REVISED - August 19, 1999
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 97-30879 & No. 98-30132
________________________
HERB FREILER; SAM SMITH, Individually and in his capacity as
Administrator of the Estate of his minor child Steven Smith; JOHN
JONES,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v.
TANGIPAHOA PARISH BOARD OF EDUCATION; E.F. BAILEY; ROBERT CAVES;
MAXINE DIXON; LEROY HART; RUTH WATSON, DONNIE WILLIAMS, SR.; ART
ZIESKE, Individually and in their capacities as members of the
School Board; TED CASON, Individually and in his capacity as
Superintendent of Schools,
Defendants-Appellants.
_________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Louisiana
_________________________________________________________________
August 13, 1999
Before KING, Chief Judge, and POLITZ and BENAVIDES, Circuit
Judges.
BENAVIDES, Circuit Judge:
Parents of children in the Tangipahoa Parish Public Schools
brought this suit to enjoin their school board from mandating
that a disclaimer be read immediately before the teaching of
evolution in all elementary and secondary classes. The district
court held that the disclaimer constituted an establishment of
religion in violation of the First Amendment. We affirm.
I.
The teaching of evolution has created controversy for many
years in the Tangipahoa Parish Public Schools (“TPPS”).
Following a failed attempt to introduce creation science into the
Tangipahoa curriculum as a legitimate scientific alternative to
evolution, the Tangipahoa Parish Board of Education (“School
Board” or “Board”) adopted a resolution disclaiming the
endorsement of evolution.1 The resolution, which passed by a 5-4
vote of the School Board on April 19, 1994, reads:
Whenever, in classes of elementary or high school, the
scientific theory of evolution is to be presented,
whether from textbook, workbook, pamphlet, other
written material, or oral presentation, the following
statement shall be quoted immediately before the unit
of study begins as a disclaimer from endorsement of
such theory.
It is hereby recognized by the Tangipahoa Board of
1
The passage of the disclaimer was not the first action by
the School Board concerning the teaching of evolution. In
December 1993, a member of the School Board proposed a Policy on
the Inclusion of Religious Material and Discussions on Religion
in the Curriculum and in Student Activities (“Policy”). That
same member later proposed a Revised Draft of Policy (“Revised
Policy”). These policies would have allowed the teaching of
alternative theories of the origin of mankind, including Creation
science. Even though it was defeated in Committee, the Revised
Policy was discussed at a March 1994 School Board meeting.
During that meeting, the Board rejected two items in the Revised
Policy concerning the study of creation science and a graduation
ceremony prayer.
The Board passed four other items included in the Revised
Policy. Those items provided that (1) no religious belief or non-
belief should be promoted or disparaged by the school system; (2)
religious materials may be included in secular education (e.g.
literature, art, humanities, etc.); (3) artistic expressions
(e.g. music, art, etc.) could have religious themes if they were
presented objectively; and (4) students could distribute
religiously oriented materials as long as students followed the
school’s rules pertaining to content-neutral time, place, and
manner restrictions.
2
Education, that the lesson to be presented, regarding
the origin of life and matter, is known as the
Scientific Theory of Evolution and should be presented
to inform students of the scientific concept and not
intended to influence or dissuade the Biblical version of
Creation or any other concept.
It is further recognized by the Board of Education that
it is the basic right and privilege of each student to
form his/her own opinion and maintain beliefs taught by
parents on this very important matter of the origin of
life and matter. Students are urged to exercise
critical thinking and gather all information possible
and closely examine each alternative toward forming an
opinion.
Preceding the adoption of the resolution, School Board
members and parents who were present at the April 19, 1994,
meeting discussed the language of the disclaimer. In particular,
debate centered on the inclusion of the phrase “Biblical version
of Creation.” A School Board member, Logan Guess, voiced
concerns that the reference to the Bible excluded non-Christian
viewpoints from the disclaimer. He argued that, even though the
disclaimer also included the phrase “or any other concept,”
School Board members were concerned only with declining to
endorse evolution because of its inconsistency with the Biblical
version of creation. Bailey, the board member who proposed the
disclaimer, justified including the phrase, arguing that because
“there are two basic concepts out there” (presumably creation
science and evolution), and because he believed that “perhaps 95
percent” of the community “fall into the category of believing
[in] divine creation,” the Board should not “shy away, or hide
away from saying that this is not to dissuade from the Biblical
version.” In his closing remarks immediately before the Board
3
voted to adopt the disclaimer, Bailey further suggested that
evolution theory as taught in science class should not be
confused with fact and that the School Board should explicitly
decline to endorse evolution theory because of its inconsistency
with the faith of the larger community.
