In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
No. 10-1353
E QUAL E MPLOYMENT O PPORTUNITY C OMMISSION,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
A UTOZ ONE, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of Illinois.
No. 1:07-cv-01154—John A. Gorman, Magistrate Judge.
A RGUED S EPTEMBER 15, 2010—D ECIDED D ECEMBER 30, 2010
Before M ANION, S YKES, and H AMILTON, Circuit Judges.
H AMILTON, Circuit Judge. From 1999 until 2004, John
Shepherd worked as a parts sales manager at AutoZone,
a vehicle services company, in Macomb, Illinois. In
2005, AutoZone terminated Shepherd’s employment
after keeping him on medical leave involuntarily for
over a year. The Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission filed this suit on Shepherd’s behalf under the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213.
2 No. 10-1353
The EEOC alleged that AutoZone violated the ADA in
three ways: first, by failing to accommodate Shepherd’s
physical limitations from March 2003 until September
2003; second, by discriminatorily denying Shepherd the
opportunity to work after September 2003; and third, by
terminating him in retaliation for filing charges against
the company. The district court granted summary judg-
ment for AutoZone on the first claim, finding that the
EEOC had not shown that Shepherd had a disability
within the meaning of the ADA as is required to demon-
strate a failure to accommodate. A jury later ruled in
favor of AutoZone on the discriminatory treatment and
retaliation claims. The district court then denied the
EEOC’s motion to alter the judgment and for a partial
new trial.
The EEOC appeals only the district court’s grant of
summary judgment on the failure-to-accommodate
claim. It argues that there are genuine issues of material
fact whether Shepherd had a disability and whether
AutoZone therefore violated the ADA by failing to rea-
sonably accommodate Shepherd’s known physical limita-
tions. Because we find that a reasonable jury could con-
clude that Shepherd had a disability under the ADA,
we reverse and remand the case for further proceedings.
Facts and Procedural Background
John Shepherd began working for AutoZone in
April 1998 as a salesperson in AutoZone’s store in Fort
Madison, Iowa. In April 1999, he was promoted to parts
sales manager and transferred to the store in Macomb,
No. 10-1353 3
Illinois, where he remained a parts sales manager until
he was fired in 2005.
As a parts sales manager, Shepherd’s responsibilities
included working closely with customers and engaging
in “manual tasks” such as routine cleaning and mainte-
nance of the store, stocking shelves, and moving mer-
chandise. At each store, daily tasks were distributed
randomly through a computer-generated assignment
system to the employees on duty, including the parts
sales manager, though the store manager maintained
discretion to re-assign tasks.
Prior to his work at AutoZone, Shepherd had sustained
an injury to his back that limited his ability to carry out
many activities requiring physical exertion. He ex-
perienced onsets of debilitating pain, referred to by the
parties as “flare-ups,” when carrying out tasks that re-
quired him to lift things or to twist or rotate his torso.
During a flare-up, Shepherd’s neck and back would
swell and he would sweat profusely. Headaches,
which also could lead to vomiting, often accompanied
the swelling.
Beginning in 1998, Shepherd received medical treat-
ment from Dr. Marc Katchen, who described Shepherd’s
impairment as myofascial tenderness, an intermittent
condition caused by tightening of the muscles upon
certain movements. The parties disagree about exactly
when Shepherd disclosed his condition to AutoZone
management. Shepherd’s supervisors knew about his
condition no later than March 2002, though they may
have known as early as 1998, the year he joined the com-
pany.
4 No. 10-1353
Shepherd’s impairment led to his taking medical
leaves of absence of one to three weeks in January 2001,
October 2001, June 2002, and March 2003. When
Shepherd returned to work in July 2002 after his third
leave of absence, he provided his supervisors with a
medical evaluation prepared by Dr. Katchen. The evalua-
tion listed physical restrictions that Dr. Katchen recom-
mended for Shepherd if he felt unwell. Based on
Dr. Katchen’s recommendation that he avoid twisting his
upper body, Shepherd requested permission to refrain
from mopping. Although store managers Terry Wilmot
and Steve Thompson knew of the restriction, they infor-
mally accommodated Shepherd only some of the time.
