United States v. Patterson

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 08-5129

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

JONATHON TERRELL PATTERSON, a/k/a Joe-Joe,

Defendant - Appellant.

No. 09-4374

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.

THOMAS JOSEPH ISBELL,

Defendant – Appellant.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Statesville. Richard L.
Voorhees, District Judge. (5:06-cr-00022-RLV-CH-12; 5:06-cr-
00022-RLV-DSC-18)

Argued: October 29, 2010 Decided: January 4, 2011

Before WILKINSON, KING, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed in part; vacated and remanded in part by unpublished
per curiam opinion.

ARGUED: Elizabeth A. Brandenburg, LAW OFFICE OF MARCIA G. SHEIN,
PC, Decatur, Georgia, for Appellants. Amy Elizabeth Ray, OFFICE
OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Asheville, North Carolina, for
Appellee. ON BRIEF: Marcia G. Shein, LAW OFFICE OF MARCIA G.
SHEIN, PC, Decatur, Georgia, for Appellants. Anne M. Tompkins,
United States Attorney, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

2
PER CURIAM:

Jonathon Patterson and Thomas Isbell appeal their

convictions for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute

cocaine and cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. In

addition to challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to

establish a single conspiracy, Patterson and Isbell allege

multiple errors at trial, and Patterson challenges the

procedural reasonableness of his sentence. 1 For the reasons set

forth below, we affirm Patterson and Isbell’s convictions, but

vacate Patterson’s sentence and remand his case for

resentencing.

I.

Patterson and Isbell (collectively “Defendants”) were two

of twenty-three individuals named in a thirty-count indictment

alleging a multi-year conspiracy between dozens of indicted and

unindicted co-conspirators to possess with the intent to

distribute cocaine powder and cocaine base within the Western

District of North Carolina.

The Defendants each pled not guilty, and the Government

proceeded to try them jointly. The jury found both of them

guilty. The district court then sentenced Patterson to 324

1
Isbell does not raise any issues regarding his sentence.

3
months’ imprisonment and Isbell to 262 months’ imprisonment.

Additional facts relating to each of the issues raised on appeal

will be discussed in context. The Defendants noted timely

appeals, and we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291

and 18 U.S.C. § 3742.

II.

A.

The Defendants first assert the evidence was insufficient

to convict them of a single, organized conspiracy. They argue

the evidence shows – at most – multiple conspiracies involving

individuals who “[got] their drugs wherever they were available”

rather than intentionally engaging in a common criminal scheme.

(Appellants’ Opening Br. 40.)

In assessing whether a guilty verdict is sufficiently

supported by the evidence, we are mindful that “[t]he jury, not

the reviewing court, weighs the credibility of the evidence and

resolves any conflicts in the evidence presented.” United

States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d 849, 862 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc)

(quotation marks omitted). The jury’s verdict must be sustained

as long as “any rational trier of fact could have found the

essential elements of the [conspiracy charged in the indictment]

beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307,

319 (1979) (emphasis omitted). In conducting such a review, we

4
view the evidence and all reasonable inferences to be drawn

therefrom in the light most favorable to the Government. United

States v. Perry, 335 F.3d 316, 320 (4th Cir. 2003).

To prove the existence of a conspiracy, the Government was

required to show: (1) two or more persons agreed to possess an

illegal substance with the intent to distribute it; (2) the

defendant knew of the conspiracy; and (3) the defendant

knowingly and voluntarily became a part of this conspiracy.

Burgos, 94 F.3d at 857. Because conspiracies are by nature

“clandestine and covert,” there is “frequently . . . little

direct evidence of such an agreement.” Id. Circumstantial

evidence can be used to prove the existence of a conspiracy, and

it can be the only proof of the conspiracy. Id. at 857-58.

Under this Court’s precedent, “trial evidence is sufficient

to establish a single conspiracy where the conspirators are

shown to share the same objectives, the same methods, the same

geographic spread, and the same results.” United States v.

