FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION JAN 07 2011
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
DANIEL ALLEN BLUNT, No. 09-15628
Petitioner - Appellant, D.C. No. 1:06-cv-00463-IEG
v.
MEMORANDUM *
JAMES A. YATES, Warden;
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE
OF CALIFORNIA,
Respondents - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Irma E. Gonzalez, Chief Judge, Presiding
Submitted December 14, 2010 **
Before: GOODWIN, WALLACE, and THOMAS, Circuit Judges.
California state prisoner Daniel Allen Blunt appeals pro se from the district
court’s judgment denying his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2253, and we affirm.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Blunt contends that there is insufficient evidence to support the jury’s
verdicts convicting him of burglary and murder. The California court’s conclusion
that there was sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable trier of fact to find Blunt
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt was not contrary to, or an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Supreme Court law, and was not an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d); see also Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979).
Blunt also contends that he received ineffective assistance because his
counsel failed to object to the admission of a witness’ pretrial statement on the
basis that it was involuntarily coerced. The California court’s conclusion that
Blunt did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel because such a challenge to
the witness’ statement would have been fruitless was not contrary to, or an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court law, and was not
an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d); see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984).
Blunt further contends that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by
introducing false evidence. However, it was not misconduct for the prosecutor to
introduce the witness’ prior inconsistent statement because it was unclear which of
the witness’ versions of the events was true and therefore the prosecutor did not
2 09-15628
knowingly use false evidence. See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 678
(1985).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Blunt’s request for
an evidentiary hearing. See Perez v. Rosario, 459 F.3d 943, 953 (9th Cir. 2006).
AFFIRMED.
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