FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
January 7, 2011
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
KATRINA ANDREWS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 10-1006
(D.C. No. 1:08-CV-01467-CMA-CBS)
CENTRAL PARKING SYSTEM, (D. Colo.)
INC., a Tennessee corporation;
RICHARD LOCHER; PAMELA
OSBORN,
Defendants-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before TYMKOVICH, BALDOCK, and HOLMES, Circuit Judges.
After defendant Central Parking System, Inc. (CPS) terminated her
employment as a supervisor at its facility at the Broadmoor Hotel, Katrina
Andrews sued CPS and her supervisors, charging violations of Title VII of the
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and
collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent
with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17; of 42 U.S.C. § 1981;
and of state tort and contract law. The district court granted summary judgment
to the defendants on all of her claims. We affirm.
In a thorough and well-reasoned opinion and order, the district court
determined that the defendants were entitled to judgment (1) on Ms. Andrews’
claim for a hostile work environment, because she failed to demonstrate that the
discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult she allegedly endured was
sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of her employment and to
create a hostile work environment; (2) on her discrimination claim based on
unequal pay, because she had presented no evidence of direct discrimination and
because she failed to make out a prima facie case of wage discrimination by
showing she was paid less than similarly-situated non-African-American
employees; (3) on her discrimination claim based on termination of her
employment, because she failed to show that she was terminated under
circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination; (4) on her retaliation
claim, because she failed to show that the defendants’ legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reasons for firing her were pretextual; (5) on her Colorado
state law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, because she failed
to show that defendants’ conduct was outrageous; and (6) on her contractually-
based claims, because she failed to show that she was not paid according to her
contract with CPS or that CPS was unjustly enriched at her expense.
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We review the district court’s entry of summary judgment de novo,
applying the same standard as the district court. Oldenkamp v. United Am. Ins.
Co., 619 F.3d 1243, 1246 (10th Cir. 2010). Summary judgment is appropriate “if
the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2). On appeal,
[w]e examine the record to determine whether any genuine issue of
material fact was in dispute; if not, we determine whether the
substantive law was applied correctly, and in so doing we examine
the factual record and reasonable inferences therefrom in the light
most favorable to the party opposing the motion.
McKnight v. Kimberly Clark Corp., 149 F.3d 1125, 1128 (10th Cir. 1998)
(brackets and quotations omitted).
Having carefully reviewed the briefs, the record, and the applicable law in
light of the above standards, we AFFIRM the district court’s entry of summary
judgment in favor of the defendants, for substantially the reasons stated in
its Opinion and Order Granting Motion for Summary Judgment, dated
December 11, 2009.
Entered for the Court
Timothy M. Tymkovich
Circuit Judge
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