FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
January 11, 2011
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
DAVID WEBB,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 09-4226
(D.C. No. 2:08-CV-00842-CW)
CLAIMETRICS MANAGEMENT, (D. Utah)
LLC; EXPRESS SERVICES; DAVIS
ORTHOPEDICS & SPORTS
MEDICINE, a business entity in the
State of Utah; WORKCARE NORTH,
LLC; PERFORMANCE REHAB
CLINIC, LLC – SALT LAKE CITY,
Defendants-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before HARTZ, O’BRIEN, and HOLMES, Circuit Judges.
The district court dismissed this action with prejudice as a sanction for
David Webb’s misrepresentations concerning diversity jurisdiction. Webb now
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is
not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value
consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
claims the court abused its discretion in dismissing his case; the dismissal
prevents him from further amending his complaint; and he should have been
granted a hearing to clarify his state of citizenship. We have jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.
Webb initiated this action under various state-law theories, including
medical malpractice, defamation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
In his amended complaint, Webb claimed he was negligently treated for a
work-related injury and falsely accused of sexual harassment. He also sought
damages for alleged violations of state and federal privacy laws, 1 and claimed to
be a citizen of Hawaii for purposes of establishing diversity jurisdiction.
The magistrate recommended the case be dismissed for failure to state a
claim, and, alternatively, as a sanction for what turned out to be Webb’s
misrepresentations concerning diversity jurisdiction. The district judge adopted
the magistrate’s report and recommendation and dismissed the entire case under
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim. 2 Agreeing with the
1
Webb invoked privacy laws from Oklahoma and Utah, as well as the
Federal Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522, alleging Claimetrics refused to
help process his worker’s compensation benefits unless he consented to having
his telephone calls recorded. A magistrate judge liberally construed Webb’s
allegations “regarding the interception of communication” as raising a claim
under § 2520, which provides a civil remedy for any person whose wire, oral, or
electronic communication is intercepted in violation of the statute. R., Vol. 1 at
235. Based on this claim, the magistrate asserted federal question jurisdiction.
2
The district judge did not specify whether the dismissal was with or without
(continued...)
-2-
magistrate’s alternative recommendation as well, the district judge dismissed the
case with prejudice as a sanction for Webb’s efforts to falsely create diversity
jurisdiction. The dismissal prompted this appeal. 3
We first consider the sanction, as it is dispositive of this appeal. We
review the appropriateness of the district court’s sanction for an abuse of
discretion, which occurs when the court relies on an erroneous legal conclusion or
clearly erroneous factual finding. See Ecclesiastes 9:10-11-12, Inc. v. LMC
Holding Co., 497 F.3d 1135, 1143 (10th Cir. 2007).
The magistrate recommended dismissal as a sanction because in 2009 Webb
averred, in the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii, he had not
been a citizen of that state since February 4, 2006, when he left for Utah to care
for an elderly parent. R., Vol. 1 at 384, 387. But in order to create diversity
jurisdiction in this case, Webb alleged that in 2008 and 2009 he was a citizen of
Hawaii. Id. at 12, 231. Deeming these conflicting allegations a fraud on the
2
(...continued)
prejudice, and thus we presume the court entered dismissal with prejudice. See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b).
3
Webb broadly asserts “everything is to be considered” in this appeal
because his notice of appeal and amended notice of appeal sought review of “the
whole . . . Case.” Reply Br. at 1 (underlining omitted). We afford Webb’s pro se
materials a liberal construction, Van Deelen v. Johnson, 497 F.3d 1151, 1153 n.1
(10th Cir. 2007), but his assertion is ill-founded. “[W]e routinely have declined
to consider arguments that are not raised, or are inadequately presented, in an
appellant’s opening brief.” Bronson v. Swensen, 500 F.3d 1099, 1104 (10th Cir.
2007). Consequently, any issue Webb intended to raise but failed to properly
brief has been forfeited.
-3-
court, the magistrate applied Ehrenhaus v. Reynolds, 965 F.2d 916, 921 (10th Cir.
1992), and determined: defendants had been prejudiced; the fraudulent
allegations substantially interfered with the judicial process; Webb was highly
culpable; there was no opportunity for advance notice; and a less severe sanction
was inappropriate. 4
The district judge agreed with the magistrate’s assessment under Ehrenhaus
and later denied Webb’s motion for reconsideration. Although Webb insisted he
actually did leave Hawaii and is now a citizen of South Dakota, the district judge
rejected that explanation, reasoning that, even if true, Webb still falsely
represented in this case that he was a citizen of Hawaii. Additionally, as the
judge noted, Webb mailed his complaint from Utah and alleged his injury
occurred on the job in Utah. The judge elaborated on the fourth Ehrenhaus factor
concerning the advance notice given to Webb, and, on that score, ruled Webb
could have responded when defendants introduced the Hawaii pleadings or
4
Under Ehrenhaus, courts considering the sanction of dismissal should
evaluate:
(1) the degree of actual prejudice to the defendant; (2) the amount of
interference with the judicial process; (3) the culpability of the
litigant; (4) whether the court warned the party in advance that
dismissal of the action would be a likely sanction for noncompliance;
and (5) the efficacy of lesser sanctions.
965 F.2d at 921 (ellipsis, citations, and quotations omitted).
-4-
clarified his citizenship status in any of the four pleadings he filed after the
magistrate issued his report and recommendation.
We perceive no error in the sanction imposed. The district judge properly
analyzed Webb’s misconduct under Ehrenhaus and determined dismissal was
warranted, a decision well within the judge’s permitted discretion. Webb insists
he made no intentional misrepresentations in the District of Hawaii, but his
explanation does not rectify his false representations in this case that he was a
citizen of Hawaii. Although Webb protests the sanction as precluding him from
again amending his complaint, that was the intended consequence for his
deceptive conduct. And, while Webb contends he should have been granted a
hearing to clarify his citizenship status, no hearing was necessary because the
district judge was keenly aware of the circumstances underlying the sanction. See
Chavez v. City of Albuquerque, 402 F.3d 1039, 1044 n.2 (10th Cir. 2005).
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. Webb’s motion to
reconsider the denial of appellate counsel is DENIED, as are all other outstanding
motions and requests for relief.
Entered for the Court
Terrence L. O’Brien
Circuit Judge
-5-