On November 7, 1994, approximately seven months after the
resolution passed, several parents of children in the TPPS
brought suit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District
of Louisiana, challenging the validity of the disclaimer under
provisions in the United States and Louisiana constitutions
barring laws “respecting an establishment of religion.”2 U.S.
Const. amends., I, XIV; La. Const. art. I, sec. 8. The district
court concluded that the resolution was devoid of secular purpose
and therefore ran afoul of the first prong of the three-part test
of Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). In reaching
this conclusion, the district court discredited the School
Board’s assertion that its secular purpose in adopting the
disclaimer was to promote critical thinking and information
gathering by students on the subject of the origin of life. The
court noted that School Board members did not mention this
purported purpose during the adoption debate and that the
2
The First Amendment of the United States Constitution in
relevant part provides: "Congress shall make no law respecting
an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof...." This prohibition is applicable to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment. See Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S.
39, 41 n. 2, 101 S. Ct. 192, 193 n. 2 (1980); School District of
Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 215-16, 83 S. Ct. 1560,
1567-68 (1963).
4
Tangipahoa Parish Public Schools already encouraged students to
think critically about all issues before the adoption of the
disclaimer. The district court found that the statements made by
School Board members both during the adoption debate and while
testifying at trial revealed that the disclaimer, in fact, had a
religious purpose--i.e., to satisfy the religious concerns of the
majority that the teaching of evolution in public school
contradicted lessons taught in Sunday school. Accordingly, the
court held the resolution invalid under the federal and state
constitutions and enjoined the reading of the disclaimer. The
School Board and the named individual defendants then brought
this appeal.
II
The sole issue for our resolution is whether the specific
disclaimer adopted by the Tangipahoa Parish Board of Education
contravenes the First Amendment. We limit our analysis to the
precise language of the disclaimer and the context in which it
was adopted. We do not confront the broader issue of whether the
reading of any disclaimer before the teaching of evolution would
amount to an unconstitutional establishment of religion.
States and their duly authorized boards of education have
the right to prescribe the academic curricula of their public
school systems. Courts therefore must exercise great “care and
restraint” when called upon to intervene in the operation of
public schools. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104, 89 S.
Ct. 266, 270 (1968). Given, however, that the “vigilant
5
protection of constitutional freedoms” is nowhere more vital than
in American public education, id., 89 S. Ct. at 270, the right to
prescribe public school curriculum must of necessity be limited
in scope. States may not require that teaching and learning be
tailored to the principles or prohibitions of any religious sect
or dogma. See id. at 106, 89 S. Ct. at 271.
In the context of public education, we have evaluated state
action challenged on Establishment Clause grounds under each of
“three complementary (and occassionally overlapping) tests”
established by the Supreme Court. Doe v. Santa Fe Independent
School District, 168 F.3d 806, 816 (5th Cir. 1999). The first
test, and the one of longest lineage, is the disjunctive three-
part Lemon test, under which a state practice is unconstitutional
if (1) it lacks a secular purpose; (2) its primary effect either
advances or inhibits religion; or (3) it excessively entangles
government with religion. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-613, 91 S.
Ct. at 2111. The second test, commonly referred to as the
endorsement test, seeks to determine whether the government
endorses religion by means of the challenged action. See, e.g.,
County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 594, 109 S. Ct. 3086,
3101 (1989) (holding that the display of a creche on the Grand
Staircase of the Allegheny County Courthouse violated the First
Amendment but that the display of a menorah as part of a secular
exhibit was constitutional). The government unconstitutionally
endorses religion when it “conveys a message that religion is
‘favored,’ ‘preferred,’ or ‘promoted’ over other beliefs.” Id.
