Case: 10-11121 Document: 00511352241 Page: 1 Date Filed: 01/14/2011
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
January 14, 2011
No. 10-11121
Summary Calendar Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee
v.
MATTHEW NORMAN SIMPSON,
Defendant-Appellant
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
USDC No. 3:09-CR-249-6
Before DAVIS, SMITH, and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Matthew Norman Simpson appeals the district court’s denial of his motion
to reopen his detention hearing under 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f) and its determination
that he was not entitled to automatic review of his detention under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3164(c).
Review of questions of statutory interpretation is de novo. United States
v. Kay, 359 F.3d 738, 742 (5th Cir. 2004). This court reviews a district court’s
ruling on a motion to reopen a detention hearing under § 3142(f) for an abuse of
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR . R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR .
R. 47.5.4.
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No. 10-11121
discretion. United States v. Hare, 873 F.2d 798 (5th Cir. 1989). A detainee is
entitled to reopen his detention hearing only if he presents new and material
evidence bearing on the issue whether there are conditions of release that will
reasonably assure his appearance at trial. See id. at 799.
Simpson contends that he has presented new and material evidence: the
length of his detention, the results of a polygraph examination showing that he
has no intent to flee, the conditions of his confinement, and the large amount of
discovery in his case. Simpson has failed to establish that this information is
new and material; therefore, he has not shown that the district court abused its
discretion in denying his motion to reopen under § 3142(f). See id. at 798-99.
Simpson also contends that he is entitled to automatic review of his
detention under § 3164, which pertains to persons detained pending trial and
which provides, in part, as follows:
(b) The trial of any person described in subsection (a)(1) [a detained
person who is being held in detention solely because he is awaiting
trial] . . . of this section shall commence not later than ninety days
following the beginning of such continuous detention . . . . The
periods of delay enumerated in [18 U.S.C.] section 3161(h) are
excluded in computing the time limitation specified in this section.
(c) Failure to commence trial of a detainee as specified in subsection
(b), through no fault of the accused or his counsel . . . shall result in
the automatic review by the court of the conditions of release. No
detainee, as defined in subsection (a), shall be held in custody
pending trial after the expiration of such ninety-day period required
for the commencement of his trial.
In this regard, the district court relied on language contained in § 3164(b)
that states that the periods of delay enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h) are
excluded in computing the time limitations specified in § 3164. The district
court determined that, because it granted an “ends-of-justice” continuance under
§ 3161(h)(7)(A) due to the complexity of the case, the delay was excluded from
the 90-day time limitation prescribed by § 3164(b). The district court concluded
that, because fewer than 90 days had elapsed between Simpson’s arrest and its
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No. 10-11121
order designating the case as complex, § 3164(c) did not require Simpson’s
release or the review of his detention.
This court agrees with the district court that the “ends-of-justice”
continuance, which is properly excludable under § 3161(h)(7)(A), resulted in
Simpson not being entitled to automatic review of his pretrial detention under
§ 3164(c). See § 3164(b); see also § 3161(h)(7)(A). This conclusion is consistent
with the holding in two Ninth Circuit opinions. See United States v. Avila, Nos.
90-30221, 90-30385, 90-30386, 90-30401, 1992 WL 75236, *13 (9th Cir. Apr. 16,
1992) (unpublished) (determining that because the district court granted an
"‘ends-of-justice'" continuance, which was excludable under § 3161(h)(8), the
court's failure to conduct an automatic review of appellants' pretrial detention
did not violate § 3164(c)); see also United States v. Dutkel, No. 88-5465, 1990 WL
127618, *2 (9th Cir. Sept. 6, 1990) (unpublished) (determining that because the
district court granted an "‘ends-of-justice'" continuance, § 3164(c)'s automatic
review provision did not apply).
AFFIRMED.
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