Smith, 451 F.3d 209, 218 (4th Cir. 2006). A member of a

conspiracy may not know its full scope or partake in its full

range of activities; moreover, the conspiracy need not “have a

discrete, identifiable organizational structure.” United States

v. Banks, 10 F.3d 1044, 1054 (4th Cir. 1993). “[O]nce it has

been shown that a conspiracy exists, the evidence need only

establish a slight connection between the defendant and the

5
conspiracy to support conviction.” Burgos, 94 F.3d at 861

(quotation marks and citation omitted). “The term ‘slight’ does

not describe the quantum of evidence that the Government must

elicit in order to establish the conspiracy, but rather the

connection that the defendant maintains with the conspiracy.”

Id.

The evidence of Patterson and Isbell’s participation in the

charged conspiracy was significant. Numerous co-conspirators

testified that the Defendants regularly purchased cocaine and

cocaine base from and sold it to the same network of individuals

in and around the same localities in western North Carolina.

They also testified that the Defendants referred buyers to other

members of the conspiracy, transacted exchanges on behalf of

other conspirators, as well as sometimes asking others to do the

same for them.

In addition to the testimony of co-conspirators, the

Government proved its case based on the testimony of law

enforcement officers who had interacted with and investigated

the Defendants. Both Patterson and Isbell had previously been

found in possession of cocaine or cocaine base during searches

of their vehicle or residence. In addition, telephone records

connected numbers associated with the Defendants to each other

and also to numbers associated with other members of the charged

conspiracy. Lastly, expert testimony described the Defendants’

6
failure to file federal tax returns and that the failure to file

regular returns was consistent with common practices among

individuals who earned their living by distributing narcotics.

Our review of the evidence in the record as summarized

above leads us to conclude that a rational trier of fact could

have found the essential elements of the charged single

conspiracy beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the evidence

is sufficient to support the Defendants’ convictions. Cf.

Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319.

B.

Patterson and Isbell raise two challenges related to the

district court’s limitations on cross-examination of witnesses.

First, they contend the district court abused its discretion by

preventing them from cross-examining witnesses about the

disposition of state charges that had been brought against them

but which were ultimately dismissed. Second, they contend the

district court abused its discretion by refusing to allow them

to inquire about possible racial bias during the course of the

investigation into the drug conspiracy. They assert that in

each instance, the district court violated their constitutional

right to confront the witnesses against them.

7
 1.

As part of its case against Patterson, the Government

called a former Lenoir Police Department officer to testify

about a March 1998 traffic stop during which he discovered crack

cocaine in Patterson’s possession. On cross-examination,

Patterson attempted to introduce evidence that state charges

brought as a result of this incident had been dismissed. The

district court sustained the Government’s objection.

The Government later called a state bureau of investigation

agent who, in describing the sort of evidence relevant to his

investigation into the charged conspiracy, referred to his

discovering the fact that drugs were seized during an October

2000 search of Isbell’s residence. On cross-examination, Isbell

attempted to elicit testimony that the state charges brought

against him as a result of the 2000 search were ultimately

dismissed. The district court once again disagreed, stating

that such questioning would

invite a mini trial on what happened and why . . .
[i]t would be more likely to invite confusion or
misunderstanding by the jury to go into the fact that
the state for whatever reason didn’t pursue [the
charges]. And you know well yourself that there are
zillions of reasons why cases get dismissed and none
of them . . . concern this jury.

(J.A. 1770-71.)

Throughout both of these exchanges, the Defendants raised

evidentiary arguments as to why they should be permitted to

8
introduce evidence that the state charges were dismissed. At no

time did they refer to their constitutional right to confront

the witnesses against them. Because the Defendants raise a

Confrontation Clause argument for the first time on appeal, we

review it for plain error. See United States v. Hughes, 401

F.3d 540, 547 (4th Cir. 2005) (reviewing for plain error an

issue the party failed to raise below); see also United States

v. Gibbs, 739 F.2d 838, 846-50 & n.25 (3d Cir. 1984) (reviewing

for plain error a Confrontation Clause argument raised for the

first time on appeal even where the defendant raised an

admissibility argument below because separate rules govern each

issue, and preserving the latter does not preserve the former).

