GLD-067 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 10-3460
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DEBORAH M. YOUNG, NATURAL GUARDIAN OF C.D. AND B.D.,
MINORS, IN OUR OWN RIGHT,
Appellant
v.
ALICE BECK DUBOW, JUDGE, IN HER INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY FOR CAUSING
PROLONGED CHILD ABUSE BY FAILING TO ENFORCE HER VERY OWN
"STANDING ORDER FOR COURTROOM H" RULES; ANGELE MARIE PARKER,
CEO; CHEREL FERRELL, SOCIAL WORKER EMPLOYEE METHODIST
SERVICES FOR FAMILIES AND CHILDREN ("METHODIST KINSHIP") IN THEIR
INDIVIDUAL, AND FEDERAL GRANT FUNDED CAPACITIES AS
BENEFICIARIES OF KIDNAP FOR PROFIT AND PROLONGED CHILD ABUSE;
ANNE MARIE AMBROSE, COMMISSIONER DHS; KAREN S. REYNOLDS,
SOCIAL WORKER; CARLA N. GARDNER, COMMISSIONER'S RESPONSE
PHILADEPHIA DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES ("DHS") IN THEIR
INDIVIDUAL CAPACITIES AND COMPLICIT ACCESSORIES TO KIDNAP FOR
PROFIT AND PROLONGED CHILD ABUSE; MARY ANN TAYLOR, IN HER
INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY AS MENTAL AND PHYSICAL CHILD ABUSER, AND
ACCOMPLICE BENEFICIARY OF KIDNAP FOR PROFIT AND PROLONGED
CHILD ABUSE
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 09-cv-05015)
District Judge: Honorable Mitchell S. Goldberg
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Summary Action Pursuant to
Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
December 16, 1020
Before: AMBRO, CHAGARES AND NYGAARD, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: January 3, 2011)
_________
OPINION
_________
PER CURIAM
Deborah Young, proceeding pro se, appeals the District Court’s order dismissing
her complaint. Because the appeal does not present a substantial question, we will
summarily affirm.
I
In November 2009, Young filed in the District Court a complaint against
Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas Judge Alice Dubow, officials at the Philadelphia
Department of Human Services (“DHS”), employees of Methodist Kinship, an
organization that provides child placement services for DHS, and Mary Ann Taylor, her
children’s paternal grandmother. Her complaint stemmed from Judge Dubow’s order
awarding custody of Young’s two children to their father and Taylor. Young alleged that
Judge Dubow’s decision “ordered kidnap for profit and prolonged child abuse of [her
children],” D. Ct. Doc. No. 3, 3, and accused the remaining defendants of contributing to
the alleged kidnap and abuse of her children. Young sought the return of her children to
her custody and $900,000 in punitive damages.
The Defendants filed motions to dismiss, which the District Court granted. Young
then filed a timely notice of appeal.
II
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We may summarily affirm the
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District Court’s order if Young’s appeal does not present a substantial question. See 3d
Cir. LAR 27.4; 3d Cir. IOP 10.6. We exercise plenary review over the District Court’s
order granting the Rule 12(b)(6) motion. See Capogrosso v. Sup. Ct. of New Jersey, 588
F.3d 180, 184 (3d Cir. 2009). “The District Court's judgment is proper only if, accepting
all factual allegations as true and construing the complaint in the light most favorable to
[Young], we determine that [she] is not entitled to relief under any reasonable reading of
the complaint.” Id. (quoting McGovern v. Philadelphia, 554 F.3d 114, 115 (3d Cir.
2009)).
The District Court presented several alternative bases for dismissing Young’s
complaint. We need only address two of these. First, we agree with the District Court
that Young’s claims were barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Dist. of Columbia
Ct. App. v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413
(1923). “In certain circumstances, where a federal suit follows a state suit, the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine prohibits the district court from exercising jurisdiction.” Great W.
Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 163-64 (3d Cir. 2010).
There are four requirements that must be met for the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to apply:
“(1) the federal plaintiff lost in state court; (2) the plaintiff ‘complain[s] of injuries caused
by [the] state-court judgments’; (3) those judgments were rendered before the federal suit
was filed; and (4) the plaintiff is inviting the district court to review and reject the state
judgments.” Id. at 166 (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S.
280, 284 (2005)). Here, there is no question that these requirements are met. Young’s
federal complaint stemmed from the adverse custody decision rendered in state court,
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Young claims that she and her children have been harmed by that decision, and she
expressly asks the District Court to reverse Judge Dubow’s custody award. See also
Marran v. Marran, 376 F.3d 143, 153 (3d Cir. 2004) (mother’s action for a declaratory
judgment invalidating Office of Children and Youth’s findings concerning the absence of
child abuse necessarily implied a finding that Court of Common Pleas made improper
custody award, and was thus barred by Rooker-Feldman).
To the extent that Young raised claims that would not be barred by Rooker-
Feldman, we also agree with the District Court that her allegations were insufficient to
state a claim for which relief could be granted. To withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, __ U.S. __, 129 S. Ct.
1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court
to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Id. Here, Young raised a number of allegations against the Defendants, but failed to
provide factual support for those allegations.
Accordingly, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s order.
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