6
at 593, 109 S. Ct. 3086. Finally, the third test, aptly named
the coercion test, analyzes school-sponsored religious activity
in terms of the coercive effect that the activity has on
students. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 112 S. Ct.
2649 (1992) (holding unconstitutional a school district’s policy
permitting school principals to invite clergy to give
“nonsectarian” invocations and benedictions at graduation
ceremonies). Under this test, school-sponsored activity
contravenes the First Amendment when “(1) the government directs
(2) a formal religious exercise (3) in such a way as to oblige
the participation of objectors.” Jones v. Clear Creek
Independent School District, 977 F.2d 963, 970 (5th Cir. 1992)
(“Clear Creek II”) (citation omitted).
Our multi-test analysis in past cases has resulted from an
Establishment Clause jurisprudence rife with confusion and from
our own desire to be both complete and judicious in our decision-
making. See, e.g., Doe ex rel. Doe v. Beaumont Independent
School District, 173 F.3d 274, 295 (5th Cir.) (analyzing school
district’s “Clergy in Schools” volunteer counseling program
utilizing Lemon, endorsement, and coercion tests), on reh’g en
banc, ___ F.3d ___ (1999); Ingebretsen v. Jackson Public School
District, 88 F.3d 274, 280 (5th Cir. 1996) (examining state
statute permitting public school students to initiate
nonsectarian, nonproselytizing prayer at compulsory and
noncompulsory school events pursuant to the Lemon, endorsement,
and coercion tests); Clear Creek II, 977 F.2d 963, 966-969, 972
7
(employing Lemon, endorsement, and coercion analysis to uphold a
school district resolution permitting public high school seniors
to choose student volunteers to deliver nonsectarian,
nonproselytizing invocations at graduation ceremonies). Nothing
in our Circuit’s case law requires that contested government
action be examined under each Supreme Court-delineated test. Cf.
Santa Fe Independent School District, 168 F.3d at 818 (explaining
that, because student-selected, student-given, sectarian,
proselytizing invocations and benedictions violate the Lemon test
and the endorsement test, analysis under the coercion test was
not necessary); Helms v. Picard, 151 F.3d 347, 362 (5th Cir.
1998) (analyzing a school aid program in accordance with only the
Lemon test), cert. granted sub nom., Mitchell v. Helms, No. 98-
1648, 1999 WL 231469 (U.S. Jun. 14, 1999). The decision to apply
a particular Establishment Clause test rests upon the nature of
the Establishment Clause violation asserted. Where, as in the
instant action, the practice at issue does not direct student
participation in a formal religious exercise, we elect not to
apply the coercion test.
III
Although widely criticized and occasionally ignored, the
Lemon test continues to govern Establishment Clause cases. In
Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 117 S. Ct. 1310 (1997), the
Supreme Court laid to rest rumors of the Lemon test’s demise when
it exclusively applied Lemon analysis to a school aid program.
The Court acknowledged the continued viability of the general
8
Lemon principles used to evaluate whether government action
violates the Establishment Clause and noted in particular that
the nature of the inquiry under Lemon’s purpose prong has
“remained largely unchanged.” Id. at 223, 117 S. Ct. at 2010.
A.
The first prong of the Lemon test requires that challenged
state action have a secular purpose. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612,
91 S. Ct. at 2111. Lemon’s first prong does not require that
challenged state action have been enacted in furtherance of
exclusively, or even predominately, secular objectives. See
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56, 105 S. Ct. 2479, 2489 (1985)
(explaining that a statute motivated in part by a religious
purpose may satisfy Lemon’s purpose prong). In order for state
activity to pass muster under Lemon’s first criterion a sincere
secular purpose for the contested state action must exist; even
if that secular purpose is but one in a sea of religious
purposes. See id. at 56, 105 S. Ct. at 2489.
The School Board has articulated three distinct, albeit
intertwined, purposes for the contested disclaimer. According to
the Board, the disclaimer serves (1) to encourage informed
freedom of belief, (2) to disclaim any orthodoxy of belief that
could be inferred from the exclusive placement of evolution in
the curriculum, and (3) to reduce offense to the sensibilities
and sensitivities of any student or parent caused by the teaching
of evolution.