Under plain error review, the Defendants must show: (1) there is

an error; (2) the error is plain; (3) the error affects their

substantial rights; and (4) failure to correct the error “would

result in a miscarriage of justice, such as when the defendant

is actually innocent or the error seriously affects the

fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial

proceedings.” Hughes, 401 F.3d at 547, 548, 555 (quotation

marks and citations omitted).

The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment guarantees

criminal defendants the opportunity for effective cross-

examination. See Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315-16 (1974).

It does not, however, confer the right to cross-examine “in

9
whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.”

Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986) (quoting

Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20 (1985) (per curiam)).

District courts thus “retain wide latitude insofar as the

Confrontation Clause is concerned to impose reasonable limits on

. . . cross-examination based on concerns about, among other

things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the

witness’ safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only

marginally relevant.” Id.

Having reviewed the record, we find no error – let alone

plain error – in the district court’s refusal to allow the

Defendants to cross-examine the witnesses on this issue.

Evidence that state charges against Patterson and Isbell were

dismissed was simply not relevant to the issue before the jury:

whether Patterson and Isbell conspired to distribute narcotics,

in violation of federal law. Moreover, as the district court

observed, the reason why the state charges were dismissed could

be entirely unrelated to whether the Defendants committed the

acts described. The admission of such evidence would have been

only marginally relevant and confused the issues before the

10
jury. As such, the district court’s ruling did not plainly

violate the Defendants’ Confrontation Clause rights. 2

2.

The same principles guide our review of the other

Confrontation Clause-based issue the Defendants raise, the

district court’s refusal to allow them to inquire into possible

racial bias in the investigation. During their cross-

examination of an agent who investigated the conspiracy, the

Defendants sought to elicit testimony about the race of the

individuals investigated and indicted for their participation in

the conspiracy. The district court prohibited the Defendants

2
The Defendants do not raise a separate evidentiary-based
argument on appeal, but to the extent such an argument overlaps
with the Confrontation Clause argument, it also fails. Although
this Court has not previously examined this issue directly,
every other circuit that has done so has uniformly upheld the
district court’s exercise of discretion to exclude evidence of
the disposition of a prior criminal proceeding. E.g., United
States v. Lyons, 403 F.3d 1248, 1255-56 (11th Cir. 2005); United
States v. Smith, 145 F.3d 458, 462-63 (1st Cir. 1998); United
States v. Tirrell, 120 F.3d 670, 677-78 (7th Cir. 1997); United
States v. Riley, 684 F.2d 542, 546 (8th Cir. 1982); United
States v. Kerley, 643 F.2d 299, 300-01 (5th Cir. 1981). As
discussed previously, such evidence had minimal to no probative
value, and was likely to confuse or mislead the jury. Thus,
under Federal Rules of Evidence 401 and 403, the district court
did not abuse its discretion in prohibiting the Defendants from
introducing evidence on this point. See United States v. Moore,
27 F.3d 969, 974 (4th Cir. 1994) (reviewing for abuse of
discretion a district court’s ruling on the admissibility of
evidence under the Federal Rules of Evidence).

11
from pursuing this line of questioning because it would lead to

a “rabbit trail [of] immaterial[ity]” as to whether Patterson

and Isbell participated in the conspiracy. (J.A. 1780.)

Once again, the Defendants’ arguments at trial focused on

the admissibility of this evidence rather than whether their

Confrontation Clause rights were being violated. Accordingly,

we review their argument for plain error. Cf. Hughes, 401 F.3d

at 547. We conclude the district court did not plainly err in

prohibiting the Defendants from cross-examining the agent about

possible racial bias in the investigation. Nothing the

Defendants sought to present at trial tended to show that any

investigator acted with racial bias. While they sought to

introduce evidence of the race of individuals indicted for the

conspiracy, they offered no evidence connecting that information

to any evidence suggesting that either the investigation or the

decision of whom to indict was racially motivated.

Consequently, this line of inquiry would unnecessarily have led

the jury astray from the issue before them, whether Patterson

and Isbell were members of the charged conspiracy. As such, the

district court’s decision to prohibit such questioning did not

constitute error.

