CLD-075 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 10-3650
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ROBERT R. OLESON,
Appellant
v.
BUREAU OF PRISONS; MR. SPALDING; MS. BROWN;
MR. THOMPSON; MR. DONAHUE; MR. SILVER;
MR. HEFFRON; MR. SCARBOUROUGH (phonetic);
MR. ESPANOZA (phonetic); MR. CASTILLO
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civil No. 09-cv-05706)
District Judge: Honorable Noel L. Hillman
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Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
December 22, 2010
Before: RENDELL, FUENTES and SMITH, Circuit Judges.
(Opinion filed: January 6, 2011)
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OPINION OF THE COURT
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PER CURIAM
Robert Oleson, a prisoner at the Federal Correctional Institute at Fort Dix, appeals
from an order of the District Court dismissing sua sponte this pro se civil rights action for
failure to exhaust administrative remedies. For the reasons that follow, we will vacate the
order of the District Court and remand for further proceedings.
On November 9, 2009, Oleson filed a complaint pursuant to Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). He
named several prison officials as defendants and alleged that they (1) refused to replace
his wheelchair, (2) refused to relocate him to a unit with a first-floor meeting room, (3)
removed items from his cell, (4) required him to wait outside in the rain for his turn to
enter the dining building, and (5) deleted visitors from his visitor log. The District Court
sua sponte dismissed the complaint for failure to exhaust. Oleson filed a motion for
reconsideration, attaching documents that he thought demonstrated that he had exhausted
his remedies. The District Court granted the motion, but again dismissed the complaint
for failure to exhaust. The defendants were never served. Oleson appealed. 1
“[E]xhaustion is mandatory under the [Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C.
1997e et seq.] and [. . .] unexhausted claims cannot be brought in court.” Jones v. Bock,
549 U.S. 199, 919-19 (2007). However, as we made clear in Ray v. Kertes, 285 F.3d
287, 295 (3d Cir. 2002), “failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense to be pleaded by the
defendant.” In some limited circumstances, it may be appropriate for the District Court
to sua sponte dismiss a complaint for failure to exhaust, such as when the plaintiff
1
We have jurisdiction to hear this appeal. 42 U.S.C. § 1291. Our review of a
district court’s dismissal for failure to exhaust is plenary. Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218,
226 (3d Cir. 2004). Summary action is warranted if an appeal presents no substantial
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expressly concedes that he or she has failed to exhaust a claim. See Id. at 293 n.5.
Oleson made no such concession. To the contrary, he claims to have exhausted his
administrative remedies. Nor is Oleson’s failure to exhaust “apparent from the face of
the complaint” or his other filings. Id. at 297. It may be—a question we do not reach—
that the documents Oleson submitted to the District Court do not prove that he exhausted
available remedies; however, as in Ray, see Id., they do not prove that he did not exhaust,
either. To dismiss on this basis improperly places the burden on Oleson, instead of on the
defendants.
Accordingly, we will summarily vacate the District Court and remand for further
proceedings. Appellant’s motion for a court order directing prison staff to provide him
with new wheelchair castors is denied.
question. LAR 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.
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