We treat the School Board’s three-fold articulation of
9
purpose with deference. See Santa Fe Independent School
District, 168 F.3d at 816. Deference, however, ought not be
confused with blind reliance. Accordingly, we examine each of
the disclaimer’s avowed purposes to ensure that the purpose is
sincere and not a sham. See id. (citing Edwards v. Aguillard,
482 U.S. 578, 586-87, 107 S. Ct. 2573, 2579 (1987)). In
undertaking such a “sham” inquiry, we consider whether the
disclaimer furthers the particular purposes articulated by the
School Board or whether the disclaimer contravenes those avowed
purposes. See Aguillard, 482 U.S. at 589, 107 S. Ct. at 2580
(finding purported purpose of protecting academic freedom to be
insincere in light of the fact that “the Act does not serve to
protect academic freedom, but has the distinctly different
purpose of discrediting evolution”). If the disclaimer furthers
just one of its proffered purposes and if that same purpose
proves to be secular, then the disclaimer survives scrutiny under
Lemon’s first prong.
We find that the contested disclaimer does not further the
first articulated objective of encouraging informed freedom of
belief or critical thinking by students. Even though the final
sentence of the disclaimer urges students “to exercise critical
thinking and gather all information possible and closely examine
each alternative toward forming an opinion," we find that the
disclaimer as a whole furthers a contrary purpose, namely the
protection and maintenance of a particular religious viewpoint.
In the first paragraph to be read to school children, the
10
Tangipahoa Board of Education declares that the “Scientific
Theory of Evolution . . . should be presented to inform students
of the scientific concept” but that such teaching is ”not
intended to influence or dissuade the Biblical version of
Creation or any other concept.” From this, school children hear
that evolution as taught in the classroom need not affect what
they already know. Such a message is contrary to an intent to
encourage critical thinking, which requires that students
approach new concepts with an open mind and a willingness to
alter and shift existing viewpoints. This conclusion is even
more inescapable when the message of the first paragraph is
coupled with the statement in the last that it is “the basic
right and privilege of each student to . . . maintain beliefs
taught by parents on [the] . . . matter of the origin of
life . . . .” We, therefore, find that the disclaimer as a whole
does not serve to encourage critical thinking and that the School
Board’s first articulated purpose is a sham.
We find that the disclaimer does further the second and
third purposes articulated by the School Board. The disclaimer
explicitly acknowledges the existence of at least one alternative
theory for the origin of life, i.e., the Biblical version of
creation. Additionally, the disclaimer reminds school children
that they can rightly maintain beliefs taught by their parents on
the subject of the origin of life. We have no doubt that the
disclaimer will further its second and third avowed objectives of
disclaiming any orthodoxy of belief that could be implied from
11
the exclusive place of evolution in the public school curriculum
and reducing student/parent offense caused by the teaching of
evolution. Accordingly, we conclude that these two purposes are
sincere.
We next consider whether disclaiming orthodoxy of belief and
reducing student/parent offense are permissible secular
objectives. In conducting this inquiry, we are mindful that a
purpose is no less secular simply because it is infused with a
religious element. Cf. Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of
the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S.
327, 335, 107 S. Ct. 2862, 2868 (1987) (explaining that the
Lemon test, requiring that the law at issue serve some secular
legislative purpose, does not require that the contested law's
purpose be unrelated to religion); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S.
668, 673, 104 S. Ct. 1355, 1359 (1984) (noting that the
Constitution "affirmatively mandates accommodation, not merely
tolerance, of all religions . . . . Anything less would require
the 'callous indifference' we have said was never intended").
For this reason, the fact that evolution, the subject about which
the School Board sought to disclaim any orthodoxy of belief, is
religiously charged, see Aguillard, 482 U.S. at 593, 107 S. Ct.
at 2582 (noting that evolution is the one scientific theory that
historically has been opposed by certain religious sects), and
the fact that the sensitivities and sensibilities to which the
School Board sought to reduce offense are religious in nature,
does not per se establish that those avowed purposes are
12
religious purposes.
In order to avoid the “callous indifference” first cautioned
against by the Supreme Court in Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306,
314, 702 S. Ct. 679, 684 (1952), we conclude that, under the
instant facts, the dual objectives of disclaiming orthodoxy of
belief and reducing student/parent offense are permissible
secular objectives that the School Board could rightly address.