12
 C.

Patterson and Isbell next claim they were denied a fair

trial due to the district court’s decision not to exclude the

testimony of witnesses who had violated the court’s

sequestration order. 3 During the trial, a witness testified that

he and several other witnesses had been locked up together at

the courthouse for several days as they waited to testify. The

witness claimed that during that time, another witness told the

others questions he had been asked such as “questions about your

school history[,] . . . did you use drugs or anything of that

nature.” (J.A. 1330-31.) The witness claimed that they had not

talked about the answers to any of the questions or conferred to

get their stories straight. The Defendants requested a

mistrial, or in the alternative that the witnesses’ testimony be

stricken, or for a limiting instruction.

Noting the availability of several remedies in cases where

a sequestration order is violated, the district court concluded

“there has been significant cross examination of all the

witnesses subsequent to the very first day of trial . . . [and]

[g]oing forward . . . counsel is encouraged to undertake what

3
Prior to trial, the district court issued a sequestration
order prohibiting “any person who will be or may become a
witness in this case (except those excluded by Rule 615)” from,
inter alia, “talk[ing] with anyone who will be or may become a
witness about any subject related to this trial.” (J.A. 214.)

13
it’s been doing all along and that is cross examining on the

potential cross fertilization of testimony that may have

occurred.” (J.A. 1338.) The court denied the motion for a

mistrial, but did instruct the jury about the violation of the

sequestration order. 4

On appeal, the Defendants claim that the limiting

instruction was insufficient to cure the breach of the violation

of the sequestration order. This is so, they contend, because

the Government’s case against them consisted almost entirely of

the testimony of co-conspirators, and the violation of the

sequestration order significantly undermined the credibility of

4
The instruction given stated:
You’ve heard testimony that several government
witnesses are housed together either at the county – a
county jail or in this courthouse. You’ve heard
testimony earlier today from government witness . . .
Corpening that while in the holding cell of this
courthouse, he heard a prior witness or witnesses who
had already testified describe certain questions that
had been posed in this trial. You may consider this
information and like information as you determine the
credibility of the testimony that you have heard. In
other words, if you find any witness may have been
exposed to conversations about this case or that any
witness may have participated in such conversation,
you should receive the testimony of such a witness
with great caution and you may give it such weight, if
any, as you deem appropriate in the light of these
alleged conversations or other similar evidence.
(J.A. 1407.)

14
that testimony, which in turn undermines confidence in the

jury’s verdict.

This Court reviews the district court’s selection of a

remedy for the violation of a sequestration order for abuse of

discretion. See United States v. Leggett, 326 F.2d 613, 613-14

(4th Cir. 1964) (per curiam) (stating the court’s choice of

remedy “depends upon the particular circumstances and lies

within the sound discretion of the trial court”).

In United States v. Cropp, 127 F.3d 354 (4th Cir. 1997),

the Court observed that the Supreme Court has identified three

remedies that are appropriate when a sequestration order has

been violated: (1) sanctioning the witness; (2) instructing the

jury that it may consider the violation with regard to the issue

of credibility; or (3) excluding the witness’ testimony. Id. at

363. “The remedy of exclusion is so severe that it is generally

employed only when there has been a showing that a party or a

party’s counsel caused the violation.” Id.

Here, the district court, after reviewing the available

options and the nature of the violation in this case, chose the

second remedy of issuing a jury instruction. In so doing, it

did not abuse its discretion. There is no suggestion in this

case that the Government caused the violation of the

sequestration order. In addition to giving a limiting

instruction, the district court also permitted Patterson and

15
Isbell to extensively cross-examine witnesses about the

sequestration order violation as well as other occasions where

the witnesses were housed together and able to communicate with

one another prior to trial. The jury thus considered – and

rejected – the Defendants’ contention that the witnesses’

testimony was unreliable or incredible due to opportunities

where the witnesses communicated with one another. Accordingly,

we conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in

deciding to issue a limiting instruction rather than excluding

the witnesses’ testimony.

D.

