boone participated in a
scheme to defraud; (2) that he did so knowingly and
with the intent to defraud; and (3) that Boone used or
caused the use of the mails in furtherance of the
scheme. United States v. Boisture, 563 F.3d 295, 298 (7th
Cir. 2009); United States v. Thyfault, 579 F.3d 748, 751
(7th Cir. 2009). The challenged evidence was relevant to
prove both the scheme itself and to prove that Boone
participated in the scheme knowingly and with intent
to defraud.
Boone argues at length that the incidents regarding
Plomin and Pattison occurred after the “mailing,” and
concludes that the incidents therefore should not have
been admissible. Boone argues that the government is
limited by the date of the mailing, and cannot produce
evidence remote in time from that occurrence. The
mailing, however, merely provides the prerequisite to
federal jurisdiction over the scheme to defraud. The
government is entitled to prove the scheme itself, and
that proof is not bounded by the timing of the mailing.
For instance, in United States v. Lanas, 324 F.3d 894
(7th Cir. 2003), the government introduced evidence
of a scheme spanning six years, in which Richard
14 No. 09-1960
Hendershot, a claims adjuster, hired private inves-
tigators to conduct surveillance on claimants, and de-
manded that those investigators provide a cash kickback
to him for each job. The scheme was in effect from 1988
to 1994, and involved six private investigation or
security firms. Id. at 898. In addition, the government
introduced evidence that Hendershot solicited kick-
backs from a law firm but that the attempt was unsuc-
cessful. Id. Clifford Lanas, one of the investigators
who provided kickbacks, and James Battista, the “bag-
man” who collected the cash payments, were charged
with Hendershot. Id. The mailings alleged in the indict-
ment all occurred in July 1994, at the end of the alleged
scheme. Id. On appeal, the defendants argued that
the government should not have been allowed to intro-
duce uncharged other acts evidence unrelated to the
dealings between the co-defendants, and which were
not factually or temporally related. Id. at 900. Specifically,
they argued that the court erred in allowing evidence
relating to the law firm and to two other vendors. Id.
We affirmed the convictions and made clear that
evidence related to those vendors and the law firm
could be admitted, not under Rule 404(b) as other acts
evidence, but as direct proof of the overall scheme itself.
Id. at 901. We noted that the defendants’ argument ap-
peared to be based on the misperception that the scope
of a mail fraud scheme is defined by the mailing charged
in the indictment and that the offense was thereby
limited to the portion of the scheme pertaining to that
mailing. Id. We rejected that notion, emphasizing that “a
mailing in furtherance of a scheme to defraud is simply
No. 09-1960 15
the element that confers federal jurisdiction under the
mail fraud statute; but a fraud scheme can produce pro-
ceeds long before the act that ultimately triggers juris-
diction.” Id., citing United States v. Mankarious, 151 F.3d
694, 705 (7th Cir. 1998). Therefore, even acts that
occurred well before the July 1994 mailings, and which
involved different participants in the scheme, could be
introduced to prove the overarching scheme.
Similarly, in Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705 (1989),
the Supreme Court affirmed a mail fraud conviction in
which the mailing occurred well after the fraud was
otherwise completed. In Schmuck, the defendant pur-
chased used cars, rolled back the odometers, and then
resold them with the lower odometer readings to
unwitting car dealers. Id. at 707. When those dealers
later resold the cars to customers, the dealer would
submit a title-application form to the Wisconsin Depart-
ment of Transportation, and that submission was the
mailing that was relied upon for the mail fraud charge.
Id. The Court upheld the conviction, reasoning that “the
use of the mails need not be an essential element of the
scheme. . . . It is sufficient for the mailing to be ‘incident
to an essential part of the scheme,’ . . . or ‘a step in the
plot’ . . . .” Id. at 710-11 [citations omitted]. Both Lanas
and Schmuck, then, make clear that the timing of the
mailing does not delineate the scope of the scheme.
Boone attempts to distinguish those cases in that
they involved evidence of acts that occurred prior to the
mailing, whereas in the present case Boone challenges
the introduction of evidence regarding conduct subse-
16 No. 09-1960
quent to the mailing. Boone presents no case support
or rationale as to why that distinction is of any import.
The fortuity of the timing of the mailing—whether it
occurred at the start or the conclusion of a fraudulent
scheme—cannot be the determining factor as to whether
the government can produce evidence of the scheme.
Such a rule would make no sense. The government
must prove both the existence of a scheme and that
there was a mailing in furtherance of that scheme. The
mailing is a jurisdictional prerequisite which must be
satisfied in order to invoke federal criminal prosecution,
but it does not constitute an endpoint beyond which
the government may not provide evidence of the
scheme. The government is entitled to establish the
scheme and can rely on evidence that occurred before
and after the mailing in order to do so.
The government takes the opposite approach, essen-
tially arguing on appeal that its use of such evidence is
unbounded, but that is equally problematic. There are
limits on the extent to which the government may intro-
duce evidence of the scheme. The district court must
consider whether such evidence survives the Rule 403
balancing test of probative value and prejudice. As evi-
dence regarding the scheme moves farther, both tempo-
rally and in terms of the defendant’s involvement, from
the defendant’s actions that form the crux of the
criminal claim, that balance may well tip in favor of
exclusion. Moreover, the definition of the scheme itself
is a limiting principle, in that only evidence of the
same scheme as opposed to a related or distinct scheme,
is admissible. In this case, the government limited at trial
No. 09-1960 17
the evidence that it chose to present once Troutman was
removed from the case, but it still presented evidence
involving meetings and shakedowns that did not
involve Boone directly. Because of the defense that
Boone chose to present, however, and the nature of the
scheme that the government alleged, that evidence was
properly admitted in this case.