Cf. Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681,
106 S. Ct. 3159, 3163 (1986) (noting that, in the context of a
civil rights action, fundamental values essential to a democratic
society include “tolerance of divergent political and religious
views” and “consideration of the sensibilities of others, and, in
the case of a school, the sensibilities of fellow students”). In
so doing, we acknowledge that local school boards need not turn a
blind eye to the concerns of students and parents troubled by the
teaching of evolution in public classrooms.
B.
Lemon’s second prong asks whether, irrespective of the
School Board’s actual purpose, “the practice under review in fact
conveys a message of endorsement or disapproval.” Doe v. Santa
Fe Independent School District, 168 F.3d 806, 817 (5th Cir.
1999). This is similar to analysis pursuant to the endorsement
test. Under either the second Lemon prong or the endorsement
test, the Supreme Court has cautioned that a government practice
may not aid one religion, aid all religions, or favor one
religion over another. See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU,
13
492 U.S. 573, 605, 109 S. Ct. 3086, 3107 (1989) (“Whatever else
the Establishment Clause may mean (and we have held it to mean no
official preference even for religion over nonreligion), it
certainly means at the very least that government may not
demonstrate a preference for one particular sect or creed
(including a preference for Christianity over other religions).”
(citation omitted)). Nonetheless, where the benefit to religion
or to a church is no more than indirect, remote, or incidental,
the Supreme Court has advised that “no realistic danger [exists]
that the community would think that the [contested government
practice] was endorsing religion or any particular creed.”
Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District, 508
U.S. 384, 395, 113 S. Ct. 2141, 2148 (1993).
Against this jurisprudential backdrop, the School Board
argues that the contested disclaimer’s primary effect is “to
communicate to students that they are free to form their own
opinions or maintain beliefs taught by parents concerning the
origin of life and matter.” According to the School Board, the
disclaimer advances freedom of thought, as well as sensitivity
to, and tolerance for, diverse beliefs in a pluralistic society.
We disagree.
In assessing the primary effect of the contested disclaimer,
we focus on the message conveyed by the disclaimer to the
students who are its intended audience. See County of Allegheny,
492 U.S. at 620, 109 S. Ct. at 3115. After careful consideration
of the oral arguments, the briefs, the record on appeal, and the
14
language of the disclaimer, we conclude that the primary effect
of the disclaimer is to protect and maintain a particular
religious viewpoint, namely belief in the Biblical version of
creation. In reaching this conclusion, we rely on the interplay
of three factors: (1) the juxtaposition of the disavowal of
endorsement of evolution with an urging that students contemplate
alternative theories of the origin of life; (2) the reminder that
students have the right to maintain beliefs taught by their
parents regarding the origin of life; and (3) the “Biblical
version of Creation” as the only alternative theory explicitly
referenced in the disclaimer.
We note that the term “disclaimer,” as used by the School
Board to describe the passage to be read to students before
lessons on evolution, is not wholly accurate. Beyond merely
“disclaiming” endorsement of evolution, the two paragraph passage
urges students to take action--to “exercise critical thinking and
gather all information possible and closely examine each
alternative” to evolution.3 The disclaimer, taken as a whole,
encourages students to read and meditate upon religion in general
and the “Biblical version of Creation” in particular.4
3
In passing on the constitutionality of the contested
disclaimer, we consider the disclaimer as a whole. Accordingly,
we do not express an opinion as to whether the first paragraph
standing alone impermissibly advances religion.