Wilmot and Thompson would sometimes re-assign mop-
ping tasks from Shepherd to other employees, though
district manager Steven Smith pressured them not to
give Shepherd “any preference.”
After Shepherd’s leave of absence from the end of
March 2003 through the beginning of April 2003, Dr.
Katchen again prepared a medical evaluation for Shep-
herd’s AutoZone supervisors. The doctor recommended
that Shepherd never mop or buff the floor. When
Smith learned of this evaluation, he told Shepherd that
he would not be able to return to work with such a re-
striction. Dr. Katchen then amended his prescribed re-
striction to allow Shepherd to return to work, changing
it from “never” to only “occasionally.”
On September 13, 2003, Thompson instructed Shepherd
to mop the floor. Shepherd injured himself while
wringing out the mop and was again placed on medical
No. 10-1353 5
leave. In December 2003, Shepherd underwent an inde-
pendent medical examination in connection with a work-
ers’ com pensation claim then pending against
AutoZone. The medical examiner found that Shepherd’s
September 2003 injury had resolved and that he could
return to work with whatever restrictions were in
place prior to his taking leave. On January 16, 2004,
Dr. Katchen also authorized Shepherd’s return to work
with increased medical restrictions, including a lift limit
of ten to nineteen pounds, a limitation on time spent
standing, and a prohibition on upper body twisting.
Despite these two medical evaluations, AutoZone did
not allow Shepherd to return to work, instead keeping
him on involuntary medical leave until February 2005,
when the company discharged him.
The EEOC filed a complaint on Shepherd’s behalf in the
Central District of Illinois. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c),
the parties consented to have their case decided by a
magistrate judge. AutoZone moved for summary judg-
ment on all of the EEOC’s claims. Relevant to our
review, AutoZone contended in its motion that the
EEOC had not shown any failure to accommodate Shep-
herd between March and September 2003 because it
had not proved that he was disabled within the meaning
of the ADA. The district court agreed, finding that Shep-
herd was not substantially limited in the major life
activity of caring for himself prior to September 2003 and,
as a result, could not be considered disabled under the
ADA. The court concluded that the EEOC was there-
fore unable to establish a failure-to-accommodate claim
during the relevant time, and granted AutoZone’s motion
on that claim. The EEOC now appeals, arguing that
6 No. 10-1353
disputed issues of fact exist as to whether Shepherd was
disabled within the statutory meaning.1
Discussion
We review the grant of summary judgment de novo
and assess the evidence in the light most favorable to
the EEOC as the non-moving party. Fredricksen v. United
Parcel Service, Co., 581 F.3d 516, 520 (7th Cir. 2009). We
will affirm summary judgment if there is not sufficient
evidence to conclude that the non-moving party has
raised a genuine issue of material fact. See Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986).
1
The district court correctly identified the components of
the reasonable accommodation test in the first part of its
decision, citing the three-step inquiry outlined by the
Supreme Court in Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998). When
applying the facts to the law, however, the court appears to
have mistakenly applied an element of the disparate treat-
ment test as part of its evaluation of reasonable accommoda-
tion. The court strayed from the reasonable accommodation
test it had identified by requiring that the EEOC demonstrate
an adverse employment action against Shepherd. No adverse
employment action is required to prove a failure to accommo-
date. See Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 631; see also Basith v. Cook County,
241 F.3d 919, 927 (7th Cir. 2001) (describing and applying
the same test for determining whether an individual is a
qualified individual with a disability under the ADA); EEOC
v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 233 F.3d 432, 437-40 (7th Cir. 2000)
(same). This misstep was not decisive for the court’s judg-
ment; we raise it only to alert the district court so that it may
avoid proceeding down that same path on remand.
