FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
LIYSA NORTHON; WAYLAND DEWITT;
JON “TOR” DEWITT, No. 07-35319
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
D.C. No.
v.
ANN RULE, an individual; FREE CV-06-00851-MO
District of Oregon,
PRESS, a division of Simon & Portland
Schuster, Inc.; SIMON & SCHUSTER,
INC., a Delaware corporation, ORDER
Defendants-Appellees.
Filed January 18, 2011
Before: A. Wallace Tashima, Richard A. Paez, and
Richard R. Clifton, Circuit Judges.
ORDER
In a true-crime book entitled Heart Full of Lies, author Ann
Rule described in detail the killing by Liysa Northon of her
husband, Christopher Northon. Liysa Northon, together with
other members of her family, filed suit in an Oregon court
against Rule and her publisher for defamation and false light
invasion of privacy. Having already pled guilty to a charge of
first degree manslaughter in an Oregon court, Liysa Northon
did not dispute that she killed her husband, but she nonethe-
less contended that the book contained multiple misrepresen-
tations. Defendants removed the defamation action to federal
district court and thereafter moved to dismiss Plaintiffs’
claims under Oregon’s anti-Strategic Lawsuit Against Public
Participation (“anti-SLAPP”) law, Or. Rev. Stat. § 31.150, et
seq. “Anti-SLAPP statutes are designed to allow the early dis-
817
818 NORTHON v. RULE
missal of meritless lawsuits aimed at chilling expression
through costly, time-consuming litigation.” Gardner v. Mar-
tino, 563 F.3d 981, 986 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Verizon Del.,
Inc. v. Covad Commc’ns. Co., 377 F.3d 1081, 1090 (9th Cir.
2004)). The district court granted the Defendants’ special
motion to strike the Plaintiffs’ claims and dismissed the case
without prejudice.1 In a memorandum disposition, a screening
panel of our court affirmed that dismissal by the district court.
Defendants subsequently filed a motion for attorneys’ fees
in connection with the appeal, citing Or. Rev. Stat.
§ 31.152(3), which provides that a defendant who prevails on
an anti-SLAPP motion to strike shall be awarded reasonable
attorneys’ fees and costs. Determining that the fee motion
raised a potentially open question of law as to whether a fee
award pursuant to a state anti-SLAPP law is governed by state
or federal law, the original panel vacated both its initial order
on the fee application and its previous decision regarding the
underlying dismissal by the district court. The matter was
reassigned to this panel to permit more detailed consideration.
In a memorandum disposition filed simultaneously with this
order, we again affirm the dismissal by the district court under
the Oregon anti-SLAPP statute.
1
Or. Rev. Stat. § 31.150(1) allows defendants to bring a special motion
to strike a claim which is treated as a motion to dismiss without prejudice.
The defendant has the initial burden of showing that the challenged state-
ment is within one of the categories of civil actions described in the stat-
ute, including any claim in a civil action that arises out of “(c) Any oral
statement made, or written statement or other document presented, in a
place open to the public or a public forum in connection with an issue of
public interest; or (d) Any other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of
the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of free speech
in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest.” Or. Rev.
Stat. § 31.150(2). If the defendant meets the initial burden, “the burden
shifts to the plaintiff in the action to establish that there is a probability
that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim by presenting substantial evi-
dence to support a prima facie case. If the plaintiff meets this burden, the
court shall deny the motion.” Or. Rev. Stat. § 31.150(3). See Gardner, 563
F. 3d at 986; Englert v. MacDonell, 551 F.3d 1099, 1101-02 (9th Cir.
2009).
NORTHON v. RULE 819
As for the Defendants’ motion for attorneys’ fees on
appeal, we hold that Oregon state law governs the award of
attorneys’ fees on appeal in this case. State laws awarding
attorneys’ fees are generally considered to be substantive laws
under the Erie doctrine and apply to actions pending in fed-
eral district court when the fee award is “connected to the
substance of the case.” Price v. Seydel, 961 F.2d 1470, 1475
(9th Cir. 1992). In United States ex. rel. Newsham v. Lock-
heed Missiles & Space Co., Inc., 190 F.3d 963, 972-73 (9th
Cir. 1999), we held that a special motion to strike and the
attorneys’ fee provision in California’s anti-SLAPP statute,
which allows a prevailing defendant on a motion to strike to
recover attorneys’ fees and costs, protect substantive rights
and apply in federal court. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code
§ 425.16(c)(1).
Although it is different in certain respects, Oregon’s anti-
SLAPP statute was modeled after California’s. See Englert v.
MacDonell, 551 F.3d 1099, 1101-02 (9th Cir. 2009). The anti-
SLAPP laws guard public participation in discussion of mat-
ters of public concern. See Lockheed, 190 F.3d at 972; Or.
Rev. Stat. § 31.150(2)(d) (“free speech in connection with a
public issue or issue of public interest”); Cal. Civ. Proc. Code
§ 425.16(a) (“freedom of speech” and “continued participa-
tion in matters of public significance”). The entitlement to
fees and costs enhances the anti-SLAPP law’s protection of
the state’s “important, substantive” interests. See Lockheed,
190 F.3d at 973.
Plaintiffs have not objected to the hours or rates requested
by Defendants’ counsel. Because we find the fee request to be
reasonable, we grant Defendants’ motion for an award against
Plaintiffs for fees on appeal under Or. Rev. Stat. § 31.152(3)
in the requested amount of $21,253.53.
MOTION GRANTED.