UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-4443
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JOHN ROBERT MYERS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Florence. R. Bryan Harwell, District Judge.
(4:08-cr-01072-RBH-6)
Submitted: December 21, 2010 Decided: January 14, 2011
Before DUNCAN, DAVIS, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Russell W. Mace, III, THE MACE FIRM, Myrtle Beach, South
Carolina, for Appellant. Arthur Bradley Parham, Rose Mary
Sheppard Parham, Assistant United States Attorneys, Florence,
South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Appellant John Robert Myers pled guilty to one count
of conspiracy to distribute fifty or more grams of cocaine base
and five kilograms or more of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(a)(1),(b)(1)(A) (2006). The district court sentenced
Myers to 120 months’ imprisonment. Myers timely appealed.
Myers’ attorney has filed a brief in accordance with
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), questioning the
adequacy of Myers’ Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11
hearing; whether Myers’ knowingly and voluntarily waived his
appellate rights; and whether Amendment 706 to the United States
Sentencing Guidelines applies to this case. Myers received
notice of his right to file a pro se supplemental brief, but did
not do so. Because we find no meritorious grounds for appeal,
we affirm.
First, Myers questions whether the district court
adequately advised him during his Rule 11 hearing, and,
relatedly, whether his waiver of his appellate rights was
knowing and voluntary. Prior to accepting a guilty plea, a
district court must conduct a plea colloquy in which it informs
the defendant of, and determines that the defendant comprehends,
the nature of the charge to which he is pleading guilty, any
mandatory minimum penalty, the maximum possible penalty he
faces, and the rights he is relinquishing by pleading guilty.
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Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b); United States v. DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114,
116 (4th Cir. 1991). “In reviewing the adequacy of compliance
with Rule 11, this Court should accord deference to the trial
court’s decision as to how best to conduct the mandated colloquy
with the defendant.” DeFusco, 949 F.2d at 116.
We have thoroughly reviewed the record in this case,
and conclude that the district court complied with the mandates
of Rule 11 in accepting Myers’ guilty plea. Thus, we hold that
the record affirmatively shows there was a factual basis for
Myers’ plea, Myers understood the constitutional rights he
waived in pleading guilty, and Myers’ guilty plea — including
his appellate waiver — was knowing and voluntary.
Next, Myers questions whether Amendment 706 to the
United States Sentencing Guidelines, which provided for a two-
level downward adjustment to “‘the base offense level assigned
to each threshold quantity of crack listed in the Drug Quantity
Table in section 2D1.1,’” should have resulted in a reduced base
offense level in this case. United States v. Brewer, 520 F.3d
367, 373 (4th Cir. 2008). The record affirmatively shows Myers
already received the benefit of Amendment 706, as his base
offense level was calculated pursuant to the 2008 edition of the
Sentencing Guidelines, and Amendment 706 became effective
November 1, 2007. Brewer, 520 F.3d at 373 (citing United States
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Sentencing Comm’n, Report to Congress: Cocaine and Federal
Sentencing Policy (May 2007)).
Finally, we conclude Myers’ sentence was reasonable.
This court reviews a district court’s sentence for
reasonableness under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall v.
United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007); see also United States v.
Pauley, 511 F.3d 468, 473-74 (4th Cir. 2007). When sentencing a
defendant, a district court must: (1) properly calculate the
Guidelines range; (2) determine whether a sentence within that
range serves the factors set out in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006);
(3) implement mandatory statutory limitations; and (4) explain
its reasons for selecting a sentence. Pauley, 511 F.3d at 473.
In the Fourth Circuit, “[a] sentence within the proper
Sentencing Guidelines range is presumptively reasonable.”
United States v. Allen, 491 F.3d 178, 193 (4th Cir. 2007); see
also Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 347-56 (2007)
(upholding presumption of reasonableness for a within-Guidelines
sentence).
Here, the district court followed the necessary
procedural steps in sentencing Myers, properly calculating the
Guidelines sentence, considering the § 3553(a) factors, and
sentencing Myers to the mandatory minimum sentence for his
crime. Hence, we determine that the sentence imposed by the
district court was reasonable.
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In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record
in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal.
We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. This court
requires that counsel inform Myers, in writing, of the right to
petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further
review. If Myers requests that a petition be filed, but counsel
believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel
may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on Myers.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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