[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS
U.S.
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
JAN 20, 2011
No. 10-12947 JOHN LEY
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 1:92-cr-00679-FAM-6
USA,
lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
HORACE EDWARD LOCKHART,
a.k.a. Clint,
lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
________________________
(January 20, 2011)
Before HULL, WILSON and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Horace Edward Lockhart appeals the district court’s denial of his motion for
relief from judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). Lockhart
contends the district court erred in determining that it lacked jurisdiction, and he
recounts the three issues raised in his motion: that the indictment was defective,
that the indictment was impermissibly amended, and that the jury was improperly
instructed on the issue of lesser included offenses.
We review jurisdictional questions de novo. Williams v. Chatman, 510 F.3d
1290, 1293 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam). Where, in a purported Rule 60(b)
motion, a defendant challenges the validity of his conviction by seeking to add a
new ground for relief or attacking the previous resolution of a claim on the merits,
the motion is properly construed as a successive habeas petition. Id. at 1293–94
(quoting Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 532, 125 S. Ct. 2641, 2648 (2005)).
Absent an order from this Court authorizing consideration of a successive habeas
petition, the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction as to that petition. Id. at
1295; see also Farris v. United States, 333 F.3d 1211, 1216 (11th Cir. 2003) (per
curiam) (the district court lacks jurisdiction to consider a second or successive
§ 2255 petition without our prior authorization, even if the petition is labeled a
Rule 60(b) motion).
Because Lockhart’s Rule 60(b) motion asserts three bases for relief from the
state court’s judgment of conviction, and because it does not allege any error in his
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earlier § 2255 proceedings, the motion is properly construed as a successive
habeas petition. See Williams, 510 F.3d at 1293–94. Lockhart did not obtain
authorization from this Court that would give the district court jurisdiction to
consider a successive habeas petition; therefore, the district court properly denied
Lockhart’s Rule 60(b) motion for lack of jurisdiction.
AFFIRMED.
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