4
The School Board asserts that the reference to the
“Biblical version of Creation” is merely illustrative, affording
meaning to the phrase “other concepts.” The School Board’s use
of a religious concept as the only illustration of an “other
concept[],” however, supports our conclusion that the disclaimer
impermissibly advances religion. Cf. Ingebretsen v. Jackson
15
Although it is not per se unconstitutional to introduce
religion or religious concepts during school hours, there is a
fundamental difference between introducing religion and religious
concepts in “an appropriate study of history, civilization,
ethics, comparative religion, or the like” and the reading of the
School Board-mandated disclaimer now before us. Stone v. Graham,
449 U.S. 39, 42, 101 S. Ct. 192, 194 (1980). The TPPS
disclaimer5 does not encourage students to think about religion
in order to provide context for a political controversy studied
in a history class, see, e.g., Aguillard, 482 U.S. at 607 n.8,
107 S. Ct. at 2590 n.8 (Powell, J., concurring) (“For example,
the political controversies in Northern Ireland, the Middle East,
and India cannot be understood properly without reference to the
underlying religious beliefs and the conflicts they tend to
generate.”), or to promote understanding of different religions,
see, e.g., School District of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203,
Public School District, 88 F.3d 274, 279 (5th Cir. 1996)
(explaining that a government measure advances religion when it
“gives a preferential, exceptional benefit to religion [or a
particular form of religion] that it does not extend to anything
else”). We also note that the record does not comport with the
School Board’s characterization of its reason for including
“Biblical version of Creation” in the disclaimer. When the
School Board debated the propriety of the proposed disclaimer, a
member suggested deleting the reference to the Biblical version
of creation. The Board ultimately rejected that suggestion,
apparently not because doing so might confuse students who needed
an illustrative reference, but because doing so would, in the
words of the disclaimer’s sponsor, “gut . . . the basic message
of the [disclaimer].”
5
Despite our conclusion that the statement to be read
student does more than “disclaim” evolution, we will continue to
refer to the entire statement as a disclaimer for purposes of
convenience.
16
225, 83 S. Ct. 1560, 1573 (1963) (“[I]t might well be said that
one’s education is not complete without a study of comparative
religion or the history of religion and its relationship to the
advancement of civilization.”). Instead, the disclaimer--
including the directive to “exercise critical thinking” in the
second paragraph, together with the explicit reference to the
“Biblical version of Creation” in the first paragraph--urges
students to think about religious theories of “the origin of life
and matter” as an alternative to evolution, the State-mandated
curriculum.
The School Board cites two cases, Lamb’s Chapel v. Center
Moriches Union Free School District, 508 U.S. 384, 113 S. Ct.
2141 (1993), and Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 102 S. Ct. 269
(1981), in defense of its position that any benefit to religion
conferred by the disclaimer is merely incidental and that, as
such, the disclaimer does not impermissibly advance religion.
These cases, in which the Supreme Court found that government
action did not violate the Establishment Clause, are
distinguishable.
In Widmar, members of a registered religious group at a
state university brought an action challenging a university
policy which excluded religious groups from being able to utilize
university facilities that were generally available for
activities of registered student groups. See Widmar, 454 U.S. at
266, 102 S. Ct. at 273. The Court found that the challenged
policy violated the First Amendment. See id. at 277, 102 S. Ct.
17
at 278. In reaching this conclusion, the Widmar Court explained
that a “religious organization’s enjoyment of merely ‘incidental’
benefits does not violate the prohibition against the ‘primary
advancement’ of religion.” See id. at 273, 102 S. Ct. at 276.
The Court relied on two factors. See id. at 274, 102 S. Ct. at
276. First, the Court found that, in allowing a registered
student religious organization to use an otherwise open forum, a
public university “does not confer any imprimatur of state
approval on religious sects or practices.” Id., 102 S. Ct. at
276. Second, the court found that use of the university
facilities is available to a broad class of speakers, including
nonreligious speakers. See id., 102 S. Ct. at 277.
Unlike in Widmar, the particular benefit to religion at
issue here is not merely incidental. A teacher’s reading of a
disclaimer that not only disavows endorsement of educational
materials but also juxtaposes that disavowal with an urging to
contemplate alternative religious concepts implies School Board
approval of religious principles. Moreover, unlike the public
forum at issue in Widmar, the disclaimer crafted by the School
Board serves only to promote a religious alternative to
evolution. We know this because the only alternative theory
explicitly referenced in the text of the disclaimer is a
religious one. Therefore, Widmar does not support the Board’s
argument.
The School Board’s reliance on Lamb’s Chapel is misplaced as
well. In that case, the Court held that using a public school
18
after school hours for the showing of religiously oriented films
did not violate the Establishment Clause. See Lamb’s Chapel, 508
U.S. at 395, 113 S. Ct. at 2148. The Court found that “this film
series would not have been during school hours, would not have
been sponsored by the school, and would have been open to the
public, not just to church members.” Id., 113 S. Ct. at 2148.
The Court concluded that, under these circumstances, there was no
realistic danger that the community would think that the school
district was endorsing religion.
There are few, if any, parallels between the instant case
and Lamb’s Chapel. Here, the disclaimer approved by the School
Board is to be read during school hours by school teachers and
explicitly encourages students to consider religious alternatives
to evolution, a part of the state-mandated curriculum. Unlike in
Lamb’s Chapel, there is a much greater danger of students and
parents perceiving that the School Board endorses religion,
specifically those creeds that teach the Biblical version of
creation.
The benefit to religion conferred by the reading of the
Tangipahoa disclaimer is more than indirect, remote, or
incidental. As such, we conclude that the disclaimer
impermissibly advances religion, thereby violating the second
prong of the Lemon test as well as the endorsement test.
IV
The School Board additionally disputes the district court’s
award of attorneys’ fees to Appellee Freiler. We review a
19
district court’s award of attorneys’ fees for abuse of
discretion, and its factual findings relating to the award of
attorneys’ fees for clear error. See Watkins v. Fordice, 7 F.3d
453, 457 (5th Cir. 1993). Where a decision awarding attorneys’
fees is adequately supported by the record and the district court
has explained its reasons for the award, there is no abuse of
discretion. See Strong v. Bellsouth Telecommunications, Inc.,
137 F.3d 844, 851 (5th Cir. 1998).
The district court found that Freiler was a prevailing party
and awarded Freiler attorneys’ fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
The court used the lodestar method of determining the appropriate
award, first multiplying an hourly rate by hours expended, and
then adjusting the award according to the factors outlined in
Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, 488 F.2d 714 (1974).
The district court found that Freiler’s counsel kept
contemporaneous time records, and that they were therefore not
reconstructed. The court found that the records contained
sufficient detail to determine the time expended in pursuing
Freiler’s claim. The district court also reduced the number of
hours that Freiler’s counsel billed by ten percent to reflect
“possible redundancy and work which in hindsight may have been
unnecessary.” Lastly, the district court applied an hourly rate
of $150,6 based explicitly on application of the Johnson factors.
6
Freiler’s counsel had petitioned the court to award fees
based on an hourly rate of $175 an hour. The court agreed that
the $175 rate was “arguably” reasonable, but decided that a $150
rate was more appropriate based on Johnson.
20
The court multiplied the $150 rate by the adjusted billable
hours, and awarded $49,444.50 to Freiler’s counsel.
We affirm the district court’s award of attorneys’ fees.
First, the billing records are sufficiently detailed under our
analysis in League of United Latin American Citizens #4554 v.
Roscoe Independent School District, 119 F.3d 1228, 1233 (5th Cir.
1997). In that case, we found that billing records were adequate
where the records showed the date, the number of hours spent, and
a “short but thorough description of the services rendered.” Id.
Second, even if Freiler’s counsel failed to contemporaneously
produce billing records, as the School Board argued, such a
failure “does not preclude an award of fees per se, as long as
the evidence produced is adequate to determine reasonable hours.”
Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. Kellstrom, 50 F.3d 319, 325 (5th
Cir. 1995). Third, the district court did not commit clear error
in finding the $150 rate to be reasonable, given the declarations
that it reviewed from three New Orleans attorneys regarding
prevailing rates. Fourth, the district court did not commit
clear error when, instead of addressing the necessity and
potential redundancy of each billed hour, it reduced the overall
number of hours by ten percent. Indeed, Louisiana Power & Light
Co. v. Kellstrom, 50 F.3d 319, 325 (5th Cir. 1995), the only case
cited by the School Board in support of its argument that a
district court must analyze each billing item, is
distinguishable. In Kellstrom, the issue was whether the billing
records were sufficiently detailed, not whether the district
21
court judge had discretion to reduce the amount of hours billed
by a percentage. See id. at 325.
VI.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s
ruling that the disclaimer violates the First Amendment and the
district court’s award of attorneys’ fees to Appellee Freiler.
AFFIRMED.
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