No. 10-1353 7
An employer violates the ADA by “not making reason-
able accommodations to the known physical or mental
limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a
disability . . . , unless [the employer] can demonstrate
that the accommodation would impose an undue hard-
ship on the operation of [its] business.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 12112(b)(5)(A) (2006); see also EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck &
Co., 417 F.3d 789, 796-97 (7th Cir. 2005). 2 In its motion
for summary judgment, AutoZone argued that Shepherd
was not a “qualified individual with a disability” from
March 2003 through September 12, 2003. Though
AutoZone acknowledged that Shepherd suffered from
an impairment throughout the relevant time, it con-
tended that Shepherd’s impairment did not constitute a
“disability” as defined by the ADA. AutoZone also as-
serted that even if Shepherd were considered disabled,
he could not, with or without reasonable accommoda-
tion, perform the essential functions of his position.
Finally, AutoZone contested the EEOC’s claim that it
failed to provide Shepherd a reasonable accommodation
that he needed to perform the essential functions of
his position. We do not reach the latter two issues. The
district court did not proceed beyond a determination
of whether Shepherd was disabled, and the EEOC’s
2
After this case was filed, Congress made significant changes
to the ADA that took effect January 1, 2009. See ADA Amend-
ments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553. Because
Congress did not express its intent for these changes to
apply retroactively, see Fredricksen, 581 F.3d at 521, we cite,
quote, and apply the ADA as it stood before the amendments.
8 No. 10-1353
claim on appeal concerns only AutoZone’s treatment of
Shepherd and his condition from March 2003 through
September 12, 2003.
AutoZone also argues on appeal that the EEOC was
required to present medical testimony to prove that
Shepherd was disabled within the meaning of the statute.
Thus, we review whether the evidence would allow a
reasonable jury to conclude that Shepherd was disabled
within the meaning of the ADA, and within this
analysis, we take up AutoZone’s assertion that medical
testimony was required.
I. Significant Limits on Personal Care
The ADA defines “disability” as (a) a physical or
mental impairment that substantially limits one or more
of the major life activities of an individual; (b) a record
of such an impairment; or (c) being regarded as having
such an impairment. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2006). The
EEOC relies on subsection (a), a physical impairment
that substantially limits a major life activity, to argue
that Shepherd was disabled from March 2003 to Septem-
ber 12, 2003, because his condition substantially limited
his ability to engage in the major life activity of caring
for himself.
Our role is not to decide whether Shepherd was
actually disabled under the ADA. Rather, we need decide
only whether a rational jury, viewing any conflicting
evidence in the light most favorable to the EEOC, could so
decide. We believe it could do so easily. We focus on
No. 10-1353 9
the two parts of the statute’s definition of disability:
First, the EEOC must demonstrate that Shepherd’s im-
pairment limited a major life activity, for which we ex-
amine the law and the evidence regarding Shepherd’s
ability to care for himself. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A)
(2006). Second, the EEOC must further show that his
limitation on a major life activity was substantial. See id.
We identify disputed issues of material fact with respect
to both parts.
A. Limitations on Self-Care
Self-care has long been recognized as a major life activity
under the ADA. The federal regulations adopted in the
year following the passage of the Act listed “caring for
oneself” as a major life activity. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i).
Courts followed suit. See Holt v. Grand Lake Mental
Health Center, Inc., 443 F.3d 762, 767 (10th Cir. 2006) (recog-
nizing self-care as a major life activity under the ADA);
Regional Economic Community Action Program, Inc. v. City
of Middletown, 294 F.3d 35, 47 (2d Cir. 2002) (providing
examples of limitations on self-care); Cehrs v. Northeast
Ohio Alzheimer’s Research Center, 155 F.3d 775, 780-81 (6th
Cir. 1998) (identifying caring for oneself as a recognized
major life activity under the Act); Dutcher v. Ingalls Ship-
building, 53 F.3d 723, 726 (5th Cir. 1995) (caring for one-
self encompasses a broad range of normal activities
related to daily living, including feeding oneself, driving,
grooming, and cleaning home).