Isbell challenges the district court’s denial of his

pretrial motion to suppress evidence seized during an October

2000 search of his residence. Specifically, Isbell asserts that

the basis for the warrant – an affidavit signed by Caldwell

County Sheriff’s Department Detective J.K. Coleman – did not

allege facts sufficient to support a probable cause finding.

Accordingly, Isbell contends that the subsequent search violated

his Fourth Amendment rights, and required suppression of all

evidence obtained during the search.

The Fourth Amendment guarantees “the right of the people to

be secure in their . . . houses . . . against unreasonable

searches and seizures.” The Supreme Court adopted the

16
prophylactic exclusionary rule to deter future police conduct

that violates the Fourth Amendment. As such, evidence obtained

in violation of the Fourth Amendment – e.g., based on a search

warrant that is not supported by probable cause – cannot be used

in a criminal proceeding against the victim of the illegal

search and seizure. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338,

347 (1974). 5

This Court reviews the legal conclusions underpinning a

denial of a motion to suppress de novo and we review the

district court’s factual findings for clear error. United

States v. Richardson, 607 F.3d 357, 369 (4th Cir. 2010). An

appellate court’s duty is “to ensure that the magistrate had a

substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed.”

Id. (quotation marks omitted). “When reviewing the probable

cause supporting a warrant, a reviewing court must consider only

the information presented to the magistrate who issued the

warrant.” United States v. Wilhelm, 80 F.3d 116, 118 (4th Cir.

1996) (citing United States v. Blackwood, 913 F.2d 139, 142 (4th

Cir. 1990)). But the Court reviews that evidence in the light

5
In United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), the Supreme
Court established a good-faith exception to this rule, which
permits, under certain circumstances, the use of evidence
obtained through a subsequently-invalidated search warrant. In
this case, we decline to exercise our discretion to proceed
directly to considering whether the Leon exception applies. See
United States v. DeQuasie, 373 F.3d 509, 520 (4th Cir. 2004).

17
most favorable to the Government. United States v. Matthews,

591 F.3d 230, 234 (4th Cir. 2009).

Whether probable cause exists is a case-by-case inquiry

that depends on the totality of the circumstances. United

States v. DeQuasie, 373 F.3d 509, 518 (4th Cir. 2004). The

judge reviewing the application for a search warrant must

“simply . . . make a practical, common-sense decision whether,

given all the circumstances set forth . . . there is a fair

probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found

in a particular place.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238

(1983); see also Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696

(1996). Thus, the known facts and circumstances of a case at

the time a warrant is sought will not – and need not – be an

airtight case against the defendant. Instead, the concern is

whether a reasonable person would conclude the “fair

probability” that such evidence exists. See Gates, 462 U.S. at

238.

Here, the magistrate judge based the probable cause

determination on an affidavit provided by Detective Coleman.

That affidavit provides the following information: Within 96

hours of the affidavit being signed, Detective Coleman had

spoken with a “confidential and reliable source of information”

(“CI”) who had on at least four prior occasions provided

information that resulted in the seizure of controlled

18
substances and arrests of suspects. (J.A. 182.) The CI told

Coleman that Isbell sold “quantities of alleged crack cocaine”

to the CI “in the past.” (J.A. 182.) Based on this

information, Detective Coleman arranged for the CI to make a

controlled purchase of crack cocaine from Isbell at his

residence on Prospect Street. The CI was equipped with wireless

transmitters that were monitored but not recorded; in addition,

prior to the purchase, the CI and her vehicle were searched for

contraband. Law enforcement officers monitored – both visually

and via the CI’s wire – the transaction where the CI purchased

“a quantity of off-white rock-like substance,” which Isbell

represented to be crack cocaine. (J.A. 183.) After making the

purchase, the CI traveled directly to an arranged spot and

delivered the substance to law enforcement officers. In

addition, the affidavit stated that Coleman’s investigation of

Isbell revealed that in October 1999, two anonymous telephone

callers reported that Isbell was selling drugs from his parents’

home. Based on the totality of these facts, as well as his

experience and education, 6 Detective Coleman believed there was

6
Detective Coleman averred that he had received over 1,000
hours of law enforcement training, had completed over 90
semester hours towards a bachelor’s degree majoring in criminal
justice, and had been involved in numerous narcotics
investigations. He further stated that he had worked closely
with agencies at every level of government concerning drug
trafficking in North Carolina and was familiar with distribution
(Continued)
19
probable cause to authorize a search for controlled substances

at Isbell’s residence on Prospect Street.