The scheme alleged in this case did not have Boone at
its center, but rather was a scheme by Troutman to seek
money from those who sought the services of her office,
particularly the housing-related services. Therefore, proof
of the scheme would necessarily involve evidence re-
garding Troutman and others in the office, in addition
to evidence of Boone’s personal involvement. The evi-
dence regarding Plomin and Pattison was significant in
establishing that scheme. The allegations were that in
order to obtain the letters of support, the victims of the
scheme would have to make “donations” to Troutman’s
office. Plomin’s testimony provided a critical component of
that scheme that could not be demonstrated by the
other evidence, which was that the requested financial
payment was in fact a quid pro quo for the services, and
not merely a request for support from Troutman. That
component was necessary to establish the basis for the
fraud charge, which was the theft of honest services.
The interaction with Plomin was the only one presented
by the government in which the victim chose not to
make the payment, and Plomin in fact did not receive
the letter of support. Because that evidence was directly
relevant to establish a critical component of the scheme,
it was admissible as direct evidence of the offense.
18 No. 09-1960
The evidence regarding Plomin and Pattison also
served to establish an element of the offense—Boone’s
knowledge. Recognizing that Boone’s defense was in
part to deny his knowledge of the scheme, the dis-
trict court provided the ostrich instruction to the jury,
instructing them that:
When the word “knowingly” is used in these instruc-
tions, it means that the defendant realized what he
was doing and was aware of the nature of his con-
duct and did not act through ignorance, mistake or
accident. Knowledge may be proved by the defen-
dant’s conduct and by all the facts and circumstances
surrounding the case.
You may infer knowledge from a combination of
suspicion and indifference to the truth. If you
find that a person had a strong suspicion that things
were not what they seemed or that someone had
withheld some important facts, yet shut his eyes
for fear of what he would learn, you may conclude
that he acted knowingly, as I have used that word. You
may not conclude that the defendant had knowl-
edge if he was merely negligent in not discovering
the truth.
Transcript of Proceedings, Vol. 5, p. 752 (07 CR 5-2, Sep-
tember 23, 2008). Therefore, the government could
prove knowledge by demonstrating that Boone must
have known of the scheme to defraud. Moreover,
because “[a] person’s state of mind is rarely susceptible
of proof by direct evidence, . . . specific intent to
defraud may be, and most often is, inferred from the
No. 09-1960 19
totality of the circumstances, including indirect and
circumstantial evidence.” United States v. Philip Morris
USA, Inc., 566 F.3d 1095, 1118 (D.C. Cir. 2009); see also
United States v. Ryan, 213 F.3d 347, 350 (7th Cir. 2000)
(noting that intent to defraud can be established
by circumstantial evidence and the inferences drawn
from the scheme itself).
Accordingly, evidence of the blatant and open nature
of the requests for payments, and of the large number
of individuals in the office who were participants in
the scheme, was relevant to demonstrate that Boone
must have known of the scheme. Regarding Plomin, her
testimony was that she met with 6 or 7 persons in
Troutman’s office seeking the letter of support, and that
in the presence of those persons Troutman declared
that Hall would explain the “political thing” that she
would need to do in order to obtain the support. The
“political thing” required of her was the payment of the
$1,500. Similarly, the Pattison testimony established
that Troutman and another person requested a payment
in only the second meeting with Pattison, informing
Pattison that he had “already bought” the fundraising
tickets that they handed to him. That meeting and con-
versation occurred in a conference area outside of
Troutman’s private office, near a reception or assistance
desk, and took place in the presence of another person
from Pattison’s office in addition to Pattison. Finally,
Pattison testified that he was instructed by someone
in Troutman’s office as to how to fill out the checks.
That evidence again established that the requests for
money were not made in a secretive manner, but rather
20 No. 09-1960
that such business was openly conducted in the
presence of others in the office, and that such requests
were made in the first or second contacts with the
victims seeking the letters of support. That latter point
is important because Boone argued at trial that it was
unbelievable that Boone would approach Greer, a per-
son he did not know, and request a bribe at that first
meeting. Evidence that similarly-bold requests were
made by Troutman and members of her office to other
persons at their initial contacts with the office was
relevant to demonstrate the manner in which the
scheme operated, and to establish that Boone, as
housing coordinator, had knowledge of that scheme
and acted in furtherance of it.
The only other evidence challenged by Boone related
to the property at 6417 South Maryland Street. That
property formed the basis for the charge of making a
false statement to the FBI. The false statement alleged
was the claim by Boone that he had no knowledge re-
garding the Maryland property. The government was
entitled to introduce evidence of the extensive dealings
of Troutman and her office with that property in order
to demonstrate that his statement had to have been
false. Even evidence unrelated to Boone directly was
relevant in that it showed that the dealings regarding
that property were not routine, but were extensive
and unusual in that they involved Troutman’s efforts
to purchase that property. That evidence, paired
with Boone’s direct involvement in matters relating to
the property, was relevant to establish that he knew
the statement was false when he made it to the FBI. Ac-
cordingly, this challenge is without merit.
No. 09-1960 21
Finally, Boone argues that even if relevant, the evi-
dence should have been excluded under Federal Rule
of Evidence 403 because its probative value was sub-
stantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.
We have already discussed the probative value of the
evidence, and particularly noted that the contested evi-
dence was necessary to establish that the “requests” for
money were in fact demands, and that the scheme
was conducted in an open and blatant manner. The
trial court concluded that the Rule 403 balancing
weighed in favor of admission, and Boone has given us
no reason to find an abuse of discretion in that deter-
mination. The decision of the district court is A FFIRMED.
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