We ruled in Nawrot v. CPC International, 277 F.3d 896,
904-05 (7th Cir. 2002), that an employee’s inability
10 No. 10-1353
to administer his own diabetes medication also
amounted to a limitation on the major life activity of self-
care. Likewise in Brunker v. Schwan’s Home Service, 583
F.3d 1004, 1008-09 (7th Cir. 2009), we found that not
being able to dress oneself appropriately constituted
evidence of a limitation on the major life activity of self-
care. Our application is consistent with the purpose of the
ADA to “provide a clear and comprehensive national
mandate” to combat disability discrimination. Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, § 2, 104
Stat. 327, 329; see also ADA Amendments Act of 2008
§ 1(b), 122 Stat. at 3554 (elaborating on a broad scope
of protection intended by Congress to be available under
the original Act); Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S.
471, 495 (1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that
the ADA was meant to serve a remedial purpose). The
specific inclusion of “caring for oneself” in the 2008
Amendments’ list of major life activities further sup-
ports this interpretation. See ADA Amendments Act of
2008 § 4(a), 122 Stat. at 3555, amending 42 U.S.C. § 12102.
Shepherd testified at his deposition that he needed
assistance with dressing himself, brushing his hair, and
bathing four or five days each week while he was
working at AutoZone prior to September 13, 2003. He
also recalled experiencing other difficulties since 2003,
including an inability to tie his shoes and the develop-
ment of oral hygiene problems that resulted from his
inability to care for his teeth properly. Shepherd’s wife,
Susan Shepherd, also testified that she had to assist him
with personal care while he was working at AutoZone.
According to her deposition testimony, she had to
No. 10-1353 11
help Shepherd with showering, putting on his pants
and shoes, and brushing his hair and teeth before he
stopped working for AutoZone.
There is some ambiguity in Susan’s testimony re-
garding exactly when Shepherd began having difficulty
with certain personal tasks. Though Susan said she
assisted him with his personal tasks “before he stopped
working for AutoZone,” at other times in her May 2008
deposition, she testified that Shepherd’s difficulties
with these tasks began “three or four years ago.” For
purposes of summary judgment, however, AutoZone
removed much of the ambiguity in its own statement of
undisputed facts filed to support its summary judgment
motion. There, AutoZone stated: “Shepherd has needed
assistance with dressing himself, brushing his hair
and bathing on a daily basis from approximately the
year 2003 or 2004 to the present time”; “[s]ince 2003,
Shepherd’s wife has assisted him with washing his
back”; “[s]ince 2003, Shepherd has had difficulty
brushing his teeth; “during [his flare-ups] . . . he would
not be able to put on his own pants, his own shoes,
brush his hair, or brush his teeth”; and, “Shepherd
would not be able to wash his own hair, back or feet
when having these flare-ups.”
These statements by AutoZone as well as the Shep-
herds’ testimony could be understood to mean that Shep-
herd’s limitations on his ability to care for himself
began at any point during or immediately after 2003. At
the summary judgment stage, any ambiguity must be
resolved in favor of the non-moving party. It was the
12 No. 10-1353
responsibility of the questioning attorney at the deposi-
tion to clarify the facts if the attorney intended to move
for summary judgment on the basis of these answers.
Particularly here, where one of the key issues was the
time period during which Shepherd was affected by
his condition—March through September 12, 2003—
AutoZone could have asked follow-up questions to try
to get more specific answers from the Shepherds. For
the purposes of summary judgment, the testimony by
Susan Shepherd was consistent with her husband’s testi-
mony to the effect that Shepherd was limited in caring
for himself between March and September 2003.
B. “Substantially” Limited
We turn now to examine whether the facts support a
conclusion that Shepherd was “substantially” limited in
caring for himself. We follow the Supreme Court’s rea-
soning in Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v.
Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 196 (2002), such that our consider-
ation of this term is “guided first and foremost by
the words of the disability definition itself.” 3 Looking to
3
The ADA Amendments Act of 2008 superseded Williams by
expressly rejecting the Court’s narrow interpretation of the
terms “substantially limits” and “major life activity” in favor
of a broader interpretation. Part of Congress’s purpose in
enacting the Amendments was to make clear its intent that
the determination of whether an individual has a disability
under the ADA “should not demand extensive analysis.”
(continued...)
No. 10-1353 13
Webster’s Dictionary and the Oxford English Dictionary,
the Court determined that “substantially” in the phrase
“substantially limits” means “considerable” or “to a
large degree.” 534 U.S. at 196-97. This less-than-precise
meaning of the term indicates that the ADA “precludes
impairments that interfere in only a minor way with
the performance of manual tasks from qualifying as
disabilities.” Id. at 197.
The implementing federal regulation states a little
more clearly that “substantially limits” means that an
individual is:
(i) Unable to perform a major life activity that the
average person in the general population can per-
form; or (ii) Significantly restricted as to the condition,
manner or duration under which an individual can
perform a particular major life activity as compared
to the condition, manner, or duration under which
3
(...continued)
ADA Amendments Act of 2008 § 2(b)(5), 122 Stat. at 3554. Of
particular note, Congress stated that the term “substantially
limits” should be interpreted broadly to provide wide cover-
age. See id. § 2(a)(1), 122 Stat. at 3553. As we have said, be-
cause there is no indication that Congress intended the
ADA Amendments to have retroactive effect, we rely on the
ADA as it existed at the time of the relevant events, and on
the case law, including Williams, interpreting that version of
the statute and implementing regulations. We reach our
conclusion that the EEOC has raised a genuine question for
trial even without the clarifying language in the Amendments,
which only underscores our conclusion.
14 No. 10-1353
the average person in the general population can
perform that same major life activity.
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1). The regulation provides that when
determining whether a limitation is “substantial,” we
consider “[t]he nature and severity of the impairment;
[t]he duration or expected duration; and [t]he per-
manent or long term impact, or the expected permanent
or long term impact of . . . the impairment.” 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.2(j)(2); see also Williams, 534 U.S. at 196 (looking
to the regulation for guidance on the meaning of “sub-
stantially limited”); Hamm v. Runyon, 51 F.3d 721, 725
(7th Cir. 1995) (same).
We have already addressed the nature and severity of
Shepherd’s impairment in our description of the limita-
tions he faced. The Shepherds testified, and AutoZone
did not dispute (for purposes of summary judgment),
that before Shepherd went on leave in 2003, he needed
assistance with the most basic personal care tasks when
a flare-up occurred.
With respect to the duration and impact of his impair-
ment, Susan testified that Shepherd experienced flare-
ups “[a]t least four to five times a week” while he was
still working at AutoZone. Shepherd also testified that
he needed assistance with his personal care “maybe four
or five days” each week “prior to September 13, 2003.”
As noted above, there were portions of the Shepherds’
testimony that were less specific or that superficially
appeared to contradict other portions, but for the
purposes of our review, we view the evidence in the
light most favorable to the non-moving party. And again,
No. 10-1353 15
AutoZone provided its own clarification in its list of
undisputed facts accompanying its summary judg-
ment motion. In addition to its statement that Shepherd
needed assistance “on a daily basis,” AutoZone wrote
that “Shepherd was experiencing these [flare-ups] four
to five times a week before he went on leave of absence
from AutoZone.” On the basis of the significant
limits on his personal care almost every day during
the relevant period, a reasonable jury could easily find
Shepherd’s limitations to be substantial.
