FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
January 10, 2011
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
MARY PATRICIA HYNOSKI,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 10-2181
(D.C. No. 6:09-CV-00812-MV-KBM)
JOHN HARMSTON; LEA (D. N.M.)
REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER;
JUDGE JAMES HALL; JUDGE
MICHAEL VIGIL; HONORABLE
EDWARD L. CHAVEZ; JUSTICE
PATRICIO M SERNA; JUSTICE
PETRA JIMENEZ MAES; JUSTICE
RICHARD C. BOSSON; JUSTICE
CHARLES W. DANIELS,
Defendants-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before KELLY and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges, and BRORBY, Senior
Circuit Judge.
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is
not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value
consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Plaintiff Mary Patricia Hynoski, appearing pro se, appeals the dismissal of
her claims arising from injuries to her wrists, medical treatment, legal advice, and
subsequent lawsuits. Although we recognize that Ms. Hynoski has faced
significant medical and financial problems, we nevertheless must affirm the
judgment of the district court.
I.
Ms. Hynoski formerly earned her living as a massage therapist in New
Mexico. Over a decade ago she injured her right wrist when she slipped and fell
at a retail food store. Defendant John Harmston, an orthopedic surgeon on staff at
the Lea Regional Medical Center, performed surgery to repair the wrist.
Ms. Hynoski filed a personal injury suit against the food store and, in 1997, a jury
found in her favor. Her attorney did not ask Dr. Harmston to testify at the trial or
argue for compensation for future medical damages.
In 2004, the right-wrist problem resurfaced and Dr. Harmston performed a
second surgery. Ms. Hynoski initially recovered from the procedure, though she
continued to experience right-wrist pain. The same year, she began complaining
about an injury to her left wrist. Dr. Harmston recommended conservative care
rather than surgery. Ms. Hynoski sent him a letter accusing him of lying and
falsifying his medical records and filed a medical-board proceeding against him in
2005. Yet in 2006 she again sought his care for her left wrist. In light of the
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circumstances, Dr. Harmston declined to continue a physician-patient
relationship.
Ms. Hynoski initiated a pro se malpractice lawsuit in state court in October
2007 against Dr. Harmston and the medical center, alleging negligence and
falsification of documents. The state trial judge granted summary judgment in
favor of defendants in February 2009, a judgment that was upheld on appeal.
Unbowed by this adverse result, Ms. Hynoski repackaged her malpractice
claims as federal constitutional and statutory violations, then filed the instant
case. In various iterations of her complaint, she named as defendants
Dr. Harmston, the medical center, the state-court judge, and all the justices of the
New Mexico Supreme Court. She also sought sanctions against non-party
attorneys.
The case was assigned to a magistrate judge who, because Ms. Hynoski
asked to proceed in forma pauperis, reviewed the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2). Discerning several flaws in the complaint, the magistrate judge
issued an order to show cause why the case should not be dismissed sua sponte.
After receiving a response to the order, the magistrate judge concluded that:
(1) The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars Ms. Hynoski’s challenge to the
state-court judgment, see Mann v. Boatright, 477 F.3d 1140, 1147
(10th Cir. 2007) (Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the “district court
cannot entertain constitutional claims attacking a state-court judgment,
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even if the state court did not pass directly on those claims, when the
constitutional attack is inextricably intertwined with the state court’s
judgment.”) (quotation marks and alterations omitted);
(2) the defendant judges were entitled to absolute immunity from suit for
performance of judicial acts, see Hunt v. Bennett, 17 F.3d 1263, 1266
(10th Cir. 1994) (“[A] state judge is absolutely immune from § 1983
liability except when the judge acts in the clear absence of all
jurisdiction.”) (quotation marks omitted); and
(3) Dr. Harmston, the medical center, and the private attorneys are not state
actors for § 1983 purposes, see Scott v. Hern, 216 F.3d 897, 906 (10th Cir.
2000) (“[A] § 1983 claim . . . based on the conduct of a private individual”
is appropriate only if that conduct “is fairly attributable to the state.”
(quotation marks omitted).
The magistrate judge therefore recommended that Ms. Hynoski’s motion to
proceed in forma pauperis be denied and the matter be dismissed.
Upon Ms. Hynoski’s objections, the district judge conducted a de novo
review and adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendations. Accordingly, the
court dismissed the case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) for failure to state
a cognizable federal claim and as legally frivolous. The district court later denied
Ms. Hynoski’s several post-judgment motions for lack of merit and denied her
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request to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal for lack of a reasoned,
nonfrivolous argument.
II.
If a plaintiff requests in-forma-pauperis status and the district court
dismisses the case under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), we review a dismissal for
failure to state a claim de novo, Perkins v. Kan. Dep’t of Corr., 165 F.3d 803, 806
(10th Cir. 1999), and a dismissal based on frivolousness for abuse of discretion,
Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Although we liberally construe
pro-se filings, Abdulhaseeb v. Calbone, 600 F.3d 1301, 1311 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 469 (2010), “only a complaint that states a plausible claim
for relief survives” dismissal proceedings, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937,
1950 (2009). Further, a suit “is frivolous where it lacks an arguable basis either
in law or fact” or is “based on an indisputably meritless legal theory.” Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 327 (1989).
On appeal, Ms. Hynoski does not confront the legal reasons for the
dismissal of her case. Instead, she renews her claims of alleged constitutional
violations, insisting that the state court should have allowed her malpractice case
to proceed to trial so that Dr. Harmston and the medical center are held
accountable for her medical injuries and complications. She also emphasizes that
some defendants engaged in fraudulent misconduct.
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The district court’s dismissal is based on well-established principles,
applied after a careful analysis of Ms. Hynoski’s filings. In essence, the lawsuit
attempted to attack a state-court judgment, impose liability on state-court judges
entitled to absolute immunity, and bring 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against private
parties. For the reasons stated in district court proceedings, the relief
Ms. Hynoski seeks is legally unavailable.
We see no error or abuse of discretion in the district court’s disposition of
this matter and therefore AFFIRM. Further, we DENY Ms. Hynoski’s motion to
proceed in forma pauperis because her appeal has no arguable basis. See Neitzke,
490 U.S. at 325. We also DENY her motion to reconsider, amend, or alter the
judgment; and DENY her request to submit evidence not provided to the district
court.
Entered for the Court
Wade Brorby
Senior Circuit Judge
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