UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-4429
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
RONNIE DEAN LOCKLEAR,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Florence. R. Bryan Harwell, District Judge.
(4:09-cr-00528-RBH-1)
Submitted: December 21, 2010 Decided: January 13, 2011
Before WILKINSON and KEENAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON,
Senior Circuit Judge.
Dismissed in part; affirmed in part by unpublished per curiam
opinion.
Henry M. Anderson, Jr., ANDERSON LAW FIRM, PA, Florence, South
Carolina, for Appellant. William Walter Wilkins, III, United
States Attorney, Columbia, South Carolina, Alfred William Walker
Bethea, Jr., Assistant United States Attorney, Florence, South
Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Appellant Ronnie Dean Locklear pled guilty to armed
robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1951(a) and 2 (2006), use
of a firearm in the commission of a felony in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (2006), and being a felon in possession of
a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2) and
924(e) (2006). Locklear’s written plea agreement included a
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C) stipulated
sentence of 252 months’ imprisonment. The district court
imposed the stipulated sentence. Locklear then filed this
timely appeal.
Locklear’s attorney has filed a brief in accordance
with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), questioning the
adequacy of Locklear’s Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11
hearing. Locklear received notice of his right to file a pro se
supplemental brief, but did not do so. Because we find no
meritorious grounds for appeal, we affirm.
Locklear questions whether the district court
adequately advised him during his Rule 11 hearing. Prior to
accepting a guilty plea, a district court must conduct a plea
colloquy in which it informs the defendant of, and determines
that the defendant comprehends, the nature of the charge to
which he is pleading guilty, any mandatory minimum penalty, the
maximum possible penalty he faces, and the rights he is
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relinquishing by pleading guilty. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b);
United States v. DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 116 (4th Cir. 1991).
“In reviewing the adequacy of compliance with Rule 11, this
Court should accord deference to the trial court’s decision as
to how best to conduct the mandated colloquy with the
defendant.” DeFusco, 949 F.2d at 116.
We have thoroughly reviewed the record in this case,
and conclude that the district court complied with the mandates
of Rule 11 in accepting Locklear’s guilty plea. Thus, we hold
that the record affirmatively shows there was a factual basis
for Locklear’s plea, Locklear understood the constitutional
rights he waived in pleading guilty, and Locklear’s guilty plea
was knowing and voluntary.
Next, we conclude we lack jurisdiction to review
Locklear’s sentence. The federal statute governing appellate
review of a sentence, 18 U.S.C. § 3742(c) (2006), limits the
circumstances under which a defendant may appeal a sentence to
which he stipulated in a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement to
claims that “his sentence was imposed in violation of law [or]
was imposed as a result of an incorrect application of the
sentencing guidelines [.]” United States v. Sanchez, 146 F.3d
796, 797 & n.1 (10th Cir. 1998); United States v. Littlefield,
105 F.3d 527, 527-28 (9th Cir. 1997). Here, Locklear’s sentence
was less than the applicable statutory maximum, and was the
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precise sentence he had bargained for with the Government.
Thus, review of his sentence is precluded by § 3742(c).
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record
in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal.
We therefore affirm Locklear’s conviction and dismiss his appeal
to the extent he challenges his sentence. This court requires
that counsel inform Locklear in writing of the right to petition
the Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If
Locklear requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes
that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move
in this court for leave to withdraw from representation.
Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof was served on
Locklear.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
DISMISSED IN PART;
AFFIRMED IN PART
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