AutoZone contends that even if Shepherd’s condition
was limiting, it was not “substantially” limiting because
it was only episodic or sporadic. Relying on our discus-
sion in Brunker, AutoZone asserts that because a broken
leg, appendicitis, or isolated bouts of depression did not
qualify as disabilities, Shepherd’s episodic flare-ups
should not qualify either. We do not agree.4
Shepherd’s impairment in this case, a permanent condi-
tion that affected his personal care almost daily, is not
comparable to the temporary or sporadic examples
we listed in Brunker. The limitations Shepherd faced in
his self-care every day or almost every day are not com-
mensurate with the temporary limitations posed by
4
Although we do not rely on the 2008 Amendments, we note
that Congress addressed this issue for future cases there,
stating: “An impairment that is episodic . . . is a disability if it
would substantially limit a major life activity when active.”
ADA Amendments Act of 2008 § 4(a), 122 Stat. at 3556, codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(D).
16 No. 10-1353
a broken leg or appendicitis, nor were they isolated.
AutoZone’s additional reliance on Moore v. Hunt Trans-
port, Inc., 221 F.3d 944 (7th Cir. 2000) is also misplaced.
Moore suffered from rheumatoid arthritis, an inflam-
matory disease of the joints that causes the joints to
swell and stiffen and that is prone to intermittent flare-
ups. AutoZone points to our statement that Moore’s
“infrequent flare-ups . . . [did not] render his condition a
disability,” but Moore’s flare-ups occurred only “one or
two [times] per year.” 221 F.3d at 952. Even with gen-
erous math, the occurrence of Shepherd’s flare-ups four
or five times a week was still greater than the frequency
experienced by the plaintiff in Moore by a factor of over
one hundred.
We find more apposite guidance in EEOC v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 233 F.3d 432, where we noted that an
episodic condition should not detract from the substan-
tiality analysis. The plaintiff in Sears suffered from a
permanent neuropathy that substantially limited her
ability to walk. We found that “a predictable yet intermit-
tent pattern” of impairment was sufficient to survive a
motion for summary judgment. 233 F.3d at 440 n.4 (“the
fact that [the] condition was episodic is not dispositive
in the disability inquiry”). Likewise, in Haschmann v.
Time Warner Entertainment Co., 151 F.3d 591 (7th Cir. 1998),
we treated “episodic flares,” characteristic of lupus, as a
disability under the ADA. 151 F.3d at 599-600. The
Haschmann plaintiff’s episodic flares of lupus are more
similar to Shepherd’s flare-ups of myofascial tenderness
than the broken leg or isolated episodes of depression
we addressed in Brunker.
No. 10-1353 17
In its order granting summary judgment for AutoZone,
the district court distinguished Shepherd’s situation
from Sears and Haschmann, as well as from our similar
holding in Vande Zande v. State of Wisconsin Department
of Administration, 44 F.3d 538 (7th Cir. 1995), that pres-
sure ulcers resulting from paralysis were intermit-
tent impairments characteristic of an admitted disability.
The court differentiated them on the basis that the “pro-
gressive diseases” in our prior cases were different
from a soft tissue neck or back injury like Shepherd’s
which, the court stated, could not be diagnosed in the
absence of flare-ups. Even if that were medically correct,
we do not see a sound legal difference in the court’s
application of the statute to the facts of this case.
The assessment of an impairment under the ADA is a
highly individualized examination that considers the
facts of each case independently in light of the statutory
and regulatory language. See Kampmier v. Emeritus Corp.,
472 F.3d 930, 938 (7th Cir. 2007) (noting that “whether
or not a medical condition rises to the level of a disability
is to be made on an individualized case-by-case basis”).
A reasonable jury could readily determine from the
totality of the evidence in this record that Shepherd was
substantially limited in his ability to care for himself
from March 2003 to September 2003.
II. Asserted Need for Medical Evidence
AutoZone also argues that an employee must provide
medical evidence of his or her substantial limitations to
satisfy the terms of the ADA. We do not read either the
18 No. 10-1353
statute or our prior case law as imposing a requirement
that the plaintiff provide medical testimony in all cases,
or in this one.
No language in the ADA or implementing regulations
states that medical testimony is required. In fact, the
Supreme Court has concluded very much to the con-
trary. The Williams Court noted that it is “insufficient for
individuals attempting to prove disability status . . . to
merely submit evidence of a medical diagnosis of an
impairment. Instead, the ADA requires those claiming
the Act’s protection to prove a disability by offering
evidence that the extent of the limitation caused by their
impairment in terms of their own experience is substan-
tial.” 534 U.S. at 198, quoting Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg,
527 U.S. 555, 567 (1999) (internal quotation marks and
alterations omitted); see also Haynes v. Williams, 392 F.3d
478, 482 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (“Whatever the comparative
credibility of medical versus personal testimony, a plain-
tiff’s personal testimony cannot be inadequate to raise a
genuine issue regarding his ‘own experience.’ ”). That is
exactly what the EEOC showed here through Shepherd’s
testimony, corroborated by Susan’s testimony.
Neither do our cases hold any differently. In Fredricksen
v. United Parcel Service, the case on which AutoZone
primarily relies, plaintiff Fredricksen suffered from
leukemia and asserted that he was substantially
limited in the major life activities of walking and breath-
ing. To corroborate his assertions, he described in vague
generalities how he had less stamina to be as mobile as he
once was. We held that Fredricksen had not met his burden
No. 10-1353 19
of demonstrating he was substantially limited; he was
merely “moderately limited.” As a separate and independ-
ent consideration, we observed that there was no med-
ical evidence to support his argument about the duration
or impact of the difficulties he faced. This observation
was limited to Fredricksen’s case, in reference to his
particular condition and the activities he asserted.
Similarly in Squibb v. Memorial Medical Center, 497 F.3d
775, 784 (7th Cir. 2007), another case that AutoZone
cites, we concluded that the evidence presented by the
plaintiff was not sufficient to defeat a motion for sum-
mary judgment on the plaintiff’s self-care disability
claim; however, we voiced no opinion as to the necessity
of expert corroboration.
Here, in contrast to the circumstances in Fredricksen
and Squibb, the Shepherds each testified about specific
activities and instances that caused Shepherd pain, the
cumulative effect of which demonstrates what could
easily be considered a “substantial” limitation. More-
over, Shepherd’s condition and its possible ramifications
were well-documented by medical professionals, in-
cluding restrictions on his movement that would prevent
him from carrying out the most basic household and
personal chores.
In other contexts, we have taught that expert testi-
mony is unnecessary to establish causation in cases where
a lay-person can understand an injury or condition. See
Wallace v. McGlothan, 606 F.3d 410, 420 (7th Cir. 2010).
When an individual suffers from a basic and obvious
injury when hit by a vehicle, for example, he or she does
not need to produce expert testimony to show that the
20 No. 10-1353
collision was the cause of the injury. See Moody v. Maine
Central Railroad Co., 823 F.2d 693, 695 (1st Cir. 1987). This
reasoning extends to the scope of a physical limitation
like Shepherd’s which is obvious to an observer and
easily described by the sufferer.
In this case, where both the Shepherds’ testimony
described in detail the limitations Shepherd faced in his
ability to care for himself and where his impairment
was well-documented, we see no need for additional
testimony regarding the extent of his limitations. The
limits of Shepherd’s personal care are the stuff of
everyday experience. At least in this case, no medical
evidence about Shepherd’s precise limitations was neces-
sary to defeat AutoZone’s summary judgment motion.
Conclusion
The evidence the EEOC has presented is plainly sus-
ceptible to the determination that Shepherd had a disa-
bility within the meaning intended by the ADA as
required to prove a failure to accommodate. Summary
judgment should not have been granted on the basis that
Shepherd was not disabled. We R EVERSE and R EMAND
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
12-30-10