Isbell characterizes the affidavit as “bare bones,” failing

to provide sufficient detail of timely events occurring at

Isbell’s Prospect Street residence to support a probable cause

determination. Much of Isbell’s argument focuses on the

inadequacy of specific components of the affidavit and ignores

the Supreme Court’s directive that a probable cause

determination is made based on the “totality of the

circumstances.” See Gates, 462 U.S. at 238-39 (adopting a

“totality of the circumstances” test in evaluating probable

cause rather than requiring independent scrutiny of each piece

of evidence cited in an affidavit). Thus, information that may

not be independently sufficient can, when combined with other

factors, support the court’s overall analysis.

Isbell also contends the CI’s statements about past

purchases of narcotics from Isbell were insufficiently detailed

or reliable to form the basis of probable cause. This argument,

too, lacks merit. “[P]robable cause may be founded upon hearsay

and information received from informants.” DeQuasie, 373 F.3d

at 518. As a general principle, it is not necessary for all

methods of drug trafficking within the state, and specifically
within Caldwell County.

20
tips to be corroborated in order to be considered credible, and

whether corroboration is necessary in a given case depends on

the particular circumstances of that case. Id. at 518-19.

Here, the CI was not an anonymous source, but someone known to

Detective Coleman who had previously provided reliable

information that assisted in arrests on four prior occasions.

Nor were the CI’s statements simply generalized comments casting

suspicion on Isbell; they were comments admitting to

participating in the alleged illegal conduct – the CI claimed to

have personally purchased cocaine from Isbell. 7 “The Supreme

Court has repeatedly recognized that a proven, reliable

informant is entitled to far more credence than an unknown,

anonymous tipster.” See United States v. Bynum, 293 F.3d 192,

197 (4th Cir. 2002).

Detective Coleman’s affidavit also contained detailed

information about the CI’s controlled purchase of cocaine from

Isbell at his Prospect Street resident within 96 hours of

signing the affidavit. The controlled purchase not only

7
These circumstances sharply distinguish this case from the
“bare bones” affidavit in United States v. Wilhelm, 80 F.3d 116,
121 (4th Cir. 1996), which the Court concluded could not support
a probable cause finding. The affidavit in Wilhelm was based on
a single telephone call from an anonymous “concerned citizen”
who the affiant swore, without any basis for doing so, was “a
mature person with personal connections with the suspects and
[who] has projected a truthfull [sic] demeanor . . . .” Id. at
117-18, 121.

21
corroborated the CI’s statements regarding her past purchases,

but also provided independent grounds on which to base the

finding of probable cause. See United States v. Clyburn, 24

F.3d 613, 618 (4th Cir. 1994) (holding the controlled purchase

of crack cocaine at the suspect’s residence verified an

informant’s reliability as to prior purchases and also

constituted probable cause for issuance of a search warrant).

Relying on United States v. Wagner, 989 F.2d 69 (2d Cir.

1993), Isbell asserts that the controlled purchase was too

remote in time from the issuance of the warrant to support a

finding of probable cause. This Court has repeatedly said “the

vitality of probable cause cannot be quantified by simply

counting the number of days between the occurrence of the facts

supplied and the issuance of the affidavit.” United States v.

Farmer, 370 F.3d 435, 439 (4th Cir. 2004) (quotation omitted).

“Rather, [the Court] must look to all the facts and

circumstances of the case, including the nature of the unlawful

activity alleged, the length of the activity, and the nature of

the property to be seized.” Id. (quotation omitted).

Furthermore, the period of 96 hours at issue here is a much

shorter time frame than the six weeks that lapsed between the

drug purchase and acquisition of a search warrant in Wagner.

Cf. Wagner, 989 F.2d at 74-75.

22
 For these reasons, the totality of the circumstances set

forth in Detective Coleman’s affidavit supports the magistrate

judge’s finding of probable cause to issue the search warrant of

Isbell’s residence. The district court thus did not err in

denying Isbell’s motion to suppress the evidence uncovered

during the subsequent search.

E.

Lastly, Patterson challenges two components of the

procedural reasonableness of his sentence: whether the district

court erred in applying a two-level offense level enhancement

for possession of a firearm and whether the district court erred

in failing to adequately articulate the basis for its sentence. 8

1.

Over Patterson’s objection, the district court applied a

two-level enhancement to his offense level pursuant to U.S.S.G.

§ 2D1.1(b)(1). This section requires the district court to

increase a defendant’s offense level two levels “[i]f a

dangerous weapon (including a firearm) was possessed” during a

drug offense. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1). The evidence adduced at

8
As noted above, Isbell does not raise any issues on appeal
related to his sentence.

23
trial shows that at least three witnesses testified that

Patterson possessed a firearm as part of the conspiracy to

distribute drugs. Carlos Gibbs, a co-conspirator, testified

that Patterson had a firearm in his vehicle during drug

transactions. Former Lenoir Police Department Officer Michael

Rawls testified that Patterson was carrying a firearm during a

1998 traffic stop during which narcotics were seized from

Patterson’s vehicle. 9 And Samuel Davis, another co-conspirator,

testified that he gave Patterson a gun in 1995 because Patterson

“was in some trouble, [and] needed one” for protection during a

conflict Patterson had with some other drug dealers. (J.A.

1584-85.)

Based on this evidence, the district court did not clearly

err in applying the enhancement to Patterson’s offense level

calculation. United States v. Layton, 564 F.3d 330, 334 (4th

Cir. 2009) (stating that an appellate court reviews the district

court’s legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings for

clear error); United States v. Harvey, 532 F.3d 326, 336-37 (4th

Cir. 2008) (stating that a court will reverse for clear error

9
Although Rawls mistakenly misidentified Isbell, rather
than Patterson, as the individual involved in the 1998 traffic
stop, Patterson did not object to this misidentification.
Moreover, Rawls’ testimony and the accompanying paperwork
surrounding the arrest clearly identified Patterson as the
individual in possession of both a firearm and narcotics.

24
only if it is “left with the definite and firm conviction that a

mistake has been committed”) (internal quotation marks omitted).

2.

After calculating Patterson’s advisory Guidelines range and

hearing the parties’ arguments as to an appropriate sentence,

the district court stated: “Pursuant to the Sentencing Reform

Act of 1984, U.S. against Booker, and [18 U.S.C. § 3553(a),]

[Patterson] will be committed to custody for a period of 324

months. That being the low end of the guidelines.” (J.A.

2430.) Patterson contends that this explanation fails to

adequately explain the basis for the sentence imposed, based on

this Court’s precedent. The Government, noting that Patterson’s

sentencing hearing took place prior to this Court’s decisions in

United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325 (4th Cir. 2009), and

United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572 (4th Cir. 2010), concedes

that the court’s explanation was inadequate and that the

sentence should be vacated and the matter remanded for

resentencing.

We agree. Although Patterson’s sentence was at the low end

of the Guidelines range, the district court failed to provide

any explanation in support of the sentence it ultimately

imposed. As such, it did not allow for meaningful adequate

review of the sentence, as set out in Carter. 564 F.3d at 328

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(“When rendering a sentence, the district court must make an

individualized assessment based on the facts presented [and]

state in open court the particular reasons supporting its chosen

sentence.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).

We cannot say that this error was harmless. Lynn, 592 F.3d at

585 (finding reversible error where the district court’s brief

comments did not show that it had “considered the defendant’s

nonfrivolous arguments prior to sentencing him” and the

Government could not show that the district court’s “explicit

consideration of those arguments would not have affected the

sentence imposed” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

Accordingly, we vacate Patterson’s sentence and remand for

resentencing.

III.

For the aforementioned reasons, we affirm the district

court’s judgments of conviction as to both Patterson and Isbell.

However, we vacate Patterson’s sentence and remand for

resentencing.

AFFIRMED IN